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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ON THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW 
by 
Craig Lang 
Florida International University, 2017 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Tatiana Kostadinova, Major Professor 
Little is known about the effects of transitional justice on the development of the rule of 
law in post-conflict states. There are assumptions in the literature that the prosecution of 
those responsible for human rights violations or convening a truth commission will help 
improve the rule of law. Using a mixed-method approach, which combined statistical 
analysis with in-country fieldwork, this investigation found that the impact of transitional 
justice, particularly trials, on the development of the rule of law is minimal and not 
automatic. In each of the four states examined, Colombia, Peru, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo, meaningful effects from transitional justice were blocked by powerful post-
conflict inhibiters, including a lack of state capacity, ethnicity and corruption. These 
findings indicate that prior assumptions about the relationship between transitional justice 
and the rule of law are overstated, and they point to the need for policymakers to 
simultaneously address these and other inhibiters while implementing transitional 
mechanisms. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
 
Introduction 
 If one were to analyze together Colombia, Peru, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
and Kosovo, it is unlikely that this group would be put forward as a model for the rule of 
law. Colombia has wrestled with guerilla insurgencies, right-wing paramilitaries and 
criminal organizations for 53 years, Peru is one of the leading producers of cocaine and 
both BiH and Kosovo are two of the more corrupt countries in Europe.1 Yet combined, 
these four countries possess more than 60 years of experience with varying mechanisms 
of transitional justice, which is generally understood as an array of processes, both 
judicial and non-judicial, used by governments to address previous human rights abuses 
and political violence. Moreover, the transitional justice literature is replete with 
testaments by scholars and practitioners that transitional justice, particularly trials, aids in 
the development of the rule of law. (Sikkink 2011, 155, Weiffen 2012, 10 and Stromseth 
2006, 254) 
Although some of the processes are still ongoing in the aforementioned states, it 
has been anywhere from 11 to 23 years since transitional justice began in these countries. 
Consequently, it is fair to ask after so much time, effort and money, did transitional 
justice make a difference, namely did the use of transitional justice in these four post-
conflict states help or deter in the development of the rule of law? That is the central 
question of this study, and a very important one considering that Colombia is beginning 
                                                          
1 Transparency International ranks BiH 38 and Kosovo 33 out of 100 (very clean) on their 2015 Corruption 
Perceptions Index, which can be found at https://www.transparency.org/country/. 
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another wave of transitional justice as part of the 2016 peace accord between the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government. 
Furthermore, the government of Kosovo agreed in 2015 with the international community 
to establish the Specialist Chambers, which is a Kosovo-only international war crimes 
tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which adjudicated cases from both BiH and Kosovo, is 
nearing its 25-year anniversary in 2018.  
 In light of these ongoing transitional justice processes, the plans to introduce new 
mechanisms, and the widespread use of this type of justice globally, answers are urgently 
needed about the effects of such things as trials and truth commissions in post-conflict 
states. Scholars have recently begun the arduous task of examining several important 
questions related to the implementation and effects of transitional justice, but gaps 
remain, particularly when it comes to understanding the relationship between transitional 
justice and the rule of law. Based upon a mix of qualitative and quantitative research, this 
study finds that the ability of transitional justice to deliver improvements in the rule of 
law is not automatic. Although there were some minor improvements to the rule of law 
that can be traced back to transitional justice in three of these four states, more 
meaningful reform was blocked by powerful post-conflict inhibiters, such as a lack of 
state capacity, insufficient resources, ethnic polarization and endemic corruption. Yet, 
before digging into these and other findings, the rest of Chapter One is dedicated to 
situating this study within the literature, as well as outlining this study’s research design.   
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What is transitional justice?  
Initially emerging as a distinct area of scholarship following the democratic 
transitions that were part of the Third Wave of Democracy, transitional justice during 
these early years consisted primarily of a new democratic government’s attempt to 
address the human rights violations of the prior regime through trials, truth-telling, 
reparations and government purges. 2 (Arthur 2009, 326, 329) Although initially part of 
democratic transitology, the boundaries of transitional justice are expanding, and its 
mechanisms are now being increasingly utilized in post-conflict environments, which do 
not necessarily involve changes in the type of government. For example, between 1970 to 
2005, transitional justice, aka, post-conflict justice, was used in 94 cases of civil war.3 
(Reiter, Olsen and Payne 2013, 158) Moreover, a review of the work of the International 
Center for Transitional Justice shows this non-governmental organization currently active 
in 32 countries across five continents, many of which involve transitions from war to 
peace.4 Consequently, transitional justice has reached a routine, steady state, and it has 
now become “obligatory” in many transitional contexts. (Teitel 2003, 89 and Subotic 
2009, 5, 22)   
Yet, despite its expanded application, the central mechanisms remain largely the 
same. Binningsbo, et al., catalog trials, truth commissions, reparations, amnesties, 
government purges (lustration) and exiles as the go-to tools in the post-conflict toolkit. 
                                                          
2 The Third Wave of Democracy is the period during the 1970s-early1990s where democratic transitions 
occurred worldwide. This period is best explained in Samuel Huntington’s 1991 book, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.   
 
3 Scholars, such as Binningsbo, et al., use the term “post-conflict justice” to refer to transitional justice used 
in post-conflict states. For this study, both terms will be used interchangeably.  
 
4 https://www.ictj.org/our-work (Accessed August 26, 2016) 
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(2012, 733) Capturing the ability of transitional justice to serve both transitions to 
democracy and peace, Olsen, Payne and Reiter (2010) define transitional justice as, 
“…the array of processes designed to address past human rights violations following 
periods of political turmoil, state repression, or armed conflict.” (11) Offering a slightly 
different take, Serrano explains transitional justice as, “…the activation of 
complementary judicial, quasi-judicial and non-judicial mechanisms aimed at addressing 
past human rights violations while embarking on a major political transformation.” 
(Serrano in Popovski & Serrano 2012, 467) Regardless of which definition one chooses, 
it is clear that transitional justice, whether as part of a democratic transition or 
peacebuilding program, has been recognized as a policy that entails a set of shared 
mechanisms and purposes, namely to facilitate a political change and address political 
violence. (Arthur 2009, 355 and Leebaw 2008, 106)  
Yet, while there is clarity about what is transitional justice, the field is only 
beginning to understand its effects. As structured, transitional justice has both short and 
long-term goals. In the short-term, utilizing truth commissions and other mechanisms 
should promote stability and peace; whereas in the long-term, scholars and practitioners 
express more aspirational goals, such as consolidating democracy and building the rule of 
law. (Leebaw 2008, 101) As outlined earlier, this study is primarily concerned with 
analyzing one anticipated long-term effect, transitional justice’s ability to aid in the 
development of the rule of law.  
Assessing What We Know  
Following their comprehensive examination of the transitional justice literature, 
Thoms, Ron and Paris note, “Our principal finding is that reliable empirical knowledge 
5 
 
on the state-level impacts of transitional justice is still limited.” (2010, 331) They go on 
to explain that the lack of empirical research is due to the largely qualitative, single-case 
studies done by transitional scholars. Echoing this refrain, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 
(2010, 134) add that many of the prior studies were not only single case studies, but they 
also only evaluated one mechanism. Explaining that both practitioners and policymakers 
have “overloaded expectations” of transitional justice, the aforementioned authors 
lament, “The proliferation of mechanisms and these divergent interpretations of their 
success notwithstanding, we know very little about whether transitional justice actually 
achieves the lofty goals it promises.” (Ibid, 134) Subsequently, what became abundantly 
clear as the field developed was the need for a range of studies to test the causal claims 
previous scholars had outlined, as well as assess the effectiveness of the various tools of 
transitional justice. Fortunately, scholars like Olsen and others have recently begun to 
address this empirical shortfall. Consequently, the literature now embodies a more 
empirical flavor. A new generation of transitional justice scholars is claiming that the 
field, at least methodologically, has entered a new wave, one which seeks to more 
accurately measure the impact of transitional justice vis-à-vis its effects on concepts like 
human security, which includes the rule of law. (Balasco 2013, 205-08)  
 In light of its roots in democratic transitions and later peacebuilding, many of the 
earlier single case studies and more recent large-N projects examined the relationship 
between transitional justice and democracy or transitional justice and the promotion of 
peace. For example, although they only examined trials, truth commissions and 
amnesties, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) find that if transitional justice is to promote 
democracy and human rights, a holistic approach is required. Labeling this approach the 
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“justice balance,” the authors find that trials with amnesties or trials, truth commissions 
and amnesties work together to improve democracy and human rights. They argue that 
these blends of mechanisms are effective because they balance accountability with 
restorative elements.  
Utilizing much of the quantitative data that led to their earlier findings, these same 
scholars, in a separate study, narrowed the range of cases to only those that experienced 
civil war or an internal conflict from 1970 to 2005. Based upon this range of cases, 
transitional justice is not a necessary condition for maintaining peace; peace was 
sustained in the majority of countries with or without the use of transitional justice. 
(Reiter, Olsen, and Payne 2013, 165) Looking specifically at Latin America, a 2015 study 
by Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm identify trials, particularly if held within five years of 
the democratic transition, as the closest of all the mechanisms as being a necessary 
condition for democratic consolidation. Yet, this study also points out that any 
mechanism on its own is not sufficient for solidifying democracy; in line with Olsen, et 
al.’s argument for a justice balance, this study also supports pairing amnesties with trials 
in order to help with democratic consolidation. In addition to providing valuable insights 
into the link between transitional justice and democracy, this Latin American analysis 
also notes that the timing and sequencing of mechanisms are not important for ensuring 
an enduring democratic state. (336-340)  
 While rightly recognized as advancing the field of transitional justice, the 
aforementioned studies do not address the relationship between transitional justice and 
the rule of law. For example, while Reiter et al., found that transitional justice has no 
effect on sustaining peace, the question remains whether the use of transitional justice 
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impacts other post-conflict goals, such as solidifying the rule of law. Olsen, Payne, and 
Reiter (2010, 161) acknowledge this shortcoming stating, “Perceptions of justice, 
fairness, or rule of law may provide a more valuable measure of success than 
improvements in democracy and human rights indicators…” While scholars have been 
slow to assess the relationship between the rule of law and transitional justice, 
policymakers and practitioners have been operating under the assumption of a positive 
relationship for quite some time.  
In a 2004 report on transitional justice and the rule of law, former United Nations 
(UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan recognized this link, claiming that the two UN ad 
hoc tribunals created for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were established, in part, to 
re-establish the rule of law in these two regions. (7, 13) In fact, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia publicly claims that one of its achievements has been 
strengthening the rule of law in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. On its website, 
the ICTY contends, “The Tribunal works in partnership with domestic courts in the 
region - transferring its evidence, knowledge and jurisprudence - as part of its continuing 
efforts to strengthen the rule of law and to bring justice to victims in the former 
Yugoslavia.”5  In other parts of the world, similar claims are made about other 
transitional mechanisms. For example, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, along with the hybrid courts in Cambodia, both believed that their work 
strengthened the rule of law in their respective countries. (Gibson, Sonis and Hean 2010, 
378-79)       
                                                          
5 http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/achievements (Accessed August 27, 2016) 
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 Helping build a theoretical framework for such a relationship, Stromseth, 
Wippman and Brooks (2006, chap. 7) foresee a connection between transitional justice 
and the rule of law when accountability proceedings, such as trials, have a sufficient 
demonstration effect and build local capacity. The demonstration effect is powerful 
because it signals to society that impunity will no longer be tolerated. Conversely, if trials 
are conducted in a manner that demonstrates bias or lack of transparency, transitional 
justice can have a negative effect. And, consistent with the aforementioned findings on 
the need for a justice balance, these authors echo their support of this idea by noting that 
trials may not be enough to promote the rule of law. A more holistic approach, such as 
that utilized in transitional justice proceedings in places like East Timor and Sierra Leone 
may be more successful. A more comprehensive use of mechanisms may be needed 
because these other programs, such as truths commissions and reparations, directly 
impact more people and build greater local support.    
 Building upon the theoretical framework erected by Stromseth, et al., a series of 
more recent empirical studies attempt to uncover if such a relationship exists between 
transitional justice and the rule of law. Based upon an examination of law and order 
scores, Sikkink (2011, 156) claims that the development of the rule of law in several 
Latin American states went hand-in-hand with the use of human rights trials. Of the 14 
countries that used human rights trials in Latin America following their democratic 
transitions, Sikkink finds that 10 of them had improved law and order scores. To that end, 
she notes, “…human rights trials and the construction of the rule of law can be two 
simultaneous and mutually reinforcing processes.” (Sikkink in Popovski & Serrano 2012, 
34) Yet, while Sikkink herself acknowledges the need for more rigorous empirical 
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testing, she does not do so, citing the difficulty in defining and measuring the rule of law. 
(Sikkink 2011, 155-156) Consequently, due to the lack of more sophisticated statistical 
analysis, along with questions surrounding her sole use of the Law and Order index as a 
comprehensive measurement for the rule of law, Sikkink’s analysis has limitations.  
 In another recent analysis, Weiffen (2012) discovers a high correlation between a 
government’s use of reconciliation policies and higher rule of law scores. Additionally, 
Weiffen finds that in countries that used domestic human rights trials between 1979 and 
2004, these countries’ rule of law scores were higher than in states that did not hold trials. 
Unfortunately, here too, multivariate regression analysis was not utilized to isolate other 
factors, nor was an attempt made to identify the impact of distinct transitional justice 
mechanisms on the rule of law. Furthermore, Weiffen’s findings regarding the use of 
domestic trials fail to say anything about countries that have been subject to international 
tribunals or hybrid courts.  
 Providing one of the strongest empirical examinations of the rule of law in a post-
conflict environment, Haggard and Tiede (2014) evaluate a country’s level of the rule of 
law before, during and after an internal conflict. Utilizing descriptive and inferential 
statistics, these two find that the rule of law is largely path dependent, i.e., the rule of law 
does not generally change from pre-and post-conflict levels. According to their results, 
the only measurement of the rule of law that improves after a conflict is the level of 
executive constraints, which not surprisingly are enhanced following the cessation of 
violence. While providing an important contribution to rule of law studies, namely the 
importance of understanding path dependency, these authors did not control for a 
country’s use of transitional justice. Interestingly, in my review of their structural break 
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analysis, several countries that had strong or modest improvements in their rule of law 
scores were also countries that utilized transitional justice, namely Croatia, Peru, 
Argentina and Rwanda. And, while not discussing transitional justice directly, these 
scholars admit to limitations, primarily the inability to explain variations in rule of law 
levels. Subsequently, further research is needed employing a control for transitional 
justice to see if this may be one factor that can help explain variations in levels of the rule 
of law.  
Another seminal work that encourages caution when claiming a link between 
transitional justice, primarily trials, and the rule of law is the 2003/2004 study by Snyder 
and Vinjamuri. Following their examination of 32 civil war cases, these authors argue 
that the legalist approach, i.e., accountability proceedings are the appropriate response to 
widespread human rights abuses in all transitional contexts, may be counter-productive to 
transitional justice’s long-term goals. (14-15) Describing their findings, the two scholars 
argue, “When a country’s political institutions are weak, when forces of reform there 
have not won a decisive victory, and when potential spoilers are strong, attempts to put 
perpetrators of atrocities on trial are likely to increase the risk of violent conflict and 
further abuses, and therefore hinder the institutionalization of the rule of law.” (Ibid, 15)  
In light of the varying methodologies and conflicting findings, it is apparent that 
several questions and gaps remain, which this research attempts to fill. Primarily, the 
failure of previous studies to control for other factors limits our ability to state with any 
degree of certainty that transitional justice was responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
increases in the rule of law identified by Sikkink and Weiffen. Secondly, this project aims 
to support in the development of a theory of change for transitional justice. After 
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reviewing 273 articles, books and working papers on transitional justice, Macdonald 
laments, “…transitional justice policy lacks a clear ‘theory of change,’ that is, it has no 
clear understanding of how change works. Therefore, even if ends are identified, it is 
unclear how we get there.” (2015, 115)  
Although several of the aforementioned works make claims of correlation or 
causation, the literature thus far has not identified how a mechanism affects the rule of 
law, i.e., it provides no theory of change. For instance, while Sikkink provides a 
compelling case that human rights trials helped improve law and order in 10 countries in 
Latin America, her study fails to explain concretely how. In several of these countries, 
such as Peru and Argentina, trials were utilized alongside other transitional justice 
mechanisms. While it is logical that trials greatly influence the rule of law, it is equally 
plausible that other transitional justice mechanisms also influence this phenomenon.  
Moreover, based upon a review of the literature that discusses the why, how and 
when mechanisms of transitional justice are chosen and implemented, it is also 
conceivable that the manner of procedural selection and implementation impacts either 
positively or negatively the ability of transitional justice to help develop the rule of law. 
For instance, it is hypothesized as part of this analysis that when states participate in 
choosing and governing their own processes of transitional justice, the rule of law 
develops more rapidly than when transitional policies are imposed by the international 
community. The ability to design and implement these mechanisms is theoretically 
important to their long-term success because this involvement fosters a sense of local 
ownership and accountability.   
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Mechanism Selection and Implementation 
 While much has been written about the political factors that impact decisions 
whether to use transitional justice, particularly the importance of the distribution of 
power between incoming and outgoing elites, this study is not concerned with the 
questions of if and why.6 Instead, what needs to be understood within this context, is the 
procedure by which mechanism decisions are made and implemented, namely is it 
domestically-generated and implemented or internationally-imposed and executed. Why 
is this important?  
Fletcher, Weinstein and Rowen (2009) argue that the level of a country’s 
autonomy from the international community, along with the legacy of colonialism and 
cultural traditions, determine which mechanisms are selected. Moreover, when the 
international community intervenes within a weak state, outside forces dictate the model 
of transitional justice used. (208) Concerned with international imposition as well, Turner 
(2008) contends that the international community imposes models of transitional justice 
and international law on states in the hopes of achieving stability and democracy. (128) 
Yet, according to Turner, imposition could actually have deleterious effects because, “By 
relying on a narrow and pre-defined course of action for peace-building, however, and by 
equating peace with a particular set of political norms and beliefs, the international 
                                                          
6 For works that discuss elite competition, see Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma) and O’Donnell, 
Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University).  
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community risks restricting the options open to countries in transition, and thus 
undermining their progress towards peace and stability.” (133)  
While not arguing that outsiders completely refrain from involvement in others’ 
transitional justice processes, the international community should be facilitators and not 
the final arbiters. Only when laws are generated internally will they be perceived as 
legitimate. (Ibid, 138) In addition to the possibility that mechanisms externally imposed 
may have negative effects, transitional justice foisted upon a country may be used by 
domestic elites in ways the international community did not anticipate, and hence disrupt 
either the short or long-term goals. For example, in Southeastern Europe, Subotic argues 
that the ICTY was “hijacked” by leaders throughout the Balkans in order to remove 
political opponents, receive international aid or position their countries favorably toward 
membership in international organizations.7 (2009, 6)  
 Reinforcing the need for transitional justice to take into account domestic 
concerns and input, Lambourne (2009) contends that for transitional justice to be truly 
transformative, i.e., meet its aspirational goals, local traditions and practices need to be 
part of it. (31, 33) Writing specifically about international and hybrid courts, which 
played a role in BiH and Kosovo, Stromseth (2011) cautions that unless these bodies are 
grounded domestically and partner with domestic institutions, these courts will act as 
“spaceships,” specifically, they will arrive and depart without leaving any lasting effect. 
But, if these courts provide sufficient demonstration effects and engage in local capacity 
building, then they can have a positive impact. (172-78) In light of the importance the 
                                                          
7 How this behavior impacted BiH and Kosovo will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
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literature places on domestic involvement in choosing and implementing transitional 
justice, it is logical to ask of each of the cases how domestic selection and 
implementation or international imposition and management affect, in part, a 
mechanism’s ability to impact the rule of law. While the literature has yet to provide 
definitive, empirical answers to these questions, this study applies these assumptions to 
BiH, Kosovo, Colombia and Peru and offers analysis on the results within the respective 
country chapters.  
The Theoretical Boundaries of This Analysis 
 Theoretically, transitional justice, as understood here, will follow the accepted 
parameters of the literature, namely it is a set of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms 
employed by governments to facilitate a political change (to peace) and address the 
effects of widespread political violence. (Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010, 11; Serrano in 
Popovski & Serrano 2012, 467) For this analysis, the mechanisms evaluated are limited 
to the primary mechanisms employed in most cases, principally domestic, hybrid and 
international trials, truth-telling, reparations, amnesties and lustration.8 While defining 
the theoretical boundaries of transitional justice is relatively straight-forward, the 
dependent variable in this analysis, the level of the rule of law, is more complicated.  
 It is acknowledged that like many concepts in political science, the rule of law is a 
contested concept, and it is difficult to measure. Yet, due to the importance of the rule of 
                                                          
8 International courts are ad-hoc or permanent criminal tribunals established by the international 
community to try defendants outside of their home state. A modification of international trials can occur 
when international judges and lawyers work alongside domestic judicial officials in the country where the 
crimes occurred in courts known as hybrids, which often times use a mix of domestic and international law. 
Lastly, domestic criminal proceedings take place in the country where the crimes occurred, but differ from 
hybrid courts in that the former are staffed and adjudicated purely with domestic legal personnel.   
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law, this challenge should not be abandoned. O’Donnell (2004, 32) labeled the rule of 
law an essential pillar in a democracy because it serves to protect civil and political 
rights. Therefore, understanding whether transitional justice promotes the development of 
the rule of law, and how, are important research questions. 
 Like its sister concept, democracy, there are a range of definitions for the rule of 
law, but they operate conceptually within a continuum. At one end, there is the 
procedural/formal definition, and at the other side of the spectrum is a definition that 
accepts the procedural dimensions but adds substantive elements to it. Returning to the 
former, according to Fuller, the law should have generality, publicity, prospectivity, 
intelligibility, consistency, practicability, stability and congruence. (Waldron in Fleming 
2011, chap. 1) Describing his understanding of procedure, Fuller writes, “The term 
‘procedural’ is, however, broadly appropriate as indicating that we are concerned, not 
with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with the ways in which a system of rules for 
governing human conduct must be constructed and administered if it is to be efficacious 
and at the same time remain what it purports to be.” (Ibid, 8) Moreover, in addition to the 
equality of the law and its public nature, the procedural view has also been linked with 
the institutions, particularly the courts, required to carry-out and ensure that the law is 
general, equally applied, prospective, etc. (Bedner 2010, 68-69) 
At the other end of the spectrum, the rule of law is conceived to be a more 
maximalist/substantive concept. While accepting the procedural requirements, proponents 
of a substantive conception argue that there must also be laws that protect human rights, 
group rights and social rights. (Ibid, 63-64) Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks (2006, 70-
71) view the debate as a difference between one side’s satisfaction with a mere 
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enunciation of what are the necessary rules, structures and processes as opposed to the 
other’s insistence that the concept also entail the substance of what is to be protected. 
Aside from the academic literature, practitioners also generally understand the rule of law 
to be something within these two dimensions. For example, former UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan (2004, 4), defined his organization’s notion of the rule of law as entailing 
accountability of all before the law, insistence that all laws be public, that states have an 
independent judiciary and that domestic laws be consistent with international human 
rights. In keeping with the substantive side of the spectrum, a recent wave of scholarship 
has added to the substantive domain a change in societal behavior and attitudes. 
Reflecting this growing line of thinking, Bergman writes, “Rule of law transcends the 
competence of courts and the judicial branch. I claim it should be understood as a social 
equilibrium where the vast majority of citizens accept to be ruled most of the time by 
binding and general norms that have a high probability of compliance.” (2012, 175) This 
scholar goes on to argue that in order for the majority of citizens to be compelled to obey 
the laws, the state must have the capacity to enforce them. Subsequently, when measuring 
the rule of law, citizens’ compliance with the law should also be factored-in. (176-77)    
In light of these two domains, it is apparent that there is no one, generally-
accepted definition or measurement of the rule of law. According to Moller and Skaaning 
(2014, 26), when conducting research on the rule of law, a researcher’s question(s) 
should dictate whether a procedural or substantive conception is utilized. Unfortunately, 
due to the paucity of studies examining the relationship between the rule of law and 
transitional justice, the literature does not explicitly state how and where transitional 
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justice affects the rule of law, i.e., the procedural, substantive or both. Recognizing the 
dissonance between the two concepts one group of legal scholars opine,   
Indeed, the question of whether and how accountability proceedings can 
contribute to strengthening domestic justice systems and to building the rule of 
law in post-conflict societies is surprisingly underanalyzed. For too long, the 
practical division of the fields of ‘transitional justice’ and ‘rule of law reform’ 
into two largely separate communities of scholars and practitioners has impeded 
efforts to explore systematically how accountability processes might, concretely, 
contribute to forward–looking rule of law reforms. (Stromseth, Wippman and 
Brooks 2006, 253)  
 
In view of this separation, it is necessary to return to the transitional justice 
literature’s assumptions about this relationship. At the procedural end, scholars expect 
transitional justice, particularly trials, to help enshrine within a society the equality of all 
before the law, one of the foundational elements of the procedural approach. (Olsen, 
Payne, and Reiter 2010, 133) On the other side of the conceptual spectrum, one of the 
most common arguments linking transitional justice and the rule of law is the 
transformational power and norm-changing abilities scholars and practitioners expect 
transitional justice to exert in a new democracy or post-conflict society.  
According to one prominent transitional scholar, trials can not only act as 
deterrents, but they can also socialize new norms by publicly demonstrating what 
behavior is acceptable. (Sikkink 2011) Furthermore, “…what distinguishes transitional 
criminal measures is their attempt to instantiate and reinforce normative change.” (Teitel 
2000, 67) Consequently, it appears that the transitional justice literature has expectations 
that these processes will impact the procedural domain by at least promoting equality 
before the law, as well as the substantive, as exemplified by the Constructivists’ 
assumptions of its ability to usher-in normative changes that would be reflected in the 
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content of the law. Therefore, in determining which rule of law approach is appropriate 
for this project, it is evident that a substantive understanding will need to be utilized in 
order to assess both the procedural and norm-changing expectations within the literature.9  
Research Design 
As highlighted earlier, one of the methodological shortcomings in the transitional 
justice literature is the absence of an adequate number of cross-national comparative 
studies. (Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2010, 335) In an effort to fill this gap, this study utilizes 
a comparative approach that seeks to examine four countries across two regions. While 
large-N studies help establish trends and facilitate generalizability, the transitional justice 
literature also needs cross-national comparative work in order to help trace the impact of 
each transitional justice mechanism on the rule of law while also assessing the selection 
and implementation modalities. The aim of this methodology is to develop a mid-range 
theory about the relationship between transitional justice and the rule of law in post-
conflict states, as well as beginning to construct a theory of change.  
1. Cases 
 The four cases selected, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Colombia and Peru, 
were chosen based upon this study’s independent variable, namely the use of transitional 
justice in post-conflict environments. Choosing cross-regional cases is fraught with 
challenges, but identifying cases based upon the explanatory variable helps mitigate 
selection bias. (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 149) Furthermore, all four of these 
countries are already identified and grouped within the literature as countries utilizing 
                                                          
9 Please see Chapter Two for a full enunciation of how the rule of law is operationalized. 
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transitional justice as part of or after an internal armed conflict. (Reiter, Olsen, and Payne 
2013, 167-69) The decision was made not to include countries that transitioned from 
authoritarianism to democracy because circumstances in post-conflict cases, such as 
claims of self-determination, ethnic cleansing and internal displacements make drawing 
inferences more difficult if both types are combined. (Arthur 2009, 360)  
 While it is recognized that these four states are only a handful of the larger 
number of possible cases, these four countries were also chosen because time series data 
measuring the rule of law in each country is available, and there is sufficient variation in 
the independent variable as well. For instance, in Colombia and Peru, both of these 
countries utilized a range of transitional justice mechanisms, including trials, truth 
commissions, amnesties and reparations. Although more limited, BiH and Kosovo vary 
from Colombia and Peru in their use of transitional justice, notably in the international 
community’s establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia to serve as the primary mechanism in these Balkan countries. These two 
European cases are important not only because they allow measurement of international 
ad-hoc tribunals, but because both countries later established a range of domestic and 
hybrid courts to complement the work of the ICTY, and in the case of each, lustration 
was also used. Consequently, these four cases not only provide the much-needed cross-
regional comparison, but they cover the panoply of transitional justice mechanisms.10  
 It should also be noted that while transitional justice has largely run its course in 
Peru, the processes of transitional justice within Colombia, Kosovo and BiH are still 
                                                          
10 Due to limited resources, in-country interviews were not conducted in Peru, and consequently, Peru will 
not be discussed separately. Peru, however, will be analyzed as part of the quantitative and concluding 
analyses based on available data.    
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ongoing, although these efforts are also coming to a close. Despite these ongoing 
proceedings, and the accompanying empirical challenges this represents, the length of 
time since these countries initiated transitional justice, along with an adequate sample 
provided by each state over these many decades, allows ample data for analysis and 
conclusions to be drawn, however tentative they may be. Moreover, if scholars were to 
wait until all processes of transitional justice had run their course, the ability to theorize 
would be severely impeded since the use of transitional justice may last up to several 
decades. Furthermore, efforts to study transitional justice phenomena within functioning 
transitional justice processes is a practice accepted in the field as evidenced by the 
plethora of literature on countries such as Argentina, BiH and Colombia. Furthermore, 
possible lessons-learned from these countries’ pasts could help inform their future 
decisions.    
2. Methodology 
 While these cases afford opportunities for fruitful comparison, they also present 
methodological challenges. Neither the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) nor the 
Most Different System Design (MDSD) easily fit this empirical project. Although under 
the umbrella of post-conflict states, the differences in the role of the international 
community within the conflicts, and each country’s unique level of development made 
employing an MSSD framework particularly troublesome. In relation to the MDSD, 
variations in the explanatory and outcome variables necessitate utilizing a different 
methodological approach. Consequently, in order to be able to best answer the 
aforementioned research questions, this study employs a mixed methodological approach, 
using both quantitative and qualitative techniques.  
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 One of the benefits of using qualitative analysis is its ability to identify causal 
mechanisms. (Munck and Snyder 2007, 20) Employing the framework provided by 
George and Bennett (2005), namely case study research with process tracing, the 
qualitative component of this project will examine the country cases using the same 
structure (same questions asked of each) as well as the same focus (mid-range typology). 
Because the rule of law is likely a result of multiple factors, using process tracing will 
help mitigate equifinality, and allow the researcher to link causes with outcomes. (Ibid) 
Moreover, process tracing allows this researcher to assess the degree of domestic 
influence and control national governments and citizens exerted over their transitional 
justice choices. In order to be able to capture some of the information necessary to 
answer these questions, qualitative data was gathered from in-country fieldwork in BiH, 
Colombia and Kosovo from February to July 2016. This included approximately 60 
interviews with former and current government officials, members of civil society and 
relevant in-country scholars.  
 Moreover, in an effort to provide a similar comparative framework in each of the 
qualitative country chapters, i.e., to ask the same questions of each, qualitative 
assessments are based on five end goals of rule of law reform. According to Kleinfeld, 
the rule of law is reflected by a government subordinate to the law, equality of all before 
the law, law and order exists, justice is efficient and human rights are protected. (2006, 
36-46) Data on the performance of each country on these five domains comes from the 
researcher’s own fieldwork and interviews, as well as publicly-available sources such as 
reports from the Organization for American States, the United Nations and European 
Union.     
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This qualitative component is complemented by a quantitative section that 
includes descriptive statistics and multivariate regression analysis. Data for this latter 
section was taken from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
which provides an aggregate, substantive rule of law score for each of these countries 
based on a wide variety of expert analyses and survey measurements. This time series 
data is important because it allows measurement of the rule of law before implementation 
of any transitional justice mechanism (except in BiH and Kosovo), the level of the rule of 
law at the time of implementation and its level five and ten years after its initiation. This 
not only increased the study’s number of observations, but it is consistent with the 
measurement timelines used within the existing literature. For instance, Olsen, Payne, 
and Reiter (2010, 146) argue that it may take up to a decade after the initiation of 
transitional justice until changes in democracy and human rights are recognized. This 
assessment is shared by Haggard and Tiede (2014) who measured rule of law levels in 
post-conflict societies before, during and five to ten years after the cessation of violence. 
Equally important to the design of this study is the use of several control variables. Based 
upon the literature’s findings, which will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Two, the 
level of gross domestic product per capita, a country’s yearly percentage of Protestants 
and the total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP were included in the 
regression model. (Moller and Skaaning 2014, 149)   
Structure of the Dissertation 
 In light of the aims of this project, the dissertation is structured accordingly: 
Chapter Two explores the presence of systematic correlation between transitional justice 
and the rule of law using quantitative methodology. It discusses appropriate measures and 
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presents findings from the descriptive and regression analyses. It concludes with a 
summary of the findings, paying attention to possible trends and patterns. The next part 
of the dissertation is divided by cases; Chapter Three examines Colombia’s Justice and 
Peace Law of 2005; Chapter Four compares BiH’s and Kosovo’s experiences with 
transitional justice since 1993. These two chapters present the qualitative findings from 
the fieldwork, as well as trace the impact of various mechanisms of transitional justice on 
the rule of law, along with identifying powerful inhibiters in each country. The final 
chapter, Chapter Five, compares the findings of the four cases, including a more detailed 
analysis of Peru, discussing the overall theoretical implications and potential causal 
mechanisms. This chapter ends with a brief conclusion on remaining questions and 
possible areas of future inquiry.  
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Chapter 2 
Toward a Deeper Understanding of the Relationship  
Between Transitional Justice & the Rule of Law 
 
Introduction 
 As outlined in the previous chapter, both scholars and practitioners expect 
transitional justice, particularly trials, to aid in the development of the rule of law. In fact, 
in a handful of studies, a relationship between these two variables was found (Sikkink 
2011; Weiffen 2012), although their failure to control for other factors, inability to 
explain how this change occurred and their focus only on trials limits the explanatory 
power of these studies. Conversely, according to Haggard and Tiede (2014), the rule of 
law is largely path dependent in post-conflict states, and therefore, a change in the rule of 
law in countries like Colombia and BiH should not be expected.   
In light of these assumptions and findings, this chapter sets out to accomplish the 
following: 1) Measure the rule of law in BiH, Kosovo, Colombia and Peru during and 
after their respective periods of internal conflict to see if in fact the rule of law is path 
dependent; 2) Compare and contrast the level of the rule of law in these four states 
against other countries in their regions; 3) Determine whether the rule of law changed 
after the introduction of transitional justice in BiH, Kosovo, Colombia and Peru; 4) If the 
rule of law did change, assess where this change occurred, i.e., in the procedural or 
substantive domains; 5) Test whether there is a correlation between transitional justice 
and the rule of law while controlling for other possible factors; and 6) Identify which 
model(s) of transitional justice (domestic, mixed or international) has an effect on the rule 
of law. However, before beginning to address each of these areas, it is helpful to first 
outline how the variables in this study are measured.  
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Measuring the Rule of Law 
 Since the rule of law is a contested concept that operates on a continuum, there 
are very few data sets that measure both the procedural and substantive domains. 
Fortunately, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) provide a comprehensive, 
yearly rule of law score for BiH, Kosovo, Colombia and Peru from 1996 to 2015.11 These 
years are important because they cover the period before transitional justice was 
introduced in Peru and Colombia, and 1996 is only three years after the creation of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which operated in 
both BiH and Kosovo. Unfortunately, data measuring the rule of law before the 
introduction of transitional justice in BiH and Kosovo is not available from the WGI.12 
Overall, however, these four countries share nine sources that make-up the WGI rule of 
law score; Colombia and Peru share the same 18 sources and BiH and Kosovo share 11. 
This continuity aids in both cross-regional and within-region comparisons. The WGI 
yearly rule of law score, which ranges from -2.5 (weak rule of law) to 2.5 (strong rule of 
law), measures not only the fundamentals of the procedural and substantive domains, but 
it expands the latter to include public perceptions and measures of crime victimization.13 
According to one legal scholar, “If citizens do not follow the law intended to 
protect their fellow citizens from assaults on their lives and properties, it means that the 
                                                          
11 Measurement of the rule of law in Kosovo begins in 2003. Many of the other data sets either exclude 
Kosovo or do not begin measuring its rule of law until after it gained independence in 2008. For example, 
the World Justice Project has comprehensive indicators for the rule of law, but their data only begins in 
2011 and does not include Kosovo.  
 
12 A qualitative baseline assessment of the rule of law before the introduction of transitional justice in both 
BiH and Kosovo is presented in Chapter Four.   
 
13 For a complete list of WGI sources and indicators for the rule of law, please see Appendix A. 
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state fails to realise [sic] this function. It therefore seems correct to look at citizens’ 
obedience to the law as well when trying to measure the elements of the rule of law…” 
(Bedner 2010, 56) The inclusion of data on behavior and perception is also important 
because it helps assess a society’s acceptance of the law, which some argue is a necessary 
condition for the rule of law to take hold. For instance, Fukuyama (2010, 37) explains, 
“The normative dimension of the law-that is, people’s belief that the law is fundamentally 
just and their subsequent willingness to abide by its rules-is key to the rule of law…if the 
gap between law and lived values is too large, the rule of law itself will not take hold.” 
Consequently, the authors of the WGI explain their multi-layered indicator accordingly, 
“[the] rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence.”14  
In addition to this explanation, it is important to highlight one other aspect of the 
WGI. While this dataset provides a yearly aggregate score for the rule of law, small 
annual changes should not be overestimated. Often, minor yearly fluctuations in scores 
occur because of changes in source indicators or fall within the prior years’ margins of 
error. What the authors of the WGI claim their data does well is describe meaningful 
changes over time, such as over a decade or more.15 Subsequently, because of the 
                                                          
14 Data for the WGI comes from surveys of households, firms, non-governmental organizations, 
commercial sources and the public sector. Most country estimates are based on at least 11 sources. The 
scores reported here are the aggregate scores.  
 
15 For a complete explanation of the WGI and its methodology, please refer to their website at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. 
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comprehensive nature of the WGI, it is an appropriate measurement of the rule of law for 
this study, and it is supported by more detailed qualitative analysis in the country 
chapters.   
Moreover, various indicators within the WGI are broken down by year to help 
identify where the rule of law changed, i.e., in the procedural or substantive domains. For 
example, within this and other chapters, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) and 
Political Terror Scale (PTS) are examined more closely because they encapsulate 
indicators along the rule of law spectrum, and they are both used for each of the four 
countries in this study. Within the BTI, its rule of law metric includes three useful 
indices. The independence of the judiciary (procedural), the prosecution of corrupt public 
officials (equality of all before the law, i.e., procedural) and the protection of civil rights 
(substantive).16 Additionally, the PTS, which measures the level of political violence 
within a country, can be extrapolated to represent the substantive changes expected, 
namely improvements in government and societal behavior.   
Measuring Transitional Justice 
  Compared to the rule of law, measuring this study’s independent variable is much 
simpler and less controversial. Transitional justice, as discussed in Chapter One, is the 
utilization of mechanisms by governments transitioning to democracy or peace that seek 
to address prior political violence while solidifying a political change. Although 
transitional justice has recently expanded to include such government actions as 
memorialization of the victims and bureaucratic reforms, the core mechanisms remain 
                                                          
16 Although the BTI only begins to quantify their indices in 2006, this does not present a problem for this 
analysis since the most dramatic changes in BiH, Colombia and Kosovo were only recorded after 2005.   
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trials, truth commissions, lustration, reparations and amnesties (Arthur 2009, 326; Olsen, 
Payne, and Reiter 2010, 31), all of which were used to varying degrees in this study’s 
four countries. Using these five mechanisms as the basis of analysis, I test the hypothesis 
that the manner in which transitional justice is chosen and implemented helps determine 
its impact on the rule of law, or more specifically, when societies choose and implement 
transitional justice rather than have it wholly imposed and executed by the international 
community, the development of the rule of law is greater. To that end, this analysis 
divides transitional justice into international, mixed and domestic categories.  
 The basis of this distinction closely follows the division used by the Transitional 
Justice Database Project, which is a database started at the University of Wisconsin that 
cataloged over 900 instances of trials, truth commissions, lustration, reparations and 
amnesties used worldwide from 1970 to 2007 based on an international, hybrid and 
domestic schema.17 According to one of the authors of this project, these three models 
were defined accordingly: international transitional justice occurs when trials take place 
in an international court; hybrid involves trials in a court where there are both domestic 
and international agents; and domestic transitional justice uses trials in domestic courts, 
i.e., in a court located in the country where the crimes occurred and operated by local 
judicial officials.18  
While this outline is helpful and generally accurate, it can be misleading when 
assessing the origination and implementation of transitional justice in countries like BiH 
                                                          
17 For a complete description and access to this Project’s data, please see the Project’s website at 
http://www.tjdbproject.com/. 
 
18 This explanation was provided in an email exchange the author had with Andy Reiter, August 11, 2016.  
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and Kosovo, which both had extensive international oversight. For example, while 
lustration can be a purely domestic process, in the case of BiH, the lustration of judges 
and prosecutors was at best a mixed form of transitional justice since the international 
community, particularly the Office of the High Representative, oversaw the process. 
Consequently, this study’s categorization of transitional justice into international, mixed 
and domestic categories goes beyond the mere manner in which trials were adjudicated. 
The distinction of transitional justice based upon these three categories is assessed yearly, 
and the basis of this categorization is in accordance with the following logic.  
A country’s implementation of transitional justice is considered domestic when 
local residents and institutions inside of the country where the crimes occurred choose 
and implement all of the mechanisms used. Within this analysis, Colombia and Peru fit 
within this category since Peruvian and Colombian governments and societies selected 
and implemented the full range of transitional justice processes. This categorization does 
not, however, preclude limited international influence and financial support, although the 
degree to which these impact the selection and execution of transitional justice must not 
be the determining factors in mechanism selection and execution.  
Those processes designated as international, which involves complete design and 
implementation by the international community, occurred in BiH and Kosovo as a result 
of the international community’s imposition of the ICTY, along with the governing 
control exercised by the respective international oversight bodies within these Balkan 
states. Once domestic courts and local governments began to engage in things like trials 
and vetting, a mixed system developed in these latter two countries. A mixed system of 
transitional justice recognizes a balance between the international community’s control 
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and involvement and domestic design and operation of the various mechanisms. While 
these designations are not as neat as those used by the Database Project, changes to their 
method of categorization were necessary in order to truly capture the international 
community’s role in all facets of transitional justice.  
Data on which mechanisms each country utilized was compiled from the 
Transitional Justice Database Project and the researcher’s own fieldwork. Table 2.1 
identifies which mechanisms were or are being used in each country, and Appendix B 
presents the yearly categorization of transitional justice in each country. 19   
Table 2.1: Transitional Justice Mechanisms Used or In Use 
 Trials* Truth 
Commission/Truth-
Telling 
Lustration 
(Vetting) 
Reparations Amnesties 
BiH ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓   
Colombia ✓  ✓   ✓  ✓  
Kosovo ✓   ✓  ✓   
Peru ✓  ✓   ✓  ✓  
 *Whether a trial was international, hybrid or domestic is discussed in the country chapters.  
 
Changes in the Rule of Law: Descriptive Analysis 
Rule of Law Levels 
Before introducing transitional justice to this analysis, it is first useful to get a 
baseline and take note of any general trends in the rule of law within BiH, Kosovo, 
Colombia and Peru over the twenty years covered in this study. According to Figure 2.1 
                                                          
19 For this analysis, truth commissions are temporary bodies commissioned by a government to investigate 
previous human rights abuses. Amnesties, reparations and lustration are all government actions that either 
respectively pardon or release previously convicted individuals, provide monetary or property restitution 
from the state to the victims and remove state officials from positions of authority due to their relationship 
with the prior regime. (Olsen, Payne & Reiter 2010, 34-38)   
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(below), three of the four countries experienced positive, sustained changes to their levels 
of the rule of law during (Colombia) or shortly after the cessation of their respective civil 
conflicts (BiH and Kosovo). Conversely, Peru’s rule of law improved slightly for a few 
years following its violent and authoritarian era, but it then declined to levels lower than 
what it had during the tumultuous 1990s.  
Figure 2.1: Yearly Rule of Law Scores 1996 to 2015 
  
*Data is from the WGI.  
The changes recorded in Colombia, BiH and Kosovo appear to question the path-
dependency thesis put forward by Haggard and Tiede. For instance, despite Colombia 
still being a country with an ongoing armed conflict, albeit with significant progress 
achieved toward ending it, the rule of law improved during years of intense fighting.  
In 2000, Colombia recorded its lowest level of the rule of law in the WGI, 
registering a disappointing -0.99. Early in the twenty-first century, the level of conflict in 
this Andean state was high with paramilitaries, guerillas, drug traffickers and the state all 
engaged in hostilities with one another. Yet, by 2002-03, modest improvements began, 
and by 2006, which is the year in which the demobilization of more than 30,000 
paramilitaries concluded, the rule of law had improved by almost a half of a point. 
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Despite some minor fluctuations since 2006, Colombia’s rule of law has consistently 
improved, and by 2015, it had risen by 0.68 of a point from its 2000-year low.      
Moreover, while the WGI did not measure the rule of law before or during the 
conflicts in BiH and Kosovo, the rule of law improved following the cessation of 
violence in both countries. In BiH for example, the first comprehensive WGI 
measurement of the rule of law (1998) reflected a poor performing state as it relates to 
this element of society.20 Yet, within six years, real progress was realized, and by 2015, 
BiH had reached an appreciably better level. Additionally, Kosovo, which may be 
considered the most politically unstable in the group because of uncertainties surrounding 
its political status from 1999 to 2008, also experienced improvements following the end 
of its 1998-99 conflict, moving from a -1.06 to a -0.47 in only 12 years.21  
 Interestingly, Peru is the one country in this study that does support the path-
dependency argument.22 The current level of the rule of law in Peru is relatively close to 
where it began in 1996. Consequently, the rule of law in this Andean nation appears 
fixed, although it should be noted that it dropped noticeably from 2005-08, which was a 
time when many of its transitional justice mechanisms were being used. Although this 
study’s sample is much smaller than Haggard’s and Tiede’s examination of 47 countries, 
and therefore should not be overgeneralized, its findings are more optimistic. Principally, 
countries emerging from a period of intense internal violence can improve their rule of 
                                                          
20 Although the WGI measured the rule of law in BiH in 1996, it was based on only two sources.  
 
21 As will be discussed in Chapter Four, Kosovo’s independence in 2008 may have been a contributing 
factor for the increase in the rule of law as well as the extensive authority the international community 
exercised in this domain.   
 
22 Peru and BiH were both included in Haggard’s and Tiede’s study; Colombia and Kosovo were not.  
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law, but as the trends demonstrate, progress is slow. Furthermore, Haggard and Tiede did 
not control for transitional justice. Consequently, it could be that the rule of law is not as 
deterministic in conflict countries that do use transitional justice as opposed to those 
countries that do not. A larger study of post-conflict states controlling for transitional 
justice needs to be executed to more fully test the path-dependency thesis.  
Comparing & Contrasting 
Although these scores are meaningful in interpreting in-country changes, it is also 
helpful to compare these averages against other countries in Latin America and 
Southeastern Europe. Unfortunately, BiH, Colombia, Kosovo and Peru have been and 
remain some of the poorer performing countries in their respective regions as it relates to 
the rule of law. Therefore, improvements in their scores should be kept in context, and as 
will be discussed more thoroughly in the country chapters, perceptions and levels of the 
rule of law in BiH, Colombia, Kosovo and Peru remain low.  
Within Latin America, Colombia and Peru are regularly in the bottom third of 
nations when comparing their averages against other Latin American states. For instance, 
in 1996, according to the WGI’s worldwide percentile ranking of states and regions, with 
100% being the highest performing and 0% the lowest in terms of rule of law, the Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) region scored 50%, but Colombia only 22% and Peru 
29%. Approximately two decades later (2015), Colombia slowly caught-up, earning a 45-
percentile rank (that year the LAC region’s score was 49%) while Peru remained behind 
at 35%. To help illustrate this gap more tangibly, Table 2.2 illustrates the distance 
between LAC states generally considered to have the rule of law (Chile and Costa Rica) 
and states without it (Colombia and Peru). 
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Table 2.2: Latin American Rule of Law Comparisons 
 Chile Costa Rica Colombia Peru 
1996 1.05 0.52 -0.89 -0.65 
2005 1.27 0.51 -0.66 -0.74 
2010 1.32 0.48 -0.35 -0.61 
2015 1.33 0.48 -0.31 -0.53 
*Data is from the WGI.    
 Not surprisingly, the two war-torn nations of BiH and Kosovo also lag behind 
their regional counterparts as illustrated in Table 2.3 below. Comparing their yearly rule 
of law levels to Slovenia and Croatia, both also former members of the ex-Yugoslavia, 
BiH’s mean rule of law from 1996 to 2015 (-0.43) lags significantly behind Slovenia’s 
average of 0.98 and Croatia’s 0.04. Kosovo is even further behind with a -0.71 mean. 
Regionally, both BiH and Kosovo also find themselves well below their neighbors in the 
WGI’s Europe and Central Asia percentile rankings. For instance, in 2003, the region was 
at 61% while BiH’s percentile ranking was 29% and Kosovo’s was 16%. However, 12 
years later, improvements were noted; BiH had closed the gap registering 46% and 
Kosovo 37%, which compared to the region’s ranking of 67%. 
Table 2.3: Southeastern Europe Rule of Law Comparisons 
 Slovenia Croatia BiH Kosovo 
1996 1.05 -0.61 -0.26 N/A 
2005 0.86 0.09 -0.56 -0.99 
2010 0.98 0.17 -0.37 -0.64 
2015 0.95 0.20 -0.29 -0.47 
*Data is from the WGI.  
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The Rule of Law & Transitional Justice 
Since yearly WGI scores are available before and after the implementation of 
transitional justice in Colombia and Peru, simple mean comparisons of the rule of law 
during these two stages can help indicate if there is a relationship between transitional 
justice and the rule of law. After calculating and comparing the mean rule of law scores 
for the years before and after the introduction of transitional justice, the results of which 
are presented in Table 2.4, the rule of law showed noticeable improvement in Colombia, 
while changes in Peru were negligible. 
Table 2.4: Rule of Law Before & After Initiating Transitional Justice (comparing means) 
 Mean RoL before transitional 
justice 
Mean RoL after initiating 
transitional justice 
Colombia -0.82 -0.42 
Peru -0.67 -0.63 
*Data is from the WGI.  
In light of the fact that WGI rule of law scores are not available for BiH and 
Kosovo before the ICTY began its work in each of these two countries, it is useful to 
compare their averages based upon the type of transitional justice used. Comparing the 
means of these two countries, the average rule of law scores while international 
transitional justice was being used were significantly lower than when a mixed model 
was introduced. For example, in BiH, its rule of law average from 1996 to 2004 was  
-0.57, but after it transitioned to a mixed system in 2005, its mean rule of law score 
increased to -0.35 during the period from 2005-2015. This same trend is seen in Kosovo 
where it averaged a rule of law score of -0.94 under a purely international model of 
transitional justice, but improved to a -0.56 under a mixed one. Figure 2.2 is a visual 
representation of the changes in means from international to a mixed model of 
36 
 
transitional justice in these two Balkan countries. Moreover, according to separate 
Independent-Samples T Tests run for both BiH and Kosovo, the differences in means are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.23  
Figure 2.2: The Rule of Law with International and Mixed Models of Transitional Justice 
  BiH     Kosovo 
   
While this data is generally helpful in beginning to understand the relationship 
between these two variables, the general mean scores do not provide any degree of 
probability that these changes are due to transitional justice and not some other factor(s), 
nor do they indicate which components of the rule of law improved. For instance, does 
the use of trials, truth commissions, etc. impact the procedural domain or are the effects 
also seen in the substantive components of the rule of law? Looking at each country 
according to its development of a strong judiciary and ability to ensure the equality of all 
before the law (procedural), the BTS found improvements in Colombia, regression in 
BiH and no changes in either Kosovo or Peru, which are fully spelled-out in Table 2.5.24   
Since 2006, which is one year after the passage of the transitional justice legal 
framework for Colombia’s paramilitaries, the independence of Colombia’s judiciary 
                                                          
23 Please see Appendix C for a full reporting of the T Tests results.  
 
24 Within the BTI, each indicator is ranked on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 representing the highest 
performing institutions and protection of civil rights and 1 being the lowest.  
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began to improve, going from a five to a seven between 2006 to 2015. According to the 
BTI 2016 Codebook, this improvement represents a change from a judiciary that was 
largely impaired by political influence and corruption (5) to one that is generally 
independent of political influence (7).25 Unfortunately, in the case of BiH, its judiciary 
has become more politicized and corrupt since 2006. Initially, the BTI scored BiH’s 
judiciary a seven, but now its courts are heavily influenced by political actors and corrupt 
practices. In terms of BiH’s and Colombia’s performances in ensuring the equality of all 
before the law, Colombia improved slightly, and BiH’s position remained the same.  
Table 2.5: Changes in Procedural and Substantive Areas of the Rule of Law 
 IJ 2006 
 
IJ 2016 PA 2006 PA 2016 CR 2006 CR 2016 
BiH 7 5 6 6 6 7 
Colombia 6 7 5 6 4 6 
Kosovo       5(2010) 5 5 5 6 6 
Peru 6 6 6 6 6 6 
*IJ = Independent Judiciary; PA = Prosecution of office abuse; CR = Civil Rights 
**Data is from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
 
 
 Turning to the substantive domain, the BTI’s assessment of the protection of civil 
rights is similar to the procedural progression. Both Colombia and BiH improved in 
protecting civil rights, while Kosovo and Peru remained at the same levels. Most 
significantly, Colombia jumped from a four to a six, which represents a move from a 
country where rights were regularly violated “in practice” (4) to a state where these rights 
are now just “not properly respected” (6). As for the PTS, the general trends found in the 
                                                          
25 For a complete enunciation of the BTI scale, please consult the 2016 BTI Codebook at www.bti-
project.org/en/index/methodology. 
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BTI are mirrored in the Political Terror Scale. For example, in 1996 through 2004, 
Colombia’s level of political violence was high. The PTS gave Colombia its worst score 
(5), signifying that political violence was prevalent throughout the entire population; yet, 
after transitional justice was introduced in 2005, Colombia reduced its level of political 
violence, and by 2011, it earned a three.26 (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, Haschke and Arnon 
2016) 
In line with BiH’s improvements in the BTI, this Balkan state was also recognized 
in the PTS for reducing its political violence. During the 1992-95 conflict, political 
violence was at its worst (5), but since this period, political violence has gradually 
receded. In 2015, BiH’s political terror rating was the lowest possible (1), representing a 
state where torture is rare and the rule of law is secure. Moreover, according to the PTS, 
Kosovo has consistently had low levels of political violence since it first began 
measuring this in 2008 (a one or two), but in Peru, this form of state violence has 
fluctuated, moving back and forth between a two and three. (Ibid)   
While this more detailed analysis is only the beginning of understanding the 
changes in the rule of law within these four countries, it does indicate that transitional 
justice may have helped develop both the procedural and substantive components of the 
rule of law, at least in Colombia. As the Colombia case illustrates, improvements were 
recorded in both the procedural (independence of the judiciary) and the substantive 
(markedly improved civil rights and less political violence). Equally significant is the fact 
that within this Andean nation, these changes occurred after the introduction of a variety 
                                                          
26 A three, while not perfect, signifies there still may be political imprisonment, but political violence is less 
widespread. For a complete explanation of the PTS scale, please refer to its website at 
www.politicalterrorscale.org/.  
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of domestically-generated and implemented transitional justice mechanisms. Bosnia’s 
experience on the other hand is mixed. According to the BTI and PTS, BiH improved 
markedly in the substantive domain, yet regressed in the procedural. More specifically, 
Bosnia’s judicial independence is deteriorating after an eight-year period of international 
transitional justice and oversight. This troubling trend is discussed in more depth in 
Chapter Four.    
The ability to arrive at any generalized conclusions about Kosovo is difficult with 
the data at hand. The BTI only began measuring Kosovo during the period between 2008 
to 2010, and the PTS also only started to record Kosovo’s political violence in 2008. Yet, 
the limited BTI scores available for Kosovo do not show any changes in either the 
procedural or substantive areas of the rule of law. In fact, Kosovo’s procedural scores (5) 
indicate that despite more than a decade of international oversight and ICTY 
involvement, Kosovo’s judiciary remains heavily influenced by politics and corruption, 
and it is still unable to adequately prosecute public officials who abuse their positions of 
power. Although the BTI components remain fixed, the PTS does, however, regularly 
assign Kosovo its highest score, indicating a “secure rule of law” and the absence of 
political violence. Consequently, at this stage, we can theorize that Kosovo’s ability to 
move from a -1.06 to -0.47 is in part related to the reduction in political violence. Yet, 
this cannot be the only factor propelling these gains. Subsequently, in Chapter Four, 
additional WGI indicators are more closely examined to identify where this shift 
occurred.       
As for Peru, its fixed levels are reflective of the limited changes in its overall 
mean score. The stubbornness of the rule of law in Peru is, however, theoretically 
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challenging since this country undertook a range of domestic mechanisms to address its 
political violence. Yet, despite more than 15 years of transitional mechanisms, the rule of 
law remains relatively the same. Neither the procedural nor the substantive domains 
improved (or deteriorated) as a result of its truth commission, trials or reparations. 
Recognizing that this chapter leaves many unanswered questions, which are better 
addressed in the qualitative analysis and country chapters, this section does, however, 
provide a general sense of the directionality of the rule of law. This element of human 
security did change in all four states in one direction or another, and in three of these four 
countries, the rule of law improved after the introduction of transitional justice. 
Furthermore, in both BiH and Kosovo, the rule of law noticeably improved once 
domestic institutions assumed some of the responsibility for formulating and executing 
transitional mechanisms. Colombia’s improvement occurred under a purely domestic 
model, but Peru’s regression while under domestic forms of transitional justice is 
puzzling.27   
Although the overall analysis of the mean rule of law scores records significant 
changes, it is not clear if these changes were the result of transitional justice. For 
example, in each of these four countries, significant improvements in the country’s GDP 
per capita were also recorded, and Protestantism increased in both Colombia and Peru, 
which according to the literature should produce positive change. In order to more 
accurately identify the effect of transitional justice, a mixed-effects regression model was 
run controlling for other possible causes in improvements to the rule of law. 
                                                          
27 Peru is discussed in the final chapter.  
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Test of Correlation 
Control Variables 
 Within the rule of law literature, Moller and Skaaning (2014, 149) identified 
seven factors that the field has recognized as affecting the rule of law. Socio-economic 
development, country size, ethnic fractionalization, natural resource abundance, common 
law system, colonial heritage and dominant religion are all variables various scholars 
have utilized to describe a country’s level of the rule of law. Yet, after Moller and 
Skaaning ran regression analysis, a country’s level of socio-economic development, 
natural resources and number of Protestants were the only variables that proved 
statistically significant.   
 Moller and Skaaning (153) opine that socio-economic levels are important 
because development encourages individuals to demand the accompanying legal 
protections for the higher self-expression values that accompany socio-economic 
development. Additionally, a state’s level of natural resources matters because of its 
effect on patron-client relations, i.e., the higher the level of natural resources the lower 
the level of the rule of law, and it is expected that a large number of Protestants is 
positively correlated to the rule of law, much like the relationship theorized between 
Protestantism and democracy. (Weber [1930] 2002)  
Based upon these findings, this study controls for socio-economic development, 
as reflected in the level of GDP per capita, as well as levels of natural resources, which is 
measured by total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP. Finally, a country’s 
percentage of Protestants is taken from the yearly U.S. Department of State Religious 
Freedom Report. Data for the two previous controls comes from the annual World Bank 
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list of economic indicators. (See Appendix D for a description and list of sources for all 
variables.)   
Regression Analysis 
Data for the regression analysis is taken from the WGI’s aggregate yearly rule of 
law score from 1996 to 2015, as well as my coding of the type of transitional justice used 
in each of the four countries (Appendix B).28 Although the WGI begins allocating scores 
for the rule of law in 1996, data for some of the early years (1997, 1999 and 2001) is 
missing, resulting in an unbalanced pool. Moreover, as is common with panel, cross-
sectional time series data, a simple linear model could not be applied due to potential 
problems with heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation. Consequently, a mixed-
effects model was chosen to test the hypothesized impact of transitional justice.  
 A mixed-effects model is the most appropriate regression tool for this study since 
the data is the result of both random and fixed effects. A general linear model is not 
optimal in this study because the yearly measurements are correlated. Mixed-effects 
models are often used when measurements are taken repeatedly of the same subject, i.e., 
the same country over twenty years. Consequently, “Though the fixed effect is the 
primary interest in most studies or experiments, it is necessary to adjust for the 
covariance structure of the data. The adjustment made in procedures like GLM-
Univariate is often not appropriate because it assumes independence of the data. The 
                                                          
28 For example, the categorical variable transitional justice was coded 1 if the model was international, 2 if 
mixed and 3 for domestic. While these cases meet the post-conflict criteria and provide meaningful 
comparisons, it is acknowledged that within the regression analysis there are limitations because two of 
these countries do not vary on the model of transitional justice used (Colombia and Peru). 
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MIXED procedure solves these problems by providing the tools necessary to estimate 
fixed and random effects in one model.” (SPSS 2005, 1)  
Based upon the literature, the following model was constructed:  
Y = a + βj + bTJ + bGDP + bResources + bProtestants + βj Time + e 
Where Y is a country’s level of the rule of law, a is a general intercept of the models, βj 
represents the intercept of country j, bTJ identifies the model of transitional justice, 
bGDP represents a country’s yearly GDP per capita, bResources is a country’s total 
natural resources rents as a percentage of its yearly GDP, bProtestants represents a 
country’s yearly percentage of Protestants, βj Time is year for country j (from 1996 to 
2015 or 1 through 20) and e is the error term. 29 (Note: b identifies the coefficients for the 
fixed effect and 𝛽 represents the coefficients for the random effect; j=(1,N) where N is 
the total number of countries.) 
 Before conducting the regression analysis, a correlation matrix for this study’s 
continuous variables was created showing the Pearson’s r scores, which range from -1 
(strong negative correlation) to 1 (strong positive correlation). The matrix identifies that 
there is a strong positive correlation between the rule of law and GDP per capita 
(Pearson’s r of 0.54), but a much weaker positive association between the dependent 
variable and natural resource rents (0.06) and the level of Protestants (0.034). While this 
does not identify cause or effect, it is consistent with the control variables recommended 
by Moller and Skaaning. Additionally, the matrix identifies a strong degree of collinearity 
among several of the control variables. For instance, the correlations between natural 
                                                          
29 The author wishes to thank Sebastian Rangel at the National University in Bogota, Colombia for his 
helpful advice and suggestions in this part of the analysis.  
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resources rents and the level of Protestants and GDP per capita are 0.79 and 0.64 
respectively. The level of Protestants is also strongly correlated with GDP per capita 
(0.50). In light of these relationships, models were run excluding some of the control 
variables. 
Returning to the original model, none of the types of transitional justice, i.e., 
international, mixed or domestic, were statistically significant. Moreover, from the 
control variables, only GDP per capita and level of natural resources were found to be 
correlated to the rule of law, the former was positively and the latter negatively 
associated.30 The absence of a relationship between this study’s independent and 
dependent variables was confirmed when the model was run without any of the control 
variables. However, when the type of transitional justice in Kosovo was coded 
differently, the international and mixed models did prove to be statistically significant.31  
More specifically, under an international model, a country’s rule of law would 
increase by 0.29, and with a mixed approach the rule of law would rise by 0.26, 
compared to if only domestic mechanisms were employed. The relationship with GDP 
per capita and the rule of law was minimal in this second test, and both natural resources 
and Protestants turned out to be statistically insignificant with P-values well above .05. 
The results from both tests are reported below in Table 2.6.32   
                                                          
30 When the model was run with only the three control variables, GDP per capita and level of Protestants 
were statistically significant.  
 
31 Instead of Kosovo’s mixed model beginning in 2008, it can be argued that it began much earlier since 
hybrid trials were used as early as 2000. The second test used data where Kosovo had three fewer years of 
international and three more years under a mixed model.   
 
32 While R produced several Goodness of Fit statistics, such as AIC, BIC and Loglik, these numbers are not 
as useful as the residual charts. It is difficult to compare the two models using these Goodness of Fit 
statistics since two of the variables in the original model are not statistically significant.  
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Table 2.6: Mixed-Effects Regression Results   
   
Test 1 (N=45)    Test 2 (N=39) 
  Coefficient P-value    Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -0.5636882 0.0070    -0.6197002 0.0029 
ITJ  0.1415024 0.2007     0.2949539 0.0076 
MTJ  0.1086073 0.2397     0.2642796 0.0068 
GDP  0.0000797 0.0020     0.0000514 0.0470 
NRR  -0.0104602 0.0308     0.0011868 0.8279 
PTS   -0.0148472 0.2216     1.6148128 0.2327    
ITJ = International Transitional Justice; MTJ = Mixed Transitional Justice; GDP = GDP per capita;  
NRR = Natural Resource Rents as a percentage of GDP; PTS = Yearly percentage of Protestants 
*According to the residual results, the best models were those that did not include the level of Protestants 
due to the high collinearity among the control variables, as outlined on pages 43-44. In all the models run, 
only GDP per capita was statistically significant with the rule of law.   
*Entries are unstandardized (or standardized) regression coefficients, computed using the R statistical 
software.   
 
Conclusion  
The univariate statistical analysis presented in this chapter appears somewhat at 
odds with the regression estimates, which take into account other factors. For instance, 
when comparing means in Colombia, which employed a wholly domestic approach to 
transitional justice, there was a noticeable improvement in the rule of law after 
transitional justice was introduced in 2005, rising from -0.66 in 2005 to -0.31 in 2015. 
Yet, according to the regression results, the domestic model is not statistically significant. 
This finding is, however, consistent with the experience in Peru. Despite utilizing an 
array of domestic mechanisms, such as a truth commission, trials, reparations and 
amnesties, its rule of law improved very little, and in fact, it declined noticeably while 
some of these policies were being used.  
In BiH and Kosovo, which are two cases that moved from an international to a 
mixed form of transitional justice, one set of regression results finds neither model 
statistically significant, but in another, both models were positively correlated to the rule 
of law. These findings are, however, at odds with the comparison in means, the 
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differences of which were statistically significant, and the histogram shown in Figure 2.3 
below, which clearly indicates better rule of law scores under a mixed or domestic model. 
Combined, both BiH and Kosovo experienced 15 years of internationally-led transitional 
justice. During this time, the yearly rule of law levels in both states remained relatively 
constant. Yet, after a shift to a hybrid system in both countries, which allowed some 
domestic input into the design and implementation of things like trials, the rule of law 
increased noticeably when compared to their international periods, particularly in BiH, 
moving from a -0.57 to -0.35.  
Figure 2.3: Rule of Law Scores & Models of Transitional Justice 
 
*Data is from the WGI, and it represents all four countries in this analysis.  
 
Although the statistical results may be at odds, the trajectory of the rule of law in 
three countries does question the generalizability of the path dependency thesis. More 
specifically, although previous scholarship argued that the rule of law is relatively stable 
in post-conflict states, three of the four countries in this study experienced sustained 
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improvements to their rule of law levels following the cessation of violence. This finding 
is important. If the rule of law does not change five to ten years after the end of civil 
conflict, as Haggard and Tiede argue, then studying the impact of transitional justice on 
the rule of law in post-conflict states is futile. As illustrated here, the rule of law does 
change five and ten years after the termination of a conflict. It is important to remember 
that the aforementioned study did not control for transitional justice in the 47 states it 
examined, and the path dependency thesis should not be abandoned altogether. As noted 
earlier, a more comprehensive study of post-conflict states, controlling for the use of 
transitional justice, needs to be developed to more fully test this thesis.  
Finally, although the improvements in mean rule of law scores in Colombia, BiH 
and Kosovo coincided with the use of transitional justice, these tentative findings should 
not be overstated. Other factors, such as the presence of international police and 
peacekeepers in BiH and Kosovo, also precipitated change. But, there are at least 
indications that transitional justice may be partially responsible for influencing the full 
rule of law spectrum. In order to get a clearer picture regarding the relationship of 
transitional justice and the rule of law, the results from the qualitative analysis are 
described in Chapters Three and Four. 
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Chapter 3  
Colombia: The Introduction of Truth, Justice and Reparations 
Introduction 
 For more than half a century, Colombia has been plagued by incessant civil 
conflict that has been fueled by the struggle for power, land and drugs. Entwined within 
this mix has been the state, right-wing paramilitaries, leftist guerillas and criminal 
organizations. After 53 years of internal strife, 267,225 individuals have been killed, most 
of them civilians, over seven million have been displaced and 8,376,463 victims have 
registered with the state.33 (Victims Unit) Fortunately, the flood of violence is beginning 
to abate. On November 24, 2016, the Government of Colombia (GoC) and the largest 
guerilla group the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) signed, for a 
second and final time, an historic peace agreement after four exhausting years of 
negotiations in Havana, Cuba.34 Moreover, the second remaining guerilla group, the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) began its own round of peace negotiations with the 
GoC on February 7, 2017.  
 Yet, before these recent developments, Colombia was no stranger to peace 
agreements and large-scale demobilizations. From 1989 to 1994, five leftist guerilla 
groups laid down their arms and reintegrated into society through a series of relatively 
successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) agreements.35 
                                                          
33 Official GoC data on the number of victims can be accessed at: http://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/RUV  
 
34 Colombian voters rejected the first peace agreement in October 2016. A revised agreement was not put 
before voters, but it was approved by Congress on November 30, 2016.  
 
35 During this time, peace agreements were reached with the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19), Movimiento 
Armado Quintin Lame, Ejercito Popular de Liberacion, Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajoadores and 
Corriente de Renovacion Socialista.   
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Furthermore, between 2003 to 2006, more than 31,000 paramilitaries demobilized, and as 
part of this process, Colombia launched its first serious attempt at utilizing an array of 
transitional justice mechanisms that promised to deliver truth, justice, reparations and 
non-repetition of conflict crimes.  
The foundation of Colombia’s first real attempt at transitional justice is Law 975 
of 2005, aka the Justice and Peace Law, which was a turning point in Colombia’s 
transitional jurisprudence and recognition of the conflict victims. Law 975 has also 
helped shape the peace agreement with the FARC by ensuring that victims remain central 
to the peace process, and it will most likely influence any potential agreement with the 
ELN. Consequently, in light of the importance of this early wave of transitional justice, 
Chapter Three examines Law 975 and other related transitional policies as they relate to 
their impact on the development of the rule of law in Colombia. It is recognized that 
Colombia’s conflict with the ELN is still ongoing while negotiations take place with this 
guerilla group, and one dose of transitional justice within this unsettled environment is 
likely insufficient to produce a tidal wave of change. Yet, because more than 50,000 
illegal combatants demobilized, special courts were created and a series of truth-telling 
and reparation initiatives were launched, some effects should be seen.36  
Based upon the statistical analysis from the previous chapter, there is evidence 
that Colombia’s rule of law did show modest improvements in the decade since passage 
of the Justice and Peace Law. Recall that from 1996 to 2004, Colombia’s mean rule of 
                                                          
36 In total, approximately 56,000 illegal combatants demobilized under the Justice and Peace framework, 
including a little more than 24,000 guerillas. (MOJ 2015, 3) The exact number of paramilitaries before 
demobilization began is unclear since many criminals demobilized with paramilitary units to take 
advantage of the provisions of the Justice and Peace process.   
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law within the WGI was a -0.82; yet, within the 10 years during which time Law 975 has 
been in effect, Colombia has averaged a -0.42, and it recently recorded a -0.31 in 2015. 
Since 2003, which is the year demobilizations began with the paramilitaries, aka the 
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the rule of law has been on a consistent 
and steady rise, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 below.   
Figure 3.1: Colombia’s Yearly Level of the Rule of Law  
 
 *Data is from the WGI.  
 
Moreover, Colombia’s improvement has been in both the procedural and 
substantive domains. According to the BTI, the independence of Colombia’s judiciary 
has improved, there is less impunity for those who abuse their positions of power and the 
protection of civil rights has increased. Additionally, Colombia went from a country 
where political violence was commonplace to a society where political assassinations, 
police brutality, etc. are less frequent. (Gibney et al. 2016) While these are welcomed 
changes, how and why did they occur? According to the regression results from Chapter 
Two, a purely domestic model of transitional justice does not have a statistically 
significant relationship with the rule of law. Yet, Colombia’s rule of law grew 
appreciably after it launched its transitional justice programs in 2005, improving from a  
-0.66 (2005) to a -0.31 in 2015.  
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Although transitional justice helped, it was not the only factor that facilitated 
change. Colombia’s GDP per-capita and level of Protestants also grew noticeably during 
this time, which are both positively correlated to the rule of law, and other events, such as 
an improvement in the overall conflict need to be taken into account. Furthermore, it is 
important to remember that much like the other three countries in this study, Colombia 
has not yet reached a satisfactory level of the rule of law, despite recent gains. By 
comparison, in other parts of South America in 2015, the WGI assigned a rule of law 
score of 1.33 to Chile and 0.68 to Uruguay, whereas Colombia scored a -0.31. In fact, 
part of the reason transitional justice has not been able to effect further change is the 
failure of the Colombian government to fully implement the transitional policies it 
promised, as well as its inability to establish an enduring governing presence in former 
conflict regions, problems that will be discussed more fully throughout this chapter. 
Consequently, there remains much room for improvement, and the rule of law is not a 
consolidated feature in this Andean nation. For this end-state to be realized, the overall 
conflict will need to come to an end, the government must take seriously recapturing and 
governing former conflict-affected regions, and endemic corruption must be curtailed. 
Without changes, any new wave of transitional justice will also likely fail to help produce 
more meaningful reform.   
In order to help assess the impact of this first wave of transitional justice and the 
state of the rule of law in Colombia, 20 interviews were conducted in-country from 
February-April 2016 and in January 2017. These interviews were conducted with current 
or former GoC officials involved in the design and implementation of Law 975, including 
a magistrate in one of the special tribunals and officials in the Fiscalia (Attorney 
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General’s Office). Moreover, members of the government that are involved in the 
financial, physical and psychosocial reparations to paramilitary victims were also 
interviewed. Based upon the interviewee’s position, a series of questions regarding the 
general state of the rule of law, along with specific questions surrounding the design and 
implementation of the Justice and Peace Law were asked of each individual (see 
Appendix E for a list of general questions).37  
To help fill-in some of the informational gaps not covered by the interviews, all 
21 half-yearly or quarterly reports of the Organization of American States Mission to 
Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA, Spanish acronym; hereafter 
MAPP) were carefully evaluated. These reports provide an impartial, international 
evaluation of the implementation of Law 975 and transitional justice in general. The 
MAPP was established in 2004 by agreement between the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the GoC to help oversee the demobilization of the paramilitaries, and 
its mandate has grown to encompass all aspects of the former and current peace 
processes. These reports are particularly useful in a comparative study since most of the 
documents report on the same elements of the peace process over-time. Moreover, to help 
assess Colombia’s and the international community’s involvement in the design, 
selection and implementation of these transitional mechanisms, more than 90 
international news articles from 2002-2006 were reviewed. These articles include 
                                                          
37 Due to the sensitivity of the previous and ongoing peace processes, most interviewees asked to remain 
anonymous.  
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interviews with both government and paramilitary negotiators, congressional 
representatives and views from the international community.38   
Currently, certain aspects of Law 975 continue to be implemented, although most 
of these mechanisms are coming to a close. For instance, initiatives for truth-telling under 
Justice and Peace were finalized in 2013, and most of the trials that will be held for 
demobilized paramilitaries have at least completed the first judicial stage. Unfortunately, 
much remains to be done to fully dispense with the reparations for this set of victims, and 
in light of this evolving and ongoing process any conclusions drawn will be tentative. 
Yet, after 11 years of implementation and a new wave of transitional justice set to get 
underway for the FARC and state officials, now is an appropriate time to take stock of 
Colombia’s first important experience with transitional justice. These findings could not 
only help conclude Justice and Peace, but they can also serve as valuable lessons for 
currently-evolving transitional policies, both in Colombia and in other conflict-affected 
states.  
To that end, this chapter will limit its study to only those transitional justice 
mechanisms designed and implemented as part of Law 975 (2005) and continue through 
2012 when Colombia’s Legal Framework for Peace and Law 1592 were approved. 
Although these newer transitional justice policies, which include elements such as 
administrative reparations and restitution of land, were introduced for a larger pool of 
victims, these post-975 mechanisms also cover paramilitary victims and are therefore 
connected to this overall initial wave of transitional justice. This chapter will not attempt 
                                                          
38 Articles related to “Colombia and paramilitaries” from 2002-2006 were reviewed using the LatinNews 
database.  
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to analyze the unfolding transitional justice formula currently being assembled for the 
FARC and agents of the state. Not only is the scope of these new mechanisms greater, but 
they also seek to provide truth and justice in different ways.  
Therefore, a logical beginning and termination point to evaluate the rule of law is 
immediately before 2005 through 2015, which is one year before the peace agreement 
with the FARC was signed and any new transitional justice mechanism began to be 
implemented. To help trace this path, the analysis is organized accordingly: the following 
section outlines the institutional edifice and type of transitional justice erected by the 
Justice and Peace Law and its related transitional initiatives; the next section assesses the 
design of this transitional framework, paying attention to the manner in which these 
policies were created and implemented; the third section evaluates the implementation of 
this wave of transitional justice against its ability to deliver change within the five 
characteristics of the rule of law outlined in Chapter One; and finally, the chapter 
concludes with some final observations and Colombia-specific recommendations.       
The Introduction of Truth, Justice & Reparations 
 Up until 2005, Colombia’s peace processes were largely disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration agreements between the executive branch and rebel 
groups. The government demanded full demobilization in return for amnesties or pardons 
with opportunities for political participation. Moreover, the negotiations that led to these 
DDR accords were done behind closed doors with little to no international, civil society 
or victim input. (Carrillo 2009,138-41) From 1989 to 1994, this model was successful in 
demobilizing approximately 5,000 combatants, and launched the political careers of a 
handful of ex-guerilla leaders.  
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According to one of these former guerrillas, now turned Colombian Senator, these 
DDR approaches were generally successful because Colombian society supported some 
of their causes, such as fixing a broken political system and alleviating poverty, and the 
opportunity for political participation provided an outlet for the political angst of these 
rebels.39 Although there was some sympathy, as reflected in the political success of 
groups like M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril), there were other domestic and international 
factors that explain why this model was chosen. For example, Colombian law did not 
require the type of retributive and restorative proceedings now enshrined in the country’s 
legal code, and human rights had not yet become a galvanizing issue within the polity or 
for international donors. (Guaqueta 2007, 425) Moreover, there was no international 
criminal court to pressure Colombia to do more, and international attention was focused 
on other conflict-affected regions like the former Yugoslavia.  
 Although there is no WGI data for this period, the first recorded measurement 
from Colombia in 1996 notes a low level of the rule of law (-0.89), which only continued 
to decline until 2002. In fact, during the 1980s-1990s, Colombia was a country beset by 
drug violence led by powerful cartels, such as the Medellin Cartel of Pablo Escobar, 
rampant kidnappings, car bombings, assassinations and guerilla-paramilitary conflict. To 
illustrate the state of lawlessness at this time, three presidential candidates were 
assassinated in the lead-up to the 1990 presidential election, and the number of annual 
civilian deaths caused by the conflict increased dramatically during the 1990s, going 
from approximately 2,000 at the start of the decade to approximately 6,000 in 1999. 
                                                          
39 Senator Antonio Navarro Wolff, interview, March 2, 2016, Bogota, Colombia.  
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(Pachico 2015 and Historical Memory Group) Consequently, it is fair to conclude that 
Colombia’s use of amnesties with political participation did little to improve the rule of 
law despite having domestic support and being domestically implemented. Any positive 
effects these amnesties may have had were negated by more powerful episodes of 
violence. The rule of law during this period was a foreign concept for most Colombians, 
and while quantitative estimates are not available, Colombia was likely at its lowest point 
during this time of general lawlessness.   
After a failed attempt at peace with the FARC under President Andres Pastrana, 
his successor, President Alvaro Uribe (2002–10), prioritized peace with the country’s 
paramilitaries. The paramilitaries initially emerged as self-defense forces for rural land 
owners during the 1960s as a way to protect cattle farmers and other rural elites from the 
guerillas. Due to a weak state and anemic military and police, GoC Decrees 3398 (1965) 
and 48 (1968) legalized these civilian self-defense groups. Describing their role, one 
scholar notes, “Although the initial response was to provide security for landowners in 
the area, the paramilitary forces assumed a much larger role within the community, 
ultimately taking over the essential roles of the state-providing security and mediating 
conflicts, but also building infrastructure, establishing schools, and offering health care.” 
(Tate 2009, 126)  
 By the 1980s, many of these paramilitary forces were enmeshed in the drug trade, 
and occasionally served as the private armies for Colombia’s drug cartels. A decade later, 
the paramilitaries had expanded their reach, operating in 26 of Colombia’s 32 
departments, and they had become synonymous with crime and political violence. 
According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, by 1999, 78% of all non-combatant 
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deaths were attributable to the paramilitaries, while the guerillas were responsible for 
20% and the state 2%. (Aviles 2006, 403) Although the paramilitaries were formally 
outlawed in 1989 due their growing criminal activities, these groups continued to act with 
impunity.     
In 1997, the strength of the paramilitaries increased when most of these disparate 
groups consolidated under the federated banner of the United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia (AUC), and they benefited from the extinction of the former Medellin and Cali 
drug cartels. Under this collective, the intensity and severity of the paramilitaries’ 
criminal behavior increased. For instance, the Colombian Ministry of Justice estimates 
that the majority of the more than 370,000 crimes recorded during the Justice and Peace 
process occurred between 1999 to 2002. (Colombian Ministry of Justice 2015, 3, 8; 
hereafter MOJ) Moreover, as of 2002, which is when the International Criminal Court’s 
(ICC) jurisdiction for some crimes in Colombia began, this court’s Office of the 
Prosecutor noted that there is a “reasonable basis” to conclude that the AUC was 
responsible for crimes against humanity, which includes murder, forced displacement, 
deprivation of physical liberty, torture and rape.40 (International Criminal Court 2012, 2-
3; hereafter ICC) 
 Consequently, when President Uribe opened a formal dialogue with the AUC in 
2002, he faced an illegal-armed group, the basis of which was at one time legal, yet it had 
morphed into a force responsible for violations of international humanitarian and human 
rights law, along with an entity heavily engaged in drug trafficking. Despite these crimes, 
                                                          
40 The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor also noted that the FARC and ELN were responsible for these same 
crimes. The ICC’s jurisdiction for war crimes began in 2009, three years after the demobilization of the 
paramilitaries. 
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the Uribe Administration initially offered the AUC a DDR-style agreement similar to 
what had been used throughout the 1990s, but after a lengthy domestic process of 
negotiation and compromise, the Justice and Peace Law was passed by the Colombian 
Congress in June of 2005.   
 Law 975 emerged as a radical change in Colombia’s transitional jurisprudence. 
According to the law, those demobilized that committed serious crimes, either 
paramilitaries or individual guerillas, are to take part in a multi-stage judicial process that 
begins with the Colombian High Commissioner for Peace or Ministry of Defense 
developing a list of those demobilized that would be subject to judicial proceedings.41 
With this list of perpetrators of serious crimes, the Fiscalia’s Justice and Peace Unit, now 
the Specialized Unit for Transitional Justice, requires those on the list to fully account for 
all of their crimes in order to be eligible for an alternative prison sentence ranging from 
five to eight years, the length of which is decided by magistrates in special tribunals 
located in three Colombian cities. For those demobilized that did not commit serious 
crimes, Decree 128 and later Law 1424 provided amnesty as long as the recipients 
contributed to truth-telling initiatives.  
 In support of this accountability mechanism, Law 975 also created The Fund for 
the Reparation of Victims, which is to provide monetary reparations to the paramilitaries’ 
victims through assets turned-over by the demobilized, with additional support provided 
by the state as needed. Reparations are to be decided by the magistrates in the Special 
Tribunals for Justice and Peace based on a valuation of harm. Rounding out this 
                                                          
41 According to Law 975, crimes of the state and its agents are not subject to any of the elements of this 
law. While this law is primarily focused on the AUC, individual guerillas that demobilized were also able 
to petition to be included under the benefits of this law.   
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transitional justice framework was the National Commission for Reparation and 
Reconciliation (NCRR), whose broad mission was to ensure victim participation in 
judicial proceedings, submit a report on the reasons for illegal armed groups, monitor 
reparations and support national reconciliation. (Law 975, Articles 50-51) From these 
responsibilities, the NCRR assembled the Historical Memory Group (HMG), which 
although not a truth commission, did produce 24 reports between 2009 to 2013 
explaining the reasons for the emergence and evolution of illegal groups by focusing on 
emblematic cases of violence.42 (Alcala and Uribe 2016, 14) 
 While Law 975 is the bedrock of this initial wave of transitional justice, other 
elements were added to it over time. The first significant addition came in June of 2011, 
although the initial impetus for it started four years earlier. Because many victims were 
not satisfied with the scope of reparations under Law 975, i.e., they also wanted their land 
returned and psychosocial support, victims began demanding a victims’ law only two 
years after the passage of the Justice and Peace Law. Subsequently, after a multi-year 
process of public and congressional debate, the Law on Victims and Land Restitution, 
aka Law 1448, was passed in 2011.  
 Law 1448 is significantly more comprehensive than Law 975. For instance, the 
former applies to all victims of the Colombian conflict, defining a victim as someone that 
has experienced a violation of his/her human rights or rights under international 
humanitarian law since 1985. This designation of victim includes not only those targeted 
                                                          
42 A truth commission was not established under Law 975 because the general conflict was still ongoing. 
(Jaramillo, Giha & Torres 2009, 36) 
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by the paramilitaries and guerillas but also those of the state. 43 Moreover, the law 
provides for the restitution of land, financial reparations, social services and pledges of 
non-repetition. Institutionally, the Victims’ Law expanded the transitional justice edifice 
by establishing three key entities, the Victim Assistance and Comprehensive Reparations 
Unit, the Center for Historical Memory and the Unit to Manage Restitution of 
Dispossessed Lands. 
 In addition to being new, the mandate of these three entities is different from 
those institutions established under Law 975. For example, the Victims’ Unit dispenses 
reparations administratively, i.e., the financial amounts are bureaucratically pre-defined 
and not determined by the courts based on a valuation of individual harm. This key 
change will be discussed later since it limited the impact of Law 975, but for now, it is 
important to note that administrative reparations are generally much less than what is 
judicially decided. With regards to the element of truth included in Law 1448, i.e., the 
Center for Historical Memory (CHM), this organization’s central aims are to support the 
construction of a Museum of Memory and aid in the organization of documents and files 
related to human rights violations. The CHM is not a truth commission. The advent of a 
truth commission in Colombia has only recently been agreed to as part of the GoC/FARC 
peace agreement. The final important piece to this puzzle is the much-needed unit for the 
return of land, much of this illegally appropriated by the paramilitaries and guerillas to 
help fuel their illegal activities.44 
                                                          
43 Law 1448 does not, however, extend to victims of BACRIM violence as the GoC does not consider the 
BACRIM part of the general political conflict. This exclusion has been controversial.  
 
44 One scholarly assessment notes that more than 13 million acres have been illegally possessed. (Summers 
2012, 222) 
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 According to officials in the Executive Branch, it became apparent under current 
President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-Present) that Colombia’s disparate transitional 
justice initiatives needed to be organized, streamlined and encapsulated into one 
comprehensive policy.45 While elements of Justice and Peace were up and running, they 
were not operating efficiently, as exemplified by the slow pace of criminal proceedings 
under Justice and Peace. For example, the first sentence against a paramilitary under Law 
975 came only in June 2010, five years after the passage of the law. To aid in this attempt 
to improve transitional justice in Colombia, the Santos Administration developed and 
Congress passed the Legal Framework for Peace (LFP) in June of 2012. This framework 
authorizes the use of non-judicial mechanisms of transitional justice, and it calls for the 
prioritization of cases involving international crimes, including those committed by 
agents of the state.46  
 The general contents of the LFP were fleshed-out through transitory article 66 of 
Colombia’s Constitution, which enshrines the right of truth, justice and reparations, along 
with the establishment of a truth commission. Moreover, it allows for the prioritization of 
serious criminal cases. The final piece of the transitional justice structure relevant to this 
study is Law 1592 (2012). Under the Justice and Peace Law, the Fiscalia is to prosecute 
all of the individuals that are on the list of serious criminal offenders, regardless of the 
perpetrator’s rank or crime. Consequently, Law 975 was not in sync with the newly-
                                                          
45 Ministry of Justice & other government official, interviews, March 8, 2016, Bogota, Colombia.  
 
46 According to Colombia’s Ministry of Justice, prioritization within this context is understood as the focus 
on prosecuting those senior paramilitary leaders most responsible for serious crimes, taking into account 
the macro-criminal environment at the time. (MOJ 2015, 13-17) 
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established Legal Framework for Peace, and its mandate to prioritize cases based on rank, 
severity of the crime and how that offense fits into the overall macro-criminal enterprises 
of these illegally-armed groups. In December of 2012, Congress remedied this 
inconsistency through passage of Law 1592, which established the legal foundation for 
the prioritization of paramilitary cases.   
 To review, Colombia’s first serious attempt at establishing truth, justice and 
reparations are encapsulated within the Justice and Peace Law. Law 975 is seminal 
because it merged DDR with transitional justice, thereby bringing the victims into an 
otherwise security-centric process. (Laplante and Theidon 2006-07, 76) Moreover, this 
law departed from the prior decade’s reliance upon general amnesties and pardons, and 
instead opted to try and prosecute thousands of demobilized paramilitaries and guerillas 
for committing egregious crimes. It also offered aspects of truth-telling through the 
Historical Memory Group and promised to provide thousands of victims judicial 
reparations. Over time, weaknesses were realized, and attempts were made to try and 
alleviate some of these deficiencies through prioritizing criminal cases and expanding the 
scope of reparations. After the passage of Law 1448, the Legal Framework for Peace and 
Law 1592, Colombia now has a comprehensive transitional justice strategy, and it had or 
is utilizing four of the five transitional justice processes identified in Chapter One, 
including domestic trials, truth-telling initiatives, amnesties and reparations.   
While it is clear that this early wave did not include international proceedings, 
such as sending defendants to an international criminal court, transitional justice by the 
turn of the twentieth century had reached a steady-state globally and had become part of 
the package of Western-backed democratic liberal reforms for post-conflict states. (Nagy 
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2008, 275-76 and Teitel 2003, 89) Consequently, outside influence and pressure could 
have been responsible for the content of this early wave. Since it is theorized that the 
manner of design and implementation are important determinants for transitional justice’s 
success, it is necessary to briefly highlight important markers that demonstrate that this 
first wave was designed, chosen and implemented by the Colombian government and 
people. Theoretically, this should have set Colombia on the path to transitional justice 
success.  
The Design of Truth, Justice & Reparations 
An important lesson provided by the Justice and Peace Law is that in these 
situations, process matters. That is, while new rules are surely necessary, it is in 
fact the process through which they are vetted, debated, adopted, interpreted, and 
implemented that defines the degree to which they can be truly effective. [italics 
in original] (Carrillo 2009, 155) 
 
At the start of negotiations in 2003, President Uribe enunciated his government’s 
position, namely there will be no impunity, but instead of trying the demobilized, the 
AUC was to be subject to an alternative justice formula that would have placed the onus 
on the AUC to provide reparations to its victims. (LatinNews, August 12, 2003) 
Reflecting this stance, the government sent the Alternative Criminal Sanctions Law 
(85/03) to Congress in 2003, which outlined a process of demobilization that included 
modest punishments for the paramilitaries, such as not being able to possess weapons or 
hold office for ten years, along with requirements for providing reparations. (Carrillo 
2009, 135-37)  
The Uribe Administration appears to have initially chosen a retributive-light 
model of transitional justice for several reasons. Some argue that the government’s initial 
bill reflected prior DDR agreements because these processes were relatively successful. 
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(Ibid, 138-39) Other possible explanations include that this was what the paramilitaries 
wanted, and/or the President himself was somewhat sympathetic to their anti-guerilla 
campaign. (Laplante and Theidon 2006-07, 62) While elements of all of these 
explanations have merit, the clearest public articulation of why retribution was not 
initially introduced centered around the need for demobilization. After some segments of 
society demanded criminal penalties, the government’s chief negotiator and Peace 
Commissioner Luis Restrepo came out against trying the paramilitaries because it might 
disrupt the delicate demobilization process. (LatinNews, February 22, 2005)     
Despite this concern, 85/03 drew widespread criticism throughout Colombia and 
the international community for its failure to fully address victim suffering and for its 
weak approach to punishing the AUC. In 2004, the Uribe Administration offered to add a 
truth tribunal, but following congressional dissatisfaction with these anemic revisions, a 
rival bill was put forward in early-2005 by a group of congressional parties that 
introduced prison sentences of one to 10 years for non-pardonable crimes. (LatinNews, 
February 1, 2005) The same month this alternative bill was put forward, the government 
again revised its legislative proposal, introducing its own alternative criminal penalties 
ranging from five to eight years. Colombia’s Interior Minister noted that the government 
had been persuaded to adopt criminal sanctions because of congressional and 
international pressure. (LatinNews, February 22, 2005) 
This new draft was openly debated in Congress with civil society participation, 
and by June of 2005 the Justice and Peace Law was passed by Congress. Describing this 
process, Carrillo notes,  
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To its credit, the Uribe administration did not press its initial legislative proposal, 
opting instead to engage in the extended public debates that followed. Political 
allies and opponents, international and domestic civil society organizations, 
foreign governments and intergovernmental bodies-all had their say, and all, in 
their various ways contributed to shaping the final Justice and Peace Law and its 
implementing norms. (2009, 152)    
 
Although there was more transparency and public input into Law 975 not 
everyone was satisfied with the result. Following its promulgation, 105 human rights and 
victims’ organizations jointly filed a lawsuit against parts of the law, primarily in 
objection to the sections that allowed reduced criminal sentences and excluded victims 
from judicial proceedings. Following this challenge, Colombia’s Constitutional Court 
upheld the law in general but required modifications to allow greater victim participation 
in judicial proceedings and enlarged the reparations program. (Laplante & Theidon 2006-
07, 81-89 and 104-05)  
While these events speak directly to governmental and societal interests, it is 
useful to also take note of the position of the other party to these negotiations, the AUC. 
Like the Uribe Administration, the paramilitaries’ positions modified during this multi-
year process, but despite being numerically strong, the AUC was weakened politically at 
the start of these negotiations by international criminal indictments, a new global war on 
terror and declining Colombian support. Although no AUC leaders or negotiators were 
interviewed as part of this study, particularly since many are either dead, in jail or were 
extradited to the United States, it is fair to state that the AUC’s interests, particularly that 
of its leadership, was to cut the best possible deal it could with a government it perceived 
to be somewhat sympathetic to their cause.47 While staying out of prison was a priority 
                                                          
47 Interview, supra n 39. 
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for this entity, their negotiators were more preoccupied with getting the government’s 
agreement not to extradite its leadership to the United States on drug trafficking charges. 
This focus on extradition, along with a new post-9/11 environment and domestic disgust 
with the paramilitaries’ behavior, limited the AUC’s room to maneuver during these 
negotiations, thereby making it easier for the government and society to change the initial 
transitional framework without jeopardizing the overall demobilization process.  
For instance, in September 2002, the United States issued its first extradition 
requests for AUC leaders, including its head Carlos Castaño, and by 2004, four of the 
AUC’s seven negotiators to the peace talks were wanted in the United States. 
Furthermore, in 2002, Interpol issued red notices (arrest warrants) for three AUC leaders 
for terrorist acts, and by the time the AUC agreed to negotiate with the GoC, the United 
States and European Union had already both designated the AUC a terrorist organization, 
a label that after September 11, 2001, further tarnished its reputation, limited its operating 
space and helped shape its negotiating positions.   
Domestically, any remaining societal support for the paramilitaries’ anti-guerilla 
activities was declining, and tougher sanctions against the paramilitaries were demanded 
by Colombian society. According to one Colombian scholar and policymaker, the 
paramilitaries involvement in criminal activity and responsibility for dozens of civilian 
massacres shifted public attitudes away from forgiveness and political reintegration. 
(Guaqueta 2007, 437) This unfavorable view of the paramilitaries is reflected in a 2006 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) survey that found 63% of Colombians 
favored prosecutions of the AUC. Moreover, 90% of survey participants favored 
reparations for the victims, and 79% called for a recording of the truth. (ICTJ 2006) 
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Interestingly, the public’s desire for accountability grew over time. In a separate 2008 
poll, 88% of Colombians supported paramilitary trials. (Lyons and Reed-Hurtado 2010, 
6)  
   In response to the introduction of the idea of criminal trials during the 
negotiations, the AUC initially threatened to halt demobilizations. As alternative criminal 
sanctions began to gain traction, the weakness of the AUC at the negotiating table was 
apparent. In a public communique of March 15, 2005, the AUC noted it would now 
accept some prison time as long as the possibility of parole was included. The 
communique goes on to reject the need to confess all of their crimes in order to receive 
reduced sentences, provide full reparations and issue public apologies. (LatinNews, 
March 22, 2005) As has already been shown, the AUC’s opposition to all of these 
policies was rejected, although initially extraditions were stayed.48  
Reflecting on the development of Law 975, it is clear that procedurally, the 
drafting and ratification of these laws were more democratic than prior peace agreements. 
During the 1990s, the amnesties given were agreed to behind closed doors between the 
President and rebel groups. Civil society, congressional and judicial input was minimal at 
best. A decade later, however, the manner in which the mechanisms were designed and 
selected was more open to input from various sectors of society and other branches of 
government through such activities as public and congressional hearings, congressional 
approval and finally judicial review. Yet, while the process was clearly domestically-
                                                          
48 In May 2008, President Uribe extradited 14 AUC leaders to the United States because they failed to 
comply with the terms of the Justice and Peace Law. The extradition of paramilitary leaders has been 
controversial as some critics believe this was an attempt by the government to silence the paramilitaries 
about their ties with the government.  
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managed, are there indicators that demonstrate that the desire for the selection of these 
mechanisms was domestically-based?    
Yes, opinion polling and congressional and civil society activity at that time 
reflects a much stronger demand for accountability, truth and reparations. This enhanced 
societal demand was subsequently channeled through a strengthened civil society, as 
reflected by the number of organizations that joined the lawsuit against Law 975, and 
these demands were supported by a more evolved criminal code. For example, after the 
1998 Rome Conference on the ICC, war crimes became a part of the country’s criminal 
code, and in 2002, the list of pardonable offenses under Colombian law was reduced. 
Therefore, while civil society was more organized to confront impunity in 2005, it was 
also able to argue, along with congressional supporters, for changes based upon 
Colombia’s criminal code and international commitments.  
This demand for truth, justice and reparations produced results. Recall that a rival 
bill was introduced in Congress calling for alternative criminal sanctions, which with the 
support of victims’ organizations and the international community, led to changes in the 
government’s position. Moreover, victims’ demands for changes to the Justice and Peace 
Law were reflected in the pursuant Constitutional Court’s decision.49 Similarly, a strong 
domestic impetus helped secure passage of the Victims’ Law. Beginning in 2007, at least 
nine public hearings were held by the government soliciting victims’ input, and by 2011, 
Colombia had a comprehensive reparations law that reflected the victims’ demands for 
the return of their land and psychosocial support.50    
                                                          
49 Please see the Constitutional Court’s decision of May 18, 2006, in Gustavo Gallón Giraldo y Otros v. 
Colombia, C-370/06. 
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Unfortunately, when it comes to the Legal Framework for Peace and Law 1592, 
victim demands have not always been fully reflected in these decisions, but the impulse 
for these changes did come from inside of Colombia. According to officials in the 
Executive Branch, the Santos Administration began a review in 2010 of Law 975 and 
transitional justice in general. The major finding from this process was that transitional 
justice in Colombia relied too heavily upon the courts; more specifically, they concluded 
that the courts should not be the central mechanism to deliver truth, justice and 
reparations. Furthermore, the government recognized that the prioritization of cases 
involving serious crimes needs to be the prosecutorial strategy moving forward. The 
Santos Administration discovered that within a post-conflict environment, case 
prioritization is essential because there are too many perpetrators and too few resources 
to prosecute them all.51   
Subsequently, the Legal Framework for Peace was assembled to unite the 
previous disparate elements of transitional justice within one comprehensive policy that 
promotes prioritization, while recognizing the need for other mechanisms, such as a truth 
commission. Law 1592 was also a natural outgrowth of this overall strategy since Justice 
and Peace was not in accordance with the over-arching LFP. Although the GoC pushed 
these reforms, namely prioritization, it should be noted that not all elements of 
Colombian society agree with this shift in policy. One government lawyer charged with 
representing the interests of the victims referred to Law 1592 as the “beginning of 
                                                          
50 Subdirector of the Victims Unit, phone interview, April 13, 2016, Bucaramanga, Colombia. 
 
51 Interview, supra n 45. 
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impunity,” and this official noted that many victims left the Justice and Peace process 
after prioritization due to their disappointment with the change.52  
How this shift affected the implementation of Law 975 will be discussed later, but 
while internal disagreements persist, Colombian society and government were the 
primary forces behind shaping the substance of this overall wave of transitional justice. 
After more than three decades of paramilitary activity and the hundreds of thousands of 
victims that had been killed, tortured, raped or displaced, Colombians generally 
recognized something more was needed than the usual disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration agreement. Yet, while domestic forces were primarily responsible for 
setting the overall framework of Law 975 and its pursuant policies, international actors 
played an important, yet supporting role.  
 During the drafting of Law 975, pressure from the international community 
provided critical support for domestic non-governmental organizations demanding a 
more robust law. For instance, in 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the U.S. 
Congress that as part of the ongoing peace process, Colombia should not offer immunity 
to those “with blood on their hands.” (LatinNews, January 25, 2005) The U.S. Under 
Secretary of State Marc Grossman visited Colombia in 2005, and his public remarks 
during his trip reiterated the need for a robust reparations program and punishment of 
criminals. (LatinNews, February 22, 2005) The views of U.S. officials were, and remain, 
important. Following the multi-billion dollar launch of Plan Colombia in 1999/2000, 
President Uribe relied upon U.S. security assistance to combat the guerillas and further 
                                                          
52 Procuraduria, interview, February 26, 2016, Bogota, Colombia.  
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his Democratic Security Policy. Upsetting Colombia’s largest bilateral donor was likely 
something the GoC could not afford to do. But, the U.S. was not the only outside party 
encouraging Colombia to do more.  
In addition to the importance of U.S. views, the ICC should also be recognized as 
another international entity that helped shape this first wave. In 1998, Colombia became a 
party to the Rome Statute, and the ICC opened a preliminary examination of the situation 
in Colombia in June of 2004. Reflecting on the importance of having the ICC monitoring 
Colombia, the Colombian Ministry of Justice concluded,  
Besides the assessments of whether Justice and Peace satisfies the principle of 
complementarity –which continues to be the object of OTP examination– the truth 
is that this constant international supervision places strict responsibility upon the 
Colombian authorities and it obligates them to deliver results that comply with the 
state’s international obligations in terms of prosecution and access to justice. 
(2015, 49) 
 
The influence of this international court is also reflected in the Legal Framework for 
Peace and Law 1592. More specifically, the ICC and the ad-hoc international criminal 
tribunals that came before it, operated on the principle of prosecuting only the most 
senior government and military officials responsible for the most serious crimes. After 
evaluating Colombia’s LFP and overall shift to prioritization, the ICC’s Office of the 
Prosecutor signaled its support for this change so long as it does not shield perpetrators of 
serious crimes from prosecution. (ICC 2012, 63) 
Returning to this section’s original question, there is strong evidence to support 
the notion that the impulse to adopt a policy of truth, justice and reparations emanated 
from Colombian society and government. Clearly, as reflected in public opinion polling, 
Colombians demanded more than just demobilization with amnesty. A desire for those 
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perpetrators of civilian massacres, displacements and rape to stand trial was a strong 
current within society. Moreover, the victims’ demands for comprehensive truth, justice 
and reparations is reflected in their ceaseless pursuit to first improve Law 975 and then 
seek the Victims’ Law. Moreover, the GoC’s decision to change some policies, namely to 
allow prosecutorial prioritization, was based upon a clear domestic reality of being 
unable to adjudicate the full list of paramilitary defendants due to limitations in resources.  
Obviously, these processes did not occur in a vacuum. International pressure was 
applied, and international norms were taken into account. Yet, these ideas and 
mechanisms were not foisted upon Colombian society or government; domestic actors 
retained the political space to adapt certain policies to Colombian realities. Furthermore, 
since the 1990s, a more vibrant civil society has emerged, and this energized element was 
able to capitalize on changes in domestic law, as well as Colombia’s international 
commitments, to advance their interests.  
In addition to being domestically designed, the implementation of Law 975 has 
been domestically-based, although there has been some financial support from donors, 
particularly the United States. The special tribunals established under the law are fully 
staffed by Colombian magistrates, and the Fiscalia’s specialized unit is comprised of 
Colombian investigators and prosecutors. Moreover, the Historical Memory Group was 
comprised of Colombians, and reparations are funded by the demobilized and state. In 
light of these facts, Colombia’s first serious wave of transitional justice represents a fully 
domestic model, utilizing domestic trials, truth-telling, reparations and amnesties. The 
ability of Colombia to choose and implement its own mechanisms of transitional justice 
should have set the stage for Colombia’s success in using this process to help improve its 
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rule of law. Yet, due to implementing challenges and the persistence of rule of law 
inhibiters, any positive effects from domestic design and implementation were 
minimized.    
Implementation of Law 975 & Its Effects  
 Chapter One introduced Kleinfeld’s work on the five common end goals of rule of 
law reform. Instead of focusing solely on passing the right types of laws and establishing 
institutions, Kleinfeld encourages rule of law reformers to focus on achieving important 
ends as a measure of success. Simply having the right legal code or adequate number of 
lawyers and judges is not enough in order to evaluate whether a society is truly governed 
by the law. (Kleinfeld 2006) Consequently, in this and the following chapter, each of 
these five end goals will be broken down in order to assess where transitional justice did 
or did not impact the rule of law, thereby helping develop a theory of change for 
mechanisms such as trials and reparations. The five ends include having a government 
subordinate to the law; ensuring the equality of all before the law; maintaining law and 
order; having a predictable and efficient judicial system; and upholding human rights. 
Within this study, ends number one and two will be considered together since they are 
closely related.     
Government Subordinate to the Law & Equality of All Before the Law 
 Colombia’s first wave of transitional justice struggled to subject the government 
to the law. The structure of Justice and Peace, and the pervasiveness of paramilitary 
influence within all levels of the government impeded these mechanisms from making 
any major inroads in establishing the equality of all before the law. Moreover, the 
emergence of the military’s involvement in “false positives,” i.e., civilians were killed by 
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the military and later presented as guerillas, only further eroded any notion that 
government impunity is being seriously addressed.  
 According to Law 975, only the crimes of illegal armed groups are subject to the 
terms of this law. (Articles 1 & 2) Any state collusion with the paramilitaries or illegal 
conduct by agents of the state are not subject to the criminal, truth-telling or reparative 
proceedings of Justice and Peace. Moreover, the Executive Branch determined which 
paramilitaries or guerillas warranted inclusion on the list of serious offenders. Therefore, 
those cases put on the list for the Fiscalia and Special Tribunals to adjudicate were based 
on political decisions and not as the result of criminal investigations. When an official in 
the Fiscalia was asked about this process, the interviewee noted that there were some 
demobilized not included on the list that the Fiscalia believed warranted inclusion.53   
 While the optics of politicians and bureaucrats selecting who would be subject to 
criminal proceedings is questionable at best, it is the government’s collusion with the 
paramilitaries over several decades that raises red flags about these decisions. In a special 
report entitled, “Colombia Elites and Organized Crime,” a non-partisan investigative 
organization, InSight Crime, reported that three years after Law 975 was passed, one-
third of Colombia’s Senate was under investigation for ties to the paramilitaries. 
Furthermore, by 2014, 61 members of Congress had been convicted of illegal ties to the 
AUC, and another 60 were under investigation. Overall, throughout the country, more 
than 11,000 individuals have been investigated in what has become known as the “para-
                                                          
53 Fiscalia, interview, February 26, 2016, Bogota, Colombia. 
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political scandal,” which included 900 politicians, 800 members of the military and 300 
other government officials. (2016, 19)  
Additionally, there remain serious questions about the extent of the reach of the 
paramilitaries, including whether it permeated the Presidency of Alvaro Uribe. Following 
the testimony of several demobilized paramilitaries, a judge ordered a congressional 
investigation of former President Uribe’s ties to the paramilitaries. According to 
testimony given within the Special Tribunals, multiple paramilitaries claimed Uribe 
collaborated with them while he was governor of Antioquia during the 1990s. (Parkinson, 
2013) Whether these allegations are true have not yet been proven, but the arrest and 
indictment of the President’s brother and cousin for para-politics only heightens 
questions about the political influence of the paramilitaries.  
Although Colombia should be applauded for the work it has done to weed-out this 
stain on its political system, the effects of para-politics continues to be felt. For instance, 
in 2015, Colombia’s prison service was forced to address disparities in the treatment of 
para-political prisoners. Within Bogota’s La Picota prison, those convicted of ties to the 
paramilitaries have been able to remodel their cells, which included installing showers 
and televisions, they placed their own locks on their cell doors, were found with 
refrigerators stocked with liquor, had a separate section for a hairdresser and massage 
parlor and one former politician recently celebrated his birthday in prison by welcoming 
34 guests into the jail over a two-day period. (Bargent 2015) Equally disturbing were the 
results from the 2014 national congressional elections. Following this plebiscite, 69 
candidates were elected that are believed to have had ties with the paramilitaries or are 
linked to politicians that did. (Cawley 2014)  
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Furthermore, in 2012, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor noted that it is 
reasonable to assume that the state is responsible for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes since its jurisdiction began in Colombia in 2002. (ICC 2012, 4) Despite these 
accusations, the state has not been subjected to any type of transitional court or truth-
telling process, although the Legal Framework for Peace does finally accept some state 
culpability. While this change is welcomed, to date, agents of the state have still not had 
to subject themselves to these types of mechanisms, although under the terms of the 
GoC/FARC peace agreement they will have to do so.  
Yet, while the Santos government recognized the need to subject the state to 
mechanisms of transitional justice, this positive step has been tainted by the emergence of 
the military’s involvement in false-positives. According to a November 2013 letter from 
the Fiscalia to the online news source Colombia Reports, this country’s Attorney 
General’s Office identified more than 3,800 victims as a result of this behavior. The 
Fiscalia noted that these actions began in earnest (more than 100 victims a year) in 2002, 
and they reached their zenith in 2007 when 1,119 civilians were killed at the hands of the 
military.  
Fortunately, the Fiscalia’s records indicate that these actions began to abate in 
2008, and four years later there had only been 15 reported false-positive deaths. 
Unfortunately, while the number of victims subsided, impunity has also been a pattern as 
it relates to these crimes. As of September 2013, only two senior army officers had been 
convicted for their involvement in false-positives, one of which was also convicted for 
collaborating with the paramilitaries between 2002-2004. (Parkinson 2013) The effects of 
the failure to deal swiftly and comprehensively with these crimes is reflected in a 2012 
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poll for Colombia’s National Center for Historical Memory. When asked why justice has 
not followed the human rights crimes committed during the conflict 39% of the conflict’s 
victims identified impunity as the culprit; the second highest category chosen, at 27%, 
was the continuing violence. (Center for Historical Memory 2012, 38) 
In addition to impunity, the state’s absence in the Justice and Peace processes has 
been felt in other ways. Two members of the Historical Memory Group recalled that 
some victims were skeptical of this truth-telling initiative because the state’s activities 
were not part of this group’s mandate. (Alcala and Uribe 2016, 19) Another individual 
involved in official memory projects in Colombia, noted that when the culminating report 
of the NCRR was released, which is entitled “BASTA YA!,” the military criticized it as 
ideologically biased since the armed forces claim the report portrays them as the 
victimizers. Looking ahead to the upcoming truth commission, this individual opined that 
the military remains concerned about their portrayal in any future reports, and identifying 
a balanced truth will be difficult.54  
Clearly, there is evidence that indicates that this first wave of transitional justice 
struggled to counteract decades of government impunity. In fact, scandals such as para-
politics and false-positives were more likely to negatively affect the rule of law. For 
example, the Institute for Management and Development’s World Competitiveness 
Yearbook, which is part of the WGI, includes a yearly measure on whether justice is 
fairly administered in a country. According to these findings, the fairness in the 
applicability of justice in Colombia has deteriorated. Before 2005, Colombia averaged a 
                                                          
54 Individual involved in memory projects, interview, March 7, 2016, Bogota, Colombia.  
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2.5 out of 10, with 10 being the best. While this score improved slight to a 3-4 from 
2005-2011, it has since declined dramatically, reaching a 1.9 in 2015. (WGI)  
Slightly more positive, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which includes a 
measure of the prosecution of those who abuse their positions of power, shows slight 
improvement from 2006 to 2016. From 2006 to 2012, Colombia received a rating of five, 
which indicates abusers of government office are not adequately prosecuted. Only in 
2014 did this score rise to a six out of ten. (BTI) One possible explanation for the BTI’s 
change in score could be explained by the judicial response to para-politics, but it is 
unclear why these two indicators are moving in different directions, although differing 
expert opinions could explain these contradictions.    
While these sources do not discuss why there are changes, it is reasonable to 
assume that the absence of the state from the proceedings of Law 975, coupled with the 
toll of para-politics and false-positives, interfered with any possible positive effects 
emanating from the limited paramilitary trials. It is also reasonable that the fallout from 
these scandals, which involved violations of international law, continues to erode 
confidence in the fairness of Colombia’s judicial system. Even if politicians are convicted 
of supporting the paramilitaries, the treatment they receive in prison is a clear indication 
that a double-standard exists.    
Law & Order 
 While transitional justice had little effect subordinating the government to the 
law, Law 975 and its accompanying demobilization procedures helped improve law and 
order in Colombia. This initial wave of DDR, tied closely to amnesties for the majority of 
demobilized, removed more than 50,000 paramilitaries and guerillas from the conflict. 
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The absence of these actors has led to a noticeable decline in overall political violence, 
kidnappings and civilian deaths. Yet, while there are improvements, non-conflict related 
crimes have gone up, and the general lack of an enduring governing presence in former 
conflict regions continues to allow criminality and violence to persist.  
 Since the tumultuous 1990s-early 2000s, the number of civilian deaths caused by 
the conflict has declined, along with the number of kidnappings. At the turn of the 
century, kidnappings were commonplace; in 2003 alone, 2,200 individuals were 
abducted. Yet, following implementation of this first wave of transitional justice and 
demobilizations, kidnappings declined precipitously and continue to subside. For 
instance, only 111 individuals were kidnapped during the first seven months of 2015. 
(U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report)  
Moreover, according to the Historical Memory Group’s final report, the number 
of civilians killed as a result of the conflict has also decreased in keeping with the 
emergence of DDR and transitional justice. In 2001, approximately 14,000 non-
combatants were killed, yet by 2005, the number had fallen to around 6,500. By 2011, it 
was estimated that only 1,500 civilians were killed. (Historical Memory Group) Figure 
3.2 below outlines the overall trends in both kidnappings and civilian deaths since 2004.  
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Figure 3.2: Number of Yearly Kidnappings and Civilian Conflict Deaths 
 
*The numbers of kidnappings come from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports and the 
numbers of civilian deaths is taken from BASTA YA!.  
**Civilian deaths for 2013-15 were not reported in BASTA YA!.  
***The 2007 kidnapping figure covers January-August; the 2013-14 kidnapping figures cover January-
June; the kidnapping figure for 2015 covers January-July. 
  
 Digging deeper into overall criminal trends, the impact of transitional justice 
appears to be weaker or a non-factor in disrupting things like theft or other non-conflict 
related offenses. As part of their ongoing survey of publics throughout Latin America, 
Latinobarometro, which is also part of the WGI Rule of Law score, found that in 
Colombia crime victimization has been on the rise. Colombian respondents have been 
asked whether they or a family member have been a victim of a crime in the last 12 
months. In 2004, 24% answered yes, 37% said the same a year later, and by 2010, 32% 
reported a crime in their family. By 2015, however, 43% of respondents reported either 
personal or family victimization. (Latinobarometro)  
Unfortunately, these polling figures are supported by actual crime statistics. 
According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), thefts have increased 
dramatically since 2005. For instance, the year the Justice and Peace Law came into 
effect, there were 159 thefts per 100,000 people in Colombia. By 2010, this figure had 
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grown to 200, and most recently it was a little more than 286 thefts per 100,000. In 
relation to assaults, this crime is also on the rise. While there were only 70 assaults per 
100,000 individuals in 2005, this rate has more than doubled, reaching 172 per 100,000 in 
2014. Consequently, the effect of transitional justice to help deter and/or reduce non-
conflict related crimes does not appear to occur, as least not in Colombia. It could be that 
the types of crimes addressed by transitional trials and truth-telling, such as war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, do little to deter everyday criminals more concerned with 
economic gain.  
While the indicators show a positive trend in reducing conflict-related violations, 
some of which can be attributed to the transitional policies implemented since 2005, i.e., 
amnesty for most of the demobilized, the lack of the state’s presence in conflict-affected 
regions has hindered further progress in solidifying law and order. One year after passage 
of Law 975, the MAPP in its sixth quarterly report of February 2006, drew attention to 
the development of new criminal actors comprised in part of demobilized AUC members. 
This international mission reported that these groups were emerging in areas where a 
security vacuum was created following the demobilization of the AUC. (10) According to 
this organization’s reports, these bandas criminales (BACRIM) are criminal elements 
primarily involved in drug trafficking and extortion. While they consist of demobilized 
AUC members, the BACRIM are not the reemergence of paramilitarism in Colombia. 
(MAPP 12th report) To support these claims, the MAPP reported in its 16th report that of 
the 11,524 BACRIM arrested by Colombian security services, only 1,680 were 
demobilized AUC. (10)  
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Nevertheless, the failure of the state to fill the security vacuum in remote areas 
has allowed criminality to persist. According to Senator Navarro Wolff, he, along with 
other congressional members, proposed to the Santos Administration a plan to enhance 
the presence of the state in 172 municipalities over the next 10 years. He reported that 
government representatives were generally open to the idea, but they noted that the state 
could not afford the 57.3-billion-peso price tag ($20 million). Emblematic of the absence 
of the state, one government official who works with the victims of the conflict, 
recounted a recent trip he had taken to a village in the northern Andes Mountains after 
2005. He reported that when he entered the village, he was informed that he was the first 
government official to visit. Both he and Senator Wolff believe that in addition to 
inadequate resources, some elites lack a general concern for the well-being of those 
regions outside of the major cities.55 If these hindrances to move beyond the cities persist, 
criminality will continue to thrive in areas affected by the conflict.  
Predictable & Efficient Justice 
 Overall, the administration of justice and reparations, which is also administered 
through the courts under Law 975, has been anything but predictable and efficient. 
Judicial proceedings have been tragically slow, and policies designed to improve 
reparations are confusing. Moreover, initial promises made by the government have not 
been met, thereby dashing victims’ expectations for truth, justice and reparations. The 
cause of these inefficiencies does not appear willful; like most conflict and post-conflict 
states, resources and institutional capacity are scarce commodities in Colombia. 
                                                          
55 Interviews, supra n 39 & 52. 
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Colombia’s judicial system has been particularly prone to these institutional deficiencies, 
but fortunately, this reality is beginning to improve, largely due to case prioritization and 
administrative reparations, both of which carry their own challenges.  
 Based upon an examination of several WGI rule of law indicators relating to this 
end-goal, Colombia’s judiciary receives mixed marks. According to the BTI 
measurement on the independence of the judiciary, the situation is improving. Between 
2006 to 2008, Colombia’s judiciary was relatively impaired by political interference and 
corruption, scoring a five out of 10. By 2016, Colombia improved to a seven, signifying a 
largely independent judiciary. This rating, which is based on expert analysis, is 
questionable. Clearly, Colombia’s judicial system has struggled to respond to para-
politics and false-positives, although it has not been entirely silent. Moreover, as will be 
discussed later, corruption permeates all levels and branches of government. Whether 
Colombia deserves a seven from the BTI on this metric can be debated, and any BTI 
claims of progress here should not be overstated. Another indicator of progress, which is 
closely tied to Law 1448 and is less controversial, is the rating of the protection of 
property rights.  
The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedoms noted that property rights 
were low in 2004 with a rating of 30 out of 100, but after implementation of the Victims’ 
Law in 2011, Colombia has maintained a property rating of 50. (WGI) Although far from 
perfect, Colombia’s improvement can be traced directly to this law’s attempt to return 
dispossessed land. Colombia’s efforts to restore illegally appropriated property to their 
rightful owners through transitional mechanisms has had a positive impact of the 
development of the rule of law. While still in its early stages, more than 81,050 land 
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restitution claims have been submitted, of which 2,450 have been adjudicated. These 
decisions have returned more than 100,000 hectares of land to more than 15,000 victims. 
(Correa 2015, 22-23 and MAPP 21st report, 5) While there remain many more claims to 
process, restitution proceedings are underway, and are moving more rapidly than the 
judicial and reparation processes under Law 975.    
 Yet, while some metrics are improving, others are not as reflected in Table 3.1. 
According to Latinobarometro, public trust in the judiciary is declining since the 
introduction of transitional justice. For instance, in 2004, 55% of respondents had little to 
no trust in the judiciary; by 2015, this level had grown to 75%. Although not quite as 
dramatic, distrust in the police is growing as well, moving from 51% in 2004 to 56% in 
2015.   
Table 3.1: Colombians’ Trust in the Judiciary and Police   
 2004 2010 2015 
Little to No Trust in 
the Judiciary 
55% 59% 75% 
A lot to Some Trust 
in the Judiciary 
41% 34% 23% 
Little to No Trust in 
the Police 
51% 53% 56% 
A lot to Some Trust 
in the Police 
48% 47% 44% 
*Data is from Latinobarometro.  
Results from a similar question in Latinobarometro, which asks respondents to rate the 
performance of the judiciary, is equally troubling, although perceptions of trust are much 
lower. For instance, the percentage of respondents that rated the judiciary as either bad or 
very bad began at 37% in 2006, slightly rose to 38% in 2008, and then jumped almost 20 
points by 2015 (56%). While various factors have contributed to this deterioration, such 
as persistent corruption, the failure to adequately implement the judicial components of 
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Law 975 has had negative repercussions on perceptions of trust and performance of 
Colombia’s judiciary. 
 For instance, from June of 2005 until March of 2014, the Fiscalia had 5,025 
individuals on its list of serious criminal offenders from the demobilization process. Yet, 
as of May 2015, only 2,053 had been charged or were awaiting charges, and of these 
individuals, only 47 have been sentenced by the end of 2016.56 Moreover, the pace of 
terminating judicial proceedings did not accelerate until after the prioritization strategy 
began. From 2005 through 2013, only fourteen demobilized paramilitaries were 
sentenced, averaging only 1 and a half sentences per year. Fortunately, since 2014, 
Colombia has averaged 11 sentences per year due in part to the prioritization plan. 
(Fiscalia a and b) While this is a positive trend, credibility was already lost as a result of 
delays, which were only compounded by a change in prosecutorial strategy. Assessing 
the impact of these judicial delays, the MAPP reported that the painstakingly slow pace 
has “affected the credibility of the process.” (16th report, 2)  
As part of the Justice and Peace process, the Fiscalia recorded 370,954 crimes 
covering 487,634 victims. (MOJ 2015, 3) The sentences handed-down have covered 
more than 22,000 of these approximate half-million victims and accounted for more than 
4,600 crimes. (Fiscalia a) While this is significant and has certainly brought justice to 
several thousand individuals, it only represents less than 5% of the overall total number 
of victims and only around 2% of the overall number of crimes reported.57 Compound 
                                                          
56 According to the Ministry of Justice, 2,147 of the more than 5,000 initially put on the list have either died 
or renounced their participation in the Justice and Peace process.  
 
57 It needs to be noted that as part of the Justice and Peace proceedings, 6,712 versiones libres were held, 
more than 15,000 cases were transferred to the regular courts involving third parties and 6,729 bodies have 
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this with the implementation of a prioritization strategy, which removed more than 600 
demobilized from the list of serious criminals, and the GoC clearly failed to fulfill its 
promises. 
 The effects of the slow pace of judicial proceedings and switching prosecutorial 
strategies mid-stream have been deleterious. Officials in both the Procuraduria and other 
government agencies that have mandates to represent Justice and Peace victims, reported 
that after Law 1592 many victims abandoned the Justice and Peace process altogether 
because they were disillusioned with the process and had lost faith in the justice system.58 
These sentiments were confirmed by the MAPP in its twenty-first report. Evaluating the 
effects of the changes caused by prioritization, this mission informed its Secretariat that 
victims were now more frustrated and surprised by this policy change, and that the 
government did a poor job of explaining it. (9) The repercussions of initially promising 
hundreds of thousands of victims an opportunity to confront their perpetrators in a court 
of law only to reverse that promise is particularly damaging in a transitional setting like 
Colombia. Many of the more than 400,000 Justice and Peace victims live in remote 
regions of the country where the state is usually absent. Yet, when they experience the 
state for the first time through transitional justice, the government fails to deliver on its 
stated promises. 
 The problems with administering justice are not only felt by the victims. The 
delays in adjudicating the criminal cases has also caused problems with the detainees. 
                                                          
been discovered, of which 3,330 have been returned. (MOJ/Fiscalia) Note: Versiones libres are the 
deposition-like sessions conducted by the Fiscalia where the demobilize confess to all of their crimes.  
 
58 Supra n 52 and other government official, interviews, March 3, 2016, Bogota, Colombia.  
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Under Law 975, the demobilized could serve no more than eight years in jail; now, in 
2017, more than a decade after the process began, dozens of detained prisoners are being 
released on parole without a judicial decision because their time in prison has exceeded 
the legal limit. The Colombian Ministry of Justice believes there are least 40 individuals 
detained under Justice and Peace that are now free, and an additional 30 have petitioned 
for release. (MOJ 2015, 34, MAPP 20th report, 7) While these prisoners have already 
admitted to some degree of guilt by agreeing to be part of Justice and Peace, these 
prisoners have the right to come before the court in a timely manner and to serve no more 
than the legal maximum sentence. Developing the rule of law requires that not only are 
the needs of the victims satisfied, but justice for the perpetrators must also be timely and 
fair.   
 In addition to failing to deliver timely verdicts, the justice system was also not 
prepared to deliver reparations. According to Article 37.3 of the Justice and Peace Law, 
victims are entitled to “prompt and comprehensive” reparations from their perpetrators. 
Under this law, the Special Tribunals’ magistrates are the ones that determine the level of 
financial reparations based on an individual valuation of harm. But, much like the 
sentencing of the demobilized, significant delays and policy changes have also disrupted 
any possible positive effects from these reparation proceedings. Since reparations under 
the Justice and Peace Law are determined at the end of a judicial process, which can last 
anywhere from five to seven years, determinations of who receives reparations and how 
much must wait until this lengthy process concludes with a sentencing verdict. 
Consequently, the first judicial award was not given until six years after the passage of 
Law 975. Moreover, out of the more than 400,000 victims, only 3,270 have received any 
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type of judicial reparations as part of the sentences handed-down.59 When polled seven 
years after the passage of 975 only 7% of conflict victims had received any type of 
monetary remuneration. (Center for Historical Memory 2012, 79) While the failure to 
recognize the majority of victims is being reconciled through the Victims’ Law, which 
provides administrative reparations, using two simultaneous procedures is not without its 
problems.  
In fact, since 2005, Colombia has experimented with four different reparation 
schemes. (MOJ 2015, 29-30) Paramilitary victims were initially promised judicial 
reparations, but with Law 1592, all victims were placed under an administrative 
allocation. The Constitutional Court ruled this provision of 1592 unconstitutional, and 
power was returned to the magistrates to determine reparations within the Special 
Tribunals. Now, victims under Law 975 receive reparations under a mixed formula that 
may draw from either judicial or administrative accounts. Subsequently, while 
paramilitary victims may still petition for judicial reparations, other conflict victims must 
go through the Victims’ Unit. Here, a decision regarding eligibility is normally given 
within 90 days of application, but the amount is much less.60 For example, if a family 
petitions for reparations based upon the murder of a loved-one, under the judicial 
proceedings, victims of homicides typically receive 823 million pesos ($280,000), while 
for the same crime, a victim under the administrative track will only receive 24 million 
($8,168). (Ibid, 29) While the Santos government decided to provide reparations for the 
                                                          
59 Supra n 50.  
 
60 The Victims’ Unit has provided administrative reparations to more than 590,000 victims. (Interview, 
supra n 50) 
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majority of conflict victims through a more efficient and cheaper administrative process 
due to implementing challenges with the judicial system, it created a double-standard. 
Whether one suffered victimization under the hands of the paramilitaries, guerillas, or 
state, reparations for the same crime should be equal for all.    
Moreover, while trying to track which victim is covered by which reparation 
process is hard enough for any researcher, imagine the difficulty victims in remote 
regions without regular access to public defenders and the internet have in trying to 
determine their eligibility. The frustration these changes brought has been noticed by the 
MAPP. In its 11th report to the OAS Secretariat, the mission reported, “…that despite the 
fact that the reparation stage has not yet begun, great expectations have been generated 
among victims regarding money and property they may receive from postulados, 
[demobilized paramilitaries] through the victim Reparations Fund…” [italics in original] 
(13) By its 21st report of May 2016, the mission identified a more somber reality 
reporting, “…during the hearing held in March 2015 on monitoring the implementation 
of the Justice and Peace Law, social organizations stated that very little has been 
achieved on truth, justice, and redress, and that there is a serious lack of victim 
participation as well as delays in the proceedings envisioned in the law. They also felt 
that the state lacks a plan to fix this situation.” (9) 
Colombia’s problems in ensuring that its transitional justice processes are 
predictable and efficient are due in large part to its institutional weakness and lack of 
state capacity. In 2007, the Fiscalia reported that in addition to the 23 prosecutors and 
150 investigators it had in its Justice and Peace Unit, it still needed 1,235 more if it was 
to adequately handle the caseload. Three years later, this unit had 159 prosecutors and 
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1,000 investigators, but it was still not enough as each prosecutor had 240 incidents to 
investigate. (MAPP 10th and 14th reports, 8 and 7) By 2016, this unit was down to only 
500 prosecutors and investigators throughout Colombia.61 Generating sufficient legal 
support for the victims was equally problematic. Despite almost half a million victims, 
the Defensoria del Pueblo was only able to muster one defender for every 400 victims. 
(MAPP 13th report, 4)   
Financially, the realities of more than half a century of violence has strained the 
ability of the government to meet its reparation commitments. According to the 
Subdirector of the Victims’ Unit, the government initially appropriated 55 billion pesos 
($18.7 million) for the implementation of Law 1448; yet midway through its mandate, 
this unit had already handed-out more than half of this allotment due to the fact that 40% 
more victims registered since the law was put into place. This official noted that the 
government now needs to do a recount to determine how much more money and time is 
needed to complete the administrative reparation process.62 In terms of the Reparations 
Fund for 975, this too will likely be unable to meet its financial demands. Of the 63 
billion pesos ($21.4 million) within this account, the demobilized have only contributed 
six percent with the government providing the rest. (MOJ 2015, 31) If required to meet 
the reparation needs of all the conflict victims, the GoC is going to be hard pressed to 
fully fund both accounts, particularly if the magistrates continue to award reparation 
amounts at higher levels and the demobilized continue to refuse to turnover their assets.  
                                                          
61 Supra n 53.  
 
62 Supra n 50.  
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Although some may counter that these results are due to a lack of political will, 
the evidence does not seem to support this explanation. In 2012, the ICC opined that 
delays in Justice and Peace were not due to a lack of political will. In fact, this 
international court was pleased with the more than 200 FARC, ELN and paramilitary 
trials that had taken place in Colombian courts. Moreover, the ICC’s prosecutor 
explained that the pace of proceedings was due in large part to the complexity of these 
cases, and in order to help, a prioritization plan should be implemented immediately. 
(ICC 2012, 5 and 62) When interviewed, a magistrate in one of the Special Tribunals 
agreed with the ICC’s assessment, and encouraged skeptics to compare the pace of 
Colombia’s transitional courts to those used in other countries.  
When I compared the pace of the Justice and Peace tribunals to that of the ICTY, 
Colombia appears to be in good standing, at least since 2014. Since the inception of the 
ICTY in 1993, it has indicted 161 individuals, and after 22 years it closed 149 cases, 
which averages 7 cases a year. (ICTY) Since 2014, Colombia averaged 11 sentences per 
year, although from 2005 to 2013 its turnover rate of 1 and a half cases a year is far 
below the ICTY’s average. In relation to other local war crimes tribunals, Colombia does 
not fare as well. For instance, BiH’s War Crimes Chamber has averaged 23 cases a year 
since 2013, and in this Balkan state, 361 war crimes cases have been adjudicated since 
2004, which included more than 500 defendants. (OSCE 2015, 1) Moreover, Bosnian 
courts are much more efficient. According to the Organization for Security and 
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Cooperation in Europe, the average length of time for a war crimes case is one to two 
years in BiH.63 (OSCE 2011, 56)   
Consequently, why are Colombia’s courts less efficient, when compared to BiH, 
as it relates to war crimes cases? Here, the utility of a mixed model of transitional justice 
becomes apparent. Although discussed more fully in the next chapter, BiH has benefited 
from almost two decades of international assistance and training, which has included a 
hybrid war crimes tribunal. While donors have provided some financial and technical 
assistance to Colombia’s Justice and Peace process, an already fragile domestic judicial 
system strained by more than 50 years of violence has relied upon Colombian 
investigators, prosecutors and judges. According to the MAPP, throughout all of its 21 
reports, this organization consistently explained implementation delays as a result of a 
lack of institutional capacity. Restrepo agrees, writing, “It seems harsh but fair to 
conclude that the Justice and Peace Law created more expectations than it could hope to 
fulfill. Limitations of capacity were forgotten, recent international experiences of 
transition disregarded.” (2012, 163-64) Subsequently, although pure speculation at this 
point, one may question whether Colombia would had benefited from a hybrid tribunal, 
particularly considering that it initially sought to prosecute 5,000 individuals.  
 As mentioned before, this first wave of transitional justice did not entirely fail to 
help improve the predictability and efficiency of Colombia’s judiciary. In fact, 
transitional mechanisms contained in Law 1448 related to the return of illegally-
appropriated land are having a positive effect on the rule of law. Yet, despite 
                                                          
63 Kosovo’s hybrid war crimes court is more in-line with Colombia in terms of performance having only 
tried 47 cases from 1999-2013. (OSCE 2010, 8, EULEX 2013) An explanation for Kosovo’s lack of 
efficiency is discussed in Chapter Four.  
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improvement in protecting property rights, delays in implementing components of Law 
975, along with radical changes to the transitional policies, can be clearly traced to 
indices that show a decline in public trust and satisfaction with the courts.  
While adjudicating complex war crimes cases are certainly not easy, resolving 
only 14 cases in eight years is disappointing within any transitional context. The 
government had promised through Law 975 that it would put approximately 5,000 
individuals before the courts. The fact that only 47 of these individuals have completed 
the process while hundreds of others were removed from the list due to prioritization is 
bound to damage the integrity of the justice system. In 2010, two years before 
prioritization, only 59% of Colombians had little to no trust in their judiciary. While 
dismal, after prioritization, this level of dissatisfaction increased to 75%. While these 
surveys measure general attitudes and not only those of the victims, these findings are 
supported by the MAPP/OEA’s and public officials’ accounts of victims’ reactions.  
Apparently, within a conflict environment, promising more than a government 
can deliver appears not only futile, but may have retarded some of the positive effects 
coming from the limited implementation of these policies. Upon reflecting on the 
implementation of Justice and Peace, Colombia’s Ministry of Justice warns, “In the 
context of political transition, the promises made by the state must be fulfilled in order to 
guarantee the transition’s stability, legitimacy, and durability. Justice and Peace has 
demonstrated that a failure to keep those promises has a high cost in terms of regaining 
both the victims’ and the ex-combatants’ trust in the administration of justice and in the 
state in general.” (2015, 41) 
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Upholding Human Rights 
 Theoretically, transitional justice has the ability to help instantiate new norms 
within a society and change behavior. (Sikkink 2011) Two key indicators that can tell us 
whether there has been a change in behavior are the level of political violence and 
protection of the victims following implementation of these transitional mechanisms. 
Within Colombia, the ability of transitional justice to instantiate new norms is suspect, 
largely because prior and new victims continue to be displaced and murdered. While the 
transitional policies are not to blame for this continued violence, the absence of the state 
in former conflict regions and the persistence of criminality prohibit transitional policies 
from delivering radical change as it relates to human rights.  
 According to the Political Terror Scale, which rates the level of political violence 
in a country on a scale of 1 (the best) to 5 (the worst), political violence has subsided 
some in accordance to the overall decline of the general conflict. From 1996 to 2004, 
Colombia was a five, i.e., political terror was prevalent throughout the entire country. 
With the demobilization of more than 31,000 paramilitaries and around 20,000 guerillas 
after 2003, Colombia improved slightly to a four from 2005-2010. Since 2011, Colombia 
has graduated to a three, except for 2013 when it jumped back to a four, and within the 
current environment, political violence may now only be common. (Gibney et al. 2016) 
 In 2015, Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) asked respondents in Colombian consolidation zones, i.e., areas previously 
prone to conflict but recently re-taken by the state, to gauge the performance of the 
government since 2005 in preventing mass violations of human rights. Fifty-seven 
percent noted that the state’s response was very inefficient or inefficient. (2015, 61-62) A 
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similar question, this time gauging citizen perceptions throughout all of Colombia, asked 
respondents if they strongly agreed that basic rights are protected by the political system. 
Before transitional justice began, 40% agreed with this statement, but after 2010 when 
there was 45% support, a significant decline occurred. In 2013 and 2014 only 28% had 
confidence in the political system to protect their basic rights. (Ibid, 59-60) These 
findings are generally supported by a 2013 Latinobarometro poll that found 53% of 
Colombians believe their government’s performance on human rights is poor/very poor, 
whereas 39% responded it was good and only 5% very good.   
 Unfortunately, these public perceptions are tied to reality. Each year, dozens of 
victims and their leaders are targeted and killed. Moreover, the bandas criminales have 
created a dangerous environment for the most vulnerable. As early as 2006, the MAPP 
warned of the regrouping of demobilized paramilitaries in areas where former AUC units 
left. (6th report, 10) One year later, the OAS mission to Colombia reported that residents 
in departments such as Narino, Choco and Putamayo, traditional zones of conflict, 
perceived no improvements in security because of the persistence of illegally-armed 
actors. The effect of these groups, according to international observers, is that victims are 
reluctant to participate in Justice and Peace proceedings for fear of retaliation. (9th report, 
12) For example, although the MAPP and GoC do not consider the BACRIM the 
reemergence of paramilitarism in Colombia, these new criminal groups consist of former 
demobilized paramilitaries. Thus, if victims are to participate in truth-telling initiatives or 
testify against paramilitary leaders in court, there is a real chance the BACRIM will 
retaliate.  
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As the security situation in former and ongoing conflict regions continued to 
deteriorate, the MAPP reported in 2011, “…threats, intimidation, and murder have been 
an almost permanent fixture over the past six years. As the trials and restitution of lands 
have moved forward, some victims and leaders have become the target of threats, 
intimidation, and murder.” (15th report, 2) In fact, as new transitional justice initiatives 
were being introduced, principally the restitution of land, threats and assassinations of 
those seeking to return to their homes increased. (MAPP, 17th report, 2) The GoC has 
enhanced its security program for the victims, but it has not been enough. From 2005 to 
2011, 50 leaders for internally-displaced persons were killed, and in 2015 alone, 54 
human rights and land defenders were murdered. (Lopez-Vidal 2012, 12 and MAPP 20th 
report, 7) Moreover, within the last two years, the BACRIM have become powerful 
enough to begin mediating conflicts and controlling community affairs in some regions. 
(MAPP 20th report, 23) Not only have the victims been targets, but a large number of 
demobilized have also not been protected. While some demobilized deaths are due to 
their continued involvement in illegal activities, others were threatened or killed for 
failing to join the BACRIM. As of 2015, 3,820 demobilized, more than 10% of the initial 
31,000, have been killed. (Ibid, 23) 
Fortunately, the prevalence of political violence related to Colombia’s military 
appears to be declining. Colombians have reported to the MAPP that their military’s 
behavior in following international humanitarian law is improving, and the MAPP has 
seen a steady increase in the state’s attempt to reinsert itself into ungoverned spaces. (20th 
report, 25-26) This attempt has, however, been insufficient. Programs offered by officials 
such as Senator Wolff to expand the state have not been adopted due to limited resources 
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and a neglect for those outside of the cities. Even with a further de-escalation of the 
conflict as a result of the GoC/FARC peace agreement, the OAS observer mission wrote 
in its most recent report,  
…communities located in the areas that have experienced the most intense armed 
conflict have not seen significant transformation in their realities following the 
implementation of measures that both the Colombian government and FARC - EP 
have approved to de-escalate confrontation as part of the dialogue process 
between the parties. The presence of elements that continue to affect the security 
of communities serves to deepen their pessimism about the real impact that these 
de-escalation measures have on their daily lives. For example, extortion remains a 
daily reality, even having increased over this period… (21st report, 22) 
 
Subsequently, any quantitative measurement indicating improvements in human 
rights should be qualified. Yes, the overall level of political violence has subsided since 
2005, but based upon the evidence and expert opinions, this is largely due to the removal 
of one of the main protagonists in the conflict, the AUC. Demobilizing more than 50,000 
illegal combatants since the conflict began is sure to help reduce violence. Yet, the fact 
that victims continue to be targeted indicates that a widespread shift in norms and 
behaviors has yet to occur. This can be explained in part by the government’s inability to 
fully reinsert its authority in former conflict zones, as well as the pull of lucrative 
criminal activities, namely drug trafficking. Throughout a range of interviews with GoC 
and international officials in Colombia, the overall sense is that Colombia is not prepared 
for the demobilization of the FARC and the ELN either. The state remains weak in 
remote areas where coca cultivation thrives, and some experts expect a significant 
number of demobilized guerillas to form their own BACRIM organizations. If this 
occurs, victims will continue to be vulnerable, and human rights will remain an 
aspiration.   
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Concluding Thoughts & Recommendations 
 The impact of transitional justice on the development of the rule of law in 
Colombia has been uneven. General amnesties used during the early 1990s for several 
guerilla groups were politically successful, but they did little to improve law and order 
and human rights. Although these early amnesties were domestically generated and 
implemented, the intensity of the conflict coupled with general lawlessness prevented any 
type of positive trickle-down effects to be realized. However, since 2002, Colombia’s 
rule of law has been on a generally modest but steady rise. In accordance with Moller and 
Skanning (2014), as well as the statistical results presented in Chapter Two, part of the 
explanation for this increase involves changes in Colombia’s economic and religious 
environments. 
 From the qualitative analysis, it was shown that the implementation of Law 1448, 
particularly its provisions for the restitution of dispossessed land has helped improve the 
protection of property rights. Furthermore, improvements to law and order, as well as a 
slight increase in the protection of human rights, can be attributed to the overall 
demobilization and amnesties afforded as part of the Justice and Peace process. Due to 
the removal and provisions of amnesty for more than 50,000 illegal paramilitary and 
guerilla combatants, the number of civilian deaths, kidnappings and general political 
violence have all subsided. While these are welcomed changes and recognizable 
achievements, this first serious wave of transitional justice should have theoretically done 
more.  
 Remembering that the Justice and Peace process, along with its subsequent 
transitional policies, is transitional justice within an ongoing conflict, it is still fair to 
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question why more was not achieved considering the structure and promises of this 
approach. For instance, Law 975 was a sea change from Colombia’s traditional policy of 
general amnesties and DDR agreements during the 1990s. These general DDR accords 
were replaced with laws that promised truth, justice, reparations and non-repetition. 
Additionally, for the first time in Colombia’s processes of peace, victims’ interests were 
considered and many of the mechanisms used came as a direct result of their lobbying 
efforts. Moreover, laws 975, 1448 and 1592, along with the Legal Framework for Peace, 
were all domestically generated and implemented. According to the theoretical 
expectations of the literature outlined in Chapter One, the domestic origination and 
execution of transitional justice should have set Colombia on the path to success. 
Additionally, Colombia utilized a “justice balance,” namely it coupled retributive trials 
with restorative mechanisms, which according to earlier findings helped improve 
democracy and human rights. (Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010) Yet, despite all of these 
advantages, the effect of transitional justice on the rule of law was minimal. Deep 
changes in the substantive domain were not found, such as normative or behavioral 
changes, and Justice and Peace did not produce widespread institutional efficiency and 
growth.  
 Two major phenomena help explain why radical reform did not follow Justice and 
Peace. First, problems with implementation left many promises of truth, justice, 
reparations and non-repetition unfulfilled. After five years, only two sentences had been 
handed-down, and the first judicial reparations were not awarded until 2011, six years 
after passage of Law 975. Even today, only a little more than 3,000 of the more than half 
a million Justice and Peace victims have received reparations through the courts, and only 
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approximately one percent of the initial 5,000 demobilized that were to come before the 
courts were ever judicially processed. Moreover, half-way through implementation of 
975, the government changed the framework of transitional justice, against the wishes of 
many, and put into place a new prosecutorial strategy that further limited criminal 
convictions, while also initially trying to limit reparations for many. As reflected in 
Latinobarometro and LAPOP opinion polling, these changes helped erode trust and the 
perceived performance of Colombia’s judiciary.   
 Encapsulated within this challenge of implementation, this initial wave also 
excluded the state. Law 975 is not applicable to state crimes nor did it require truth-
telling initiatives to take into account state crimes. The failure to include the state as part 
of this wave was a mistake that damaged the legitimacy of the process. The culpability of 
the state in war crimes and crimes against humanity came out in the false-positive and 
para-political scandals, as well as by the ICC. While thousands of brave and honorable 
Colombian soldiers and police have lost their lives during this five-decade long conflict, 
the sheer size and reach of both the army’s killing of civilians and hundreds of 
government officials’ ties to the paramilitaries indicates that these illegal behaviors were 
not isolated incidents. Fortunately, some steps have been taken to prosecute individuals 
responsible for these crimes, and as part of the implementation of the next wave of 
transitional justice agents of the state will have to account for their crimes within a 
special judicial tribunal and truth commission.  
 The second major impediment has been the existence of rule of law inhibiters. 
Many of these inhibiters are common during a conflict and post-conflict setting, and even 
with the best efforts, transitional justice is likely unable to penetrate the wall created by 
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these obstacles. One of the primary inhibiters is the persistence of the general conflict 
itself. The Justice and Peace process began within a conflict environment; in 2005, the 
FARC and ELN both remained engaged in challenging the state militarily. In addition to 
military conflict, the failure of the state to fully reinsert its presence and govern former 
conflict regions has allowed criminality, drug trafficking and overall violence to persist.  
 The reporting from the international observer mission in Colombia has captured 
the emergence of the BACRIM, and the ability of these criminal gangs to kill, intimidate 
and prevent victims from taking part in all aspects of the Justice and Peace process. The 
failure to provide security is a clear violation of the government’s pledge of non-
repetition. The third inhibiter identified helps explain why implementation and 
revictimization occurs. The lack of resources, both financial and institutional, inhibits a 
quicker resolution of judicial cases, threatens the solvency of both judicial and 
administrative reparations, and prevents the state from governing in all former conflict 
regions. In fact, despite having observed the BACRIM establish control over former 
AUC strongholds, Colombia’s Attorney General warned the country that in the 
Department of Antioquia, the BACRIM group, El Clan del Golfo, is already offering 
financial incentives to demobilizing FARC to join their criminal ranks. This illegal group 
is also seeking to establish a presence in areas abandoned by the FARC as a result of their 
ongoing demobilization. (Vanguardia Liberal 2017, 8A)  
 The final rule of law inhibiter in Colombia is corruption. Along with their rule of 
law indicator, the WGI also produces a yearly measurement of corruption, which they 
define as the perception that public power is used for private gain. Unlike the positive 
trend in the rule of law, corruption is getting worse in Colombia. Despite improving at 
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the turn of the century, corruption reached its pinnacle during 2010-13, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.3.  
Figure 3.3: Perceived Level of Corruption in Colombia: 1996-2015  
 
*Scores range from 2.5 (little corruption) to -2.5 (widespread corruption).  
**Data is from the WGI measurement on corruption.  
 
LAPOP surveys have captured a similar attitude. In 2005, 36% of Colombians believed 
corruption to be widespread, yet by 2010 the number had risen to 54% and most recently 
to 60% (2014). (2015, 52) These public perceptions are being borne-out by current 
events. In January 2017, several Senators, Congressmen and President Uribe’s former 
Vice Transport Minister were arrested for allegedly taking bribes to help the Brazilian 
engineering firm Odebrecht receive lucrative construction contracts in Colombia. (Maas 
2017) The pervasiveness of state graft has reached a level that according to the country’s 
Inspector General costs the government $7.5 billion a year or roughly 10% of the 
government’s 2017 budget. (Alsema 2016) In a conflict-affected state, the loss of almost 
$8 billion a year is significant, particularly as it strains to meet its transitional justice 
demands and increase the capacity of its institutions.  
 In light of these inhibiters, Colombia needs to take action if this upcoming wave 
of transitional justice is to help promote the rule of law. Like its 975 cousin, this newer 
wave is comprehensive in that it includes elements of truth, justice and reparations. There 
will be a special tribunal to try guerillas and agents of the state, a truth commission and 
the administrative reparations under Law 1448 will continue. Yet, as has been shown, the 
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democratic design and implementation of these mechanisms will not be enough to meet 
transitional justice’s long-term aspirational goals. For this process to help develop the 
rule of law, the government must find a way to use both transitional justice and its 
ongoing development programs to expand the reach of the state. Getting paramilitaries 
and guerillas to demobilize is not enough; the security vacuum created by these 
demobilized groups allows existing criminal organizations, many of which are composed 
of former demobilized combatants, to use these areas for illegal enrichment and 
continued exploitation of the victims. Not only must the security forces remain in these 
regions, but other branches of government must follow. During an interview with one 
international diplomat in Colombia, this individual shared his assessment that in rural 
areas, institutions that promote the rule of law are generally absent. These institutions, 
such as the Fiscalia and courts, do not attempt to educate and include the indigenous and 
local communities in their organizations, and service in remote areas for those already in 
these agencies is a “career-killer.”64 Whether this attitude and incentives will change is 
unclear, but if the state does not take-over these zones, criminality and violence will 
persist.  
 Although Colombia has a tradition of ignoring its rural areas, some efforts were 
undertaken recently to address this problem. First, under President Uribe, the GoC 
initiated a National Consolidation Plan in Uribe’s second term that was to promote 
security, reduce the illegal drug trade, establish government services and jump-start 
economic development in rural regions. Initially, this plan aimed to reach 15 different 
                                                          
64 International official in Colombia, interview, March 2, 2016, Bogota, Colombia.  
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zones covering 100 municipalities. (Isaacson 2012) After President Uribe, President 
Santos, continued with consolidation, albeit at reduced levels. Under President Santos, 
the initial plan was reformulated and re-launched in November 2011 as the National Plan 
for Territorial Consolidation.  
But, under Santos’ initiative, the number of targeted municipalities was reduced 
from 100 to 58, and the consolidation budget was cut from 320 billion pesos in 2010 to 
125 billion pesos in 2011 (from $108 million to $42.5 million). (Ibid) Since consolidation 
began while President Santos was Defense Minister, and one of the original architects of 
this policy, Sergillo Jaramillo now serves as Peace Commissioner, it is perplexing why 
this government significantly reduced this program. While I was unable to speak directly 
with officials that could answer this question, the reason may be tied to the ongoing peace 
talks. For instance, consolidation programs typically target areas where illegally-armed 
actors once served as the governing authority. Reducing the FARC’s and ELN’s 
influence in areas they hope will serve as their base of future political support was likely 
opposed by the guerillas before peace talks began.  
 Regardless of the reasoning for the reduction, a range of Colombian officials 
realize the GoC must enhance and renew consolidation efforts if these potential peace 
accords are to have a long-term effect. And, if transitional justice is to do more than 
merely determine guilt or innocence, the government must muster the political 
determination and dedicate the necessary resources to establish an enduring presence in 
areas traditionally neglected. Without this, the rule of law will not be experienced by 
those victimized, their reparations will be spent without prospects for sustainable 
subsistence and other powerful actors will fill the governing vacuum, potentially 
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perpetuating the cycle of violence and victimization. Fortunately, for BiH and Kosovo, 
which are discussed in the next chapter, the absence of the state has not been an inhibiter 
to transitional justice and the rule of law, but rather, an equally powerful one, ethnicity, 
has prevented transitional mechanisms from playing a meaningful role in these Balkan 
states.            
  
106 
 
Chapter 4 
BiH & Kosovo: The Challenges of Ethnicity 
Introduction 
 The relationship between transitional justice and the rule of law in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo is complicated. According to the results of Chapter Two, 
both countries’ mean rule of law scores noticeably increased after these countries 
transitioned from an international to a mixed model of transitional justice, as illustrated in 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2.65 In addition to the differences in their mean rule of law scores 
before and after the introduction of a mixed model, the differences in means are 
statistically significant. In Chapter Two, the results were presented from the Independent 
Samples T-Tests for each set of means, which reported statistically significant differences 
at the .05 level. Yet, despite this apparent relationship, the regression analysis produced 
no statistically significant results for the rule of law in either model after controlling for 
alternative factors.  
Figure 4.1: The Rule of Law in Bosnia & Herzegovina 
    
*Bosnia began using a mixed model in 2005.  
  
 
 
                                                          
65 An international model of transitional justice occurs when the international community entirely develops 
and implements the mechanisms of transitional justice. A mixed model involves both international and 
domestic actors, and it is represented by a balance in the responsibilities to formulate and execute 
transitional policies.  
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Figure 4.2: The Rule of Law in Kosovo 
 
*Kosovo’s switch to a mixed model occurred in 2008.  
**Data for both figures is from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).  
 
 Subsequently, upon tracing the effects of transitional justice within Kleinfeld’s 
five common ends goals for rule of law reform, the picture becomes clearer. While the 
international model employed in each country had its own drawbacks, the more detailed 
qualitative analysis supports the regression results, namely the mixed model has not been 
any more effective in developing the rule of law than was the international. Powerful rule 
of law inhibiters exist in both Balkan states, which create thick walls blocking the 
diffusion of many of the positive effects of transitional justice. The main inhibiter shared 
by both countries is the prioritization of ethnicity over dealing with the crimes of the past. 
Moreover, international and local emphasis on trials failed to provide a justice balance, 
and the growth of corruption also inhibited the diffusion of many potentially positive 
effects.    
 In order to help understand this complicated dynamic, 25 interviews were 
conducted in BiH and Kosovo during June of 2016. These interviews were held with 
international and local government officials, members of civil society and relevant in-
country scholars. (See Appendix F for a list of general questions.) To help supplement 
these interviews, a series of reports from international institutions in both BiH and 
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Kosovo were carefully studied. For BiH, all 48 reports from the High Representative in 
BiH to the UN Secretary General (UNSYG) covering 1996-2015, along with all 
European Commission (EC) Progress Reports from 2005-2015, were reviewed. In 
relation to Kosovo, 51 of the UN Secretary General’s quarterly Kosovo reports to the UN 
Security Council from 1999-2015 were examined, which since 2009 also include the 
European Union’s assessment of the rule of law in Kosovo.66 Other relevant international 
reports such as from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were also 
reviewed as needed. All of these reports served as useful sources of information, and they 
enhanced the number of observations on both the rule of law and transitional justice 
variables.    
 To help the reader understand the powerful effects of ethnicity within these cases, 
this chapter is organized accordingly: the following section explains the various models 
of transitional justice used; section three describes how these models were designed and 
executed, including outlining how bias and a focus on trials influenced model design; 
next, the implementation of these models will be evaluated against the five end goals of 
the rule of law, pointing out in each where the aforementioned inhibiters emerged; and 
finally, the chapter concludes with some final observations.  
The Transitional Justice Framework 
 Since the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 
1991, a plethora of scholarly literature and crisis reports have emerged explaining the 
                                                          
66 For citation purposes, reports from the High Representative are designated as OHR; these OHR reports 
were reviewed online and do not contain page numbers. European Commission reports are labeled EC, and 
UN reports on Kosovo are identified as UNSYG. 
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reasons for its breakup, the tragedy of the conflicts that ensued and the organization and 
governance of the post-conflict periods.67 Consequently, this analysis does not seek to 
replicate what has already been exhaustively covered, but it is useful to highlight the 
factors that precipitated the need for transitional justice. For instance, in BiH 150,000 
people were killed and another 170,000 injured during the fighting that ensued between 
Bosnia’s Croat, Serb and Bosniak communities from 1992-1995.68 Moreover, as a result 
of the conflict, more than two million people had been displaced, 25,000 women were 
raped, 60%-70% of homes and 1,600 religious sites were destroyed or damaged and 
30,000 people were missing.69 (Kiza 2012, 249 & 259) The conflict in BiH is also 
notorious for the genocide that occurred in the town of Srebrenica during July of 1995 
that took the lives of 8,000 Bosniak men and boys. Following this atrocity, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened and by November of that year Croatia, 
BiH and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) had signed the Dayton Peace 
Accords thereby ending approximately four years of fighting.  
In addition to terminating the conflict, the Dayton Accords also established an 
internationally-led Office of the High Representative (OHR) charged with ensuring 
implementation of the peace agreement, which included the use of executive powers 
(“Bonn Powers”) if local officials were not abiding by the terms of the accord.70 
                                                          
67 The International Crisis Group has a series of reports detailing the wars in the Balkans, which can be 
found at https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans.  
 
68 The Bosniak community is predominantly Muslim, whereas the Croat and Serb populations are 
Christian/Orthodox. 
 
69 The Association of Women Victims of the War, interview, June 9, 2016, Sarajevo, BiH.  
 
70 OHR is funded primarily by the EU and United States, and its political support and guidance comes from 
the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, which includes the United States, Russia and several 
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Moreover, Dayton created a federated Bosnian state dividing the country into two 
entities, the predominantly Serbian Republika Srpska (RS) and the largely Muslim and 
Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter the Federation). Within the 
Federation, there are 10 separate cantons, and in additions to these divisions, the district 
of Brcko also enjoys significant governing autonomy outside of either the Federation or 
the RS. Subsequently, implementation of transitional justice has been challenging, 
particularly since there is a state court, 10 cantonal courts in the Federation, five district 
courts in the RS and a court in Brcko all with jurisdiction for war crimes.   
Kosovo’s internal conflict, which lasted from 1998-99, centered around the one-
time Serbian province’s desire to be independent after the heavy-handed rule of Slobodan 
Milosevic. While part of the SFRY, Kosovo enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, but once 
Serbia revoked much of that autonomy in 1989, the impulse for independence grew 
within the dominant ethnic Albanian community. By 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) was engaged in a conflict with forces from the FRY and Serbia. As a result of this 
violence, approximately 13,000 people were killed, and more than half of Kosovo’s 1.7 
million people were displaced.71 (Di Lellio and McCurn 2012, 133)  
In order to prevent the same level of destruction in Kosovo as had taken place in 
BiH, the international community intervened more quickly, primarily through NATO 
bombardment of Serb forces, and by June of 1999 governing authority for Kosovo had 
been transferred to the United Nations (UN) under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 
                                                          
Western European nations. Although now smaller and more limited in its activities, OHR still operates in 
BiH.  
 
71 The UN estimated that 800,000 Kosovars were refugees and another 500,000 were internally displaced 
during the 1998-1999 period. (UNSYG July 12, 1999, 3)  
111 
 
(1999). UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (hereafter 1244) established an 
interim, UN-led administration designed to govern Kosovo until its future status was 
decided, which after several years of fruitless negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo 
resulted in Kosovo unilaterally declaring independence in 2008 with the support of the 
United States and key European nations.72 As part of their declaration of independence, 
Kosovo agreed to limited, continued international oversight, which included the 
deployment of the European Union Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo (EULEX), whose 
current mandate expires in June of 2018.  
In light of the widespread human rights abuses that were occurring as part of the 
dissolution of the SFRY, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia through UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) 
in order to prosecute serious violations of international criminal law occurring in this 
region of the world. As part of the terms of both Dayton and 1244, BiH and Kosovo are 
obligated to cooperate with this tribunal. Throughout the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY 
operates under the principle of concurrent jurisdiction with domestic courts, although the 
ICTY statute does allow it to take-over any case in the pursuit of international justice.73 
While not created only for BiH, approximately 80% of the 161 indictments it issued were 
related to the conflict in this Balkan state. (Kiza, 252) In fact, the ICTY’s first 
indictments and trials involved two Bosnian Serbs in 1994 and 1996 respectively, and its 
last trial, which is currently ongoing, involves former Bosnian Serb leader Ratko Mladic.  
                                                          
72 As of March 29, 2017, 113 countries had recognized the Republic of Kosovo, although Serbia has still 
not formally recognized Kosovo’s independence. (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)  
 
73 Concurrent jurisdiction technically provides both the ICTY and local courts jurisdiction in war crime 
cases, although in practice, the ICTY was the preeminent institution for many years.  
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Since it first started its investigations in Kosovo in 1999, the ICTY has completed 
all of its cases against the 15 individuals, both Serbian and Kosovar, indicted for Kosovo 
related war crimes, which included issuing indictments against a sitting president 
(Slobodan Milosevic) and prime minister (Ramush Haradinaj). The current international 
transitional justice structure in Kosovo centers around the recently-established Specialist 
Chambers in The Hague, Netherlands. This international tribunal has the authority to 
investigate and prosecute post-1999 crimes committed by the KLA, which includes 
allegations of harvesting the organs of some of its prisoners.74 (UNSYG August 1, 2014, 
20) 
While the ICTY has been operating since 1993, both Kosovo and BiH have also 
employed domestic trials. For instance, during the conflict, some Bosnian courts 
conducted trials for war crimes, although these were generally dismissed for being 
ethnically biased. (Orentlicher 2010, 109) Despite Kosovo not having much of a judiciary 
during its conflict, seven war crimes cases were carried out locally from 1999-2000, but 
here too, four of these convictions were later overturned by international panels of 
judges. To help mitigate local bias, the international community required Bosnian 
prosecutors to first obtain ICTY approval for any war crimes arrests. This policy, which 
was labeled Rules of the Road, was in effect from 1996 until 2004; of the 4,985 names 
submitted to the ICTY, approval was given for 848 arrests. (Ibid, 110-11)  
In Kosovo, bias was addressed differently. As part of its executive authorities, the 
UNMIK Special Representative of the Secretary General in Kosovo (the SRSG) began 
                                                          
74 According to the EU’s former special prosecutor, the Specialist Chambers’ jurisdiction begins in Kosovo 
when the ICTY’s mandate ends, i.e., June of 1999. (UNSYG August 1, 2014, 21) 
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appointing international judges and prosecutors in 2000 to adjudicate war crimes cases 
within local courts. These cases were heard by mixed panels of judges, with the majority 
being international, and by 2002, there were 27 international judges and prosecutors 
working throughout Kosovo. (UNSYG July 17, 2002, 5) This initial hybrid system, 
whereby international judges and prosecutors worked within local courts, was, however, 
not the UN’s or Kosovo’s original choice. In his report to the Security Council of March 
3, 2000, the Secretary General asked member states to provide financial and personnel 
support for a hybrid Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court. (25) This court did not 
however enjoy enough international support, and as a result, UNMIK continued to rely 
on international judges, prosecutors and investigators to handle war crimes cases within 
the existing court structure. In December 2008, as part of the post-independence 
arrangements, authority for all war crimes cases was transferred to EULEX, which has 
also opted to use a hybrid system.  
Despite the fact that a dedicated war crimes tribunal was not adopted in Kosovo, 
this idea was embraced in BiH. In 2005, following the urgings of OHR and the ICTY, the 
War Crimes Chamber (WCC) was established within BiH’s State Court. The WCC 
operated as a hybrid tribunal from its inception until the end of 2012, and it has the 
charge of handling the most complex war crimes cases. Less serious ones are being 
adjudicated by local courts, in accordance with BiH’s War Crime Strategy of 2008, 
which set the target dates of 2015 and 2023 to complete all complex cases first and all 
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remaining cases last.75 As will be discussed, BiH failed to meet its 2015 deadline, but it 
has finished adjudicating all 10 cases transferred to the WCC from the ICTY.  
Examining this panoply of retributive mechanisms, BiH and Kosovo have utilized 
a range of international, hybrid and domestic trials.76 The ICTY remains active in 
prosecuting Bosnian-related cases, but beginning in 2013, this country’s WCC 
transformed into a fully domestic court, which is complemented by a range of war crimes 
trials at the local level. Despite its independence, Kosovo is still using international 
(Specialist Chambers) and hybrid trials for its remaining cases. The “judicial training 
wheels” have yet to come off for Kosovo, and substantial authority for accountability 
proceedings still rests with EULEX. Yet, despite the emphasis on trials, several other 
mechanisms have been used, albeit in limited ways.  
Although there is some local civil society and international support for a regional 
truth commission for the former Yugoslavia (known by its acronym RECOM - Regional 
Commission on Establishing the Facts on War Crimes and Grave Violations of Human 
Rights in the Former Yugoslavia), neither BiH nor Kosovo have officially signed-on, nor 
have they utilized their own truth commissions. For reasons that will be discussed later, 
Kosovo has generally avoided any attempts at establishing an historical record of events, 
and while BiH has attempted two separate truth-telling initiatives, these were limited in 
scope and effect. For instance, a mixed international/RS Commission on Srebrenica did 
release a report on events in this BiH town in June 2004, but attempts to produce a 
                                                          
75 This strategy is a prosecutorial and not a comprehensive transitional justice strategy.    
 
76 BiH also filed suit against Serbia in the International Court of Justice, which ruled in 2007 that Serbia 
was not directly responsible for genocide in BiH, only Bosnian Serbs. This verdict angered many Bosniaks. 
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similar product covering the siege of Sarajevo did not bear fruit.77 In addition to these 
bodies, there were two efforts for a Bosnian-wide truth commission, but neither attempt 
made it past a draft law owing to the lack of international and local political support. 
(Dragovic-Soso 2016, 8-10)  
Out of the remaining three mechanisms that are part of this analysis, amnesty has 
not been used, which is not surprising considering the emphasis on accountability. 
Lustration, which in these cases more closely resembles vetting, has been done. The first 
round of judicial vetting in Kosovo was conducted by UNMIK in 2001; seven years later, 
the vetting was more formal. In 2008, UNMIK established the Independent Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Commission, which was an autonomous, temporary body within the 
Kosovo Judicial Council created specifically to oversee the vetting of all judges and 
prosecutors. With the financial support of the European Commission and United States, 
334 judges and prosecutors were either reappointed or newly hired as part of this 2008 
review. (UNSYG March 13, 2001, 9, UNDP 2012, 36) Later, under its mandate, EULEX 
conducted its own round of judicial vetting in 2010. (UNSYG July 29, 2010, 16) A 
similar program was utilized by OHR in 2004 when after its vetting 20% of judges and 
prosecutors were removed and replaced. (EC 2005, 17)  
While victims in both countries deserve and need a comprehensive reparations 
program, efforts at restorative justice have been limited to property restitution. In 2000, 
the Housing and Property Directorate (HPD) was established in Kosovo under the 
authority of UNMIK to resolve residential property claims, and a similar commission 
                                                          
77 Although a Sarajevo-focused truth commission was established under the Ministry of Human Rights and 
Refugees in 2006, this body dissolved in only a year without producing a report due to ethnic 
disagreements. (Subotic 2009, 149-50) 
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(Commission on Real Property Claims for Displaced Persons and Refugees) was created 
in BiH. In terms of providing monetary compensation to victims, little has been done. 
While there are laws on the missing in both BiH and Kosovo, which for instance requires 
the Kosovo government to pay for things like burial costs once the missing are identified, 
neither state has a comprehensive reparations program for the majority of its victims, i.e., 
there has been no tangible acknowledgement of harm or efforts to restore victims to their 
pre-war state. Moreover, if the governments do dispense with some type of financial 
remuneration, it is usually packaged as pensions or other forms of social assistance.    
To review, both BiH and Kosovo have pursued a trial-heavy approach to 
transitional justice, although much of it has been dictated by the international community. 
Initial domestic trials were replete with bias, but varying hybrid systems have been and 
are being utilized to some effect. This focus on retributive justice has unfortunately 
prevented other mechanisms from being fully realized. There has been no serious effort at 
establishing truth, although ICTY trials have helped, and financial reparations for 
hundreds of thousands of victims have generally been forgotten or are too costly. The 
willingness to forgive and forget through any type of amnesty program has also been 
conspicuously absent. Restitution of property has been emphasized, as was the vetting of 
judicial personnel, but here too, the international community was the initiator and 
implementer of these reforms.  
In light of these shortcomings and despite the length of time that has transpired 
since the termination of the conflicts, both states are now working on their own 
comprehensive transitional justice strategy, albeit haltingly. As part of these strategies, 
programs are envisioned that would reform institutions, establish truth and provide 
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comprehensive reparations. Unfortunately, these strategies have been discussed for 
several years, and the lack of domestic political support for them is delaying their 
adoption. Yet, as part of both countries EU accession processes, proponents of these 
policies are hopeful international pressure will persuade local leaders to adopt 
comprehensive transitional justice policies.78    
Since these strategies are only in the development stage, they will not be part of 
this analysis. But, for BiH what is included is its use of a full range of trials, limited truth-
telling, reparations and lustration, whereas Kosovo’s transitional justice will be measured 
based upon international and hybrid trials along with lustration and reparations. 
Categorizing these mechanisms by year and model, as found in Annex B, was 
challenging. Due to the mix of international governance and developing domestic 
institutions, labeling these formulas according to this study’s international, mixed or 
domestic schema was difficult. However, based upon the definitions provided for these 
three models in Chapter Two, it is important to recall that the basis for determining a 
mixed model is the balance between the international community’s and local 
government’s responsibilities in the design and execution of the various mechanisms. 
BiH was able to move to a mixed model in 2005 following the creation of its War Crimes 
Chamber, and although hybrid judicial panels began in Kosovo as early as 2000, a true 
shared commitment to transitional justice was not in place until after its independence in 
2008. How the international community and each country arrived at their respective 
formulas is explained next. 
                                                          
78 Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, interview, June 10, 2016, Sarajevo, BiH.  
Bekim Blakaj, Humanitarian Law Center Pristina, interview, June 20, 2016, Pristina, Kosovo.  
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Model Design: International Imposition to a Balanced Approach 
 Within the transitional justice literature, it is theorized that those transitional 
processes domestically designed and implemented will be more effective in ushering-in 
meaningful changes as opposed to those internationally imposed. (Lambourne 2009, 31, 
33, Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks 2006, chap. 7, Turner 2008) As was already 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, while the descriptive statistics indicate a 
difference in models, the regression and qualitative analyses do not. Yet, understanding 
how the various mechanisms of transitional justice were developed and executed remains 
important, particularly since it describes why a justice balance was never used. Moreover, 
the imposition of the international models helps illustrate the problems of ethnic bias in 
both BiH and Kosovo.  
In order to understand the initial ICTY-centered approach, it is helpful to take 
note of the moment, both domestically and internationally, during which time this 
tribunal emerged. According to Sikkink, the ICTY was an important component within 
the emerging Justice Cascade, which is the culmination of international and domestic 
political forces that have established the global norm of individual criminal 
accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. (2011) Moreover, as 
Fletcher, Weinstein and Rowen note, when the international community intervenes in a 
weak state it will typically dictate which transitional mechanisms are used, which usually 
involves some type of accountability proceeding. (2009, 201, 209) In addition to the 
presence and spread of the accountability norm, an international court was imposed 
because the international community was not convinced the local courts could try war 
crimes cases fairly.  
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For example, Kerr contends, “…the intention was not to preclude the exercise of 
jurisdiction by national courts.  Rather, it was to ensure that the Tribunal had the power to 
command deferral of cases in national courts, if it saw fit, and to permit those cases to go 
ahead in national courts, where appropriate.” (2004, 66) Under the ICTY’s Rules of the 
Road, which oversaw Bosnian war crimes prosecutions for almost a decade, the ICTY 
had final say on who could be prosecuted locally from 1996 until 2004. The genesis for 
this program, according to OHR, was to help stop arbitrary arrests based on ethnicity in 
both of the entities. (OHR July 10, 1996)  
While the ICTY did not officially have a Rules of the Road policy with Kosovo, 
domestic war crimes prosecutions were also tightly controlled by the international 
community. The practice of UNMIK placing international judicial officials at the center 
of war crimes cases began in 2000. Early on however, UNMIK appointed local judges 
and prosecutors to temporary courts in 1999, but after bias emerged, the SRSG used 
internationally-led judicial panels consisting of two international judges alongside one 
local counterpart. Moreover, prosecutions were done by international attorneys. 
UNMIK’s control over war crimes cases continued throughout its rule of law mandate 
(1999-2008). For instance, although the UN reported in April 2002 that most of the 
international police units in Kosovo had been integrated with local police, the war crimes 
unit had not; additionally, the first local war crimes indictment against the KLA was 
issued by an international prosecutor. (UNSYG April 22, 2002, 6, UNSYG January 29, 
2003, 9) When oversight of the Kosovo Police Service was transferred to local control in 
2006, UNMIK did not include the war crimes unit or witness protection, and when the 
Kosovo Special Prosecutor’s Office was established a year later, war crimes was 
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conspicuously absent from its charge. (UNSYG June 5, 2006, 13, UNSYG June 29, 2007, 
12)  
In addition to the aforementioned factors supporting international control of trials, 
there were also practical realities that favored an initially heavy-handed international 
approach. In his first Kosovo report, the UN Secretary General explained that there was 
an institutional void in Kosovo’s judiciary. Following the war, all Kosovo Serb judges 
and prosecutors fled the province over fears of retribution, and most of the legally-trained 
Kosovo Albanians had either not yet returned from being displaced or were not qualified 
to take-on complicated war crimes cases. (UNSYG July 12, 1999, 4, UNSYG September 
18, 2000, 9) In BiH, a similar reality was faced; in 1995, BiH and OHR had to rebuild the 
judiciary from scratch as many of the former judges and prosecutors had either been 
killed during the conflict or left the country altogether. (Kiza, 250) 
 The international monopolization of transitional justice was not only in the 
judicial realm. Part of the reason a truth commission was never established in BiH 
involved ICTY concerns that this body would be a competitor for international resources 
and local witnesses. (Subotic 2009, 146-48) Yet, despite the absence of a truth 
commission, both OHR and UNMIK carried-out a series of vettings and returned 
residential property due to a lack of local political will to undertake either of these 
initiatives. Consequently, the model that emerged early on, many times out of necessity, 
was imposition of justice, lustration and the return of property by the international 
community. There was little to no domestic input into the design of these mechanisms, 
and local officials did not have shared responsibility for implementing these programs. 
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Without international action, it is likely little would have been done on transitional 
justice, or at the very least, it would not have been done well.  
However, after approximately 10 years of international imposition, 
responsibilities in transitional justice began to be slowly devolved to local institutions. In 
BiH, the need to establish a local successor to the ICTY spurred OHR and the tribunal to 
create a Bosnian-based war crimes court as part of the ICTY’s completion strategy. 
According to its original plan, this international tribunal was designed only to try the 
most serious cases involving senior officials; the ICTY’s temporary nature precluded this 
court from trying every individual responsible for war crimes from the former 
Yugoslavia. In BiH alone, there have been approximately 1,500 local convictions or 
indictments for war crimes, a judicial burden no ad-hoc international court is prepared to 
assume. (EC 2016, 27) Consequently, in 2002, after consultations with relevant local and 
international stakeholders, OHR recommended and the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) approved the creation of the War Crimes Chamber within the Bosnian State Court, 
which became operational in 2005. (OHR March 5, 2002 and OHR October 13, 2003)  
 Although the idea for the WCC came from the international community largely 
out of necessity, since its inception Bosnian officials have taken greater ownership of it. 
In the beginning, the court was a hybrid; in 2005, panels of two international judges 
worked alongside one local. By 2008, the balance had shifted to 2 local judges alongside 
one international. (International Center for Transitional Justice 2009, 4) In fact, when the 
original mandate for the international judges and prosecutors expired in 2010, many local 
Bosnian judicial officials requested extensions for the international judicial officials, 
which led to the High Representative extending their mandates through 2012. Presently, 
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there are no international judges or prosecutors within the WCC or Special Prosecutor’s 
Office.  
 While EULEX has continued to use hybrid judicial panels, it has also slowly 
shifted more operational responsibilities for war crimes cases to local institutions 
following Kosovo’s independence. In 2009, UN reports make their first mention of the 
Kosovo police beginning to assist in war crimes investigations, and by 2013, EULEX had 
reported that local and international prosecutors were investigating 100 war crimes cases. 
(EULEX 2013) The fact that local authorities have assumed some responsibilities for 
sensitive criminal cases does not mean the balance has completely shifted to local 
control, as in BiH. For instance, after the Council of Europe published in 2010 a report on 
KLA war crimes, EULEX and an international prosecutor investigated these allegations, 
eventually leading to the international Specialist Chambers. When international and 
Kosovar officials were asked about the Specialist Chambers, all interlocutors agreed that 
its creation was imposed by the EU and United States, and its location in The Hague is 
due to the high level of local political influence within the courts, concerns over witness 
protection and a lack of local capacity to prosecute these cases.79 
 Additionally, according to both EULEX and the OSCE, more Kosovar 
involvement in local war crimes cases has not occurred because local judicial officials 
fear for their safety and undergo intense social pressure not to prosecute former KLA 
members. (OSCE 2010, 26) In fact, in one EULEX report, one local judge asked to have 
his name removed from the minutes of the court records in a sensitive war crimes case. 
                                                          
79 International official, interview, June 14, 2016, Pristina, Kosovo.  
Transitional Justice consultant to the Government of Kosovo, interview, June 20, 2016, Pristina, Kosovo.  
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When this request was denied, the judge went on television to disassociate himself from 
the verdict. (2010, 31) Yet, while EULEX may still retain a great amount of authority in 
these types of cases, there is more of a balance than before independence. Moreover, like 
BiH, Kosovo’s government, along with civil society, are responsible for drafting their 
own comprehensive transitional justice strategy, and both countries now have their own 
prosecutorial and judicial councils that appoint and conduct disciplinary proceedings for 
all local judges and prosecutors.  
 It would be incomplete, however, to end this discussion on the why and how of 
mechanism selection without also highlighting the role ethnic politics played in these 
choices. Although initial ICTY resistance to a Bosnian truth commission has been noted, 
a Bosnian official also admitted that any type of fact-finding remains too difficult 
considering the lingering ethnic polarization among the various communities.80 A 
representative in the Ombudsman’s office added that local support for a truth commission 
has subsided because many Bosnians fear this will lead to amnesties, and they also do not 
want a commission to produce a report that may equate victim suffering.81 Similar 
attitudes are found in Kosovo where due to Serbia’s failure to apologize for its part in the 
conflict, many Kosovars are hesitant to support any regional truth initiative that includes 
officials from Serbia or would equate the suffering of Kosovo’s Albanian and Serbian 
communities. (Di Lellio and McCurn, 132, 140)    
In Kosovo, independence and ethnicity have also mixed to hinder the rate of 
Kosovo’s assumption of judicial responsibilities and activities in northern Kosovo. 
                                                          
80 Interview, supra n 78.  
 
81 Bosnian Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office, Interview, June 4, 2016, Sarajevo, BiH.  
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Before Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, EULEX was preparing for a less 
robust mission, but in light of some EU members’ refusal to recognize Kosovo, along 
with Serbia’s rejection of the declaration, EULEX was required to change its mandate 
from monitoring, mentoring and advising to one with more executive authorities. (Hylke-
Dijkstra 2011, 197-99) Status sensitivities have also kept Kosovar officials from 
adjudicating war crimes cases in the ethnically-divided and contested region of northern 
Kosovo. Here, international judges and prosecutors remain the only judicial personnel 
carrying out sensitive cases because of the Kosovo Serbs’ refusal to accept Pristina’s 
authority in these matters. (UNSYG April 27, 2015, 12)  
Consequently, the processes of mechanism design and implementation are 
complicated. International imposition of the ICTY by the Security Council was a result of 
international factors, but also based on the reality of biased and initially weak judiciaries. 
International hegemony in accountability proceedings persisted for many years, and the 
transfer of responsibilities did not begin until the need arose. A more balanced approach, 
i.e., utilizing a truth commission alongside trials or offering amnesties, was never 
seriously considered, largely due to deep ethnic divides and the international 
preoccupation with justice. While understanding the influence of international and 
domestic factors helps explain the why and how of mechanism design and 
implementation, it is also important to ask whether these models reflect the wants and 
needs of the people of BiH and Kosovo.  
Interestingly, opinion polling shows that citizens in both states prioritize 
accountability over other mechanisms. In Kosovo, 90% of respondents in 2007 believed 
punishing war crimes perpetrators was important; prioritization of trials was also evident 
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in a 2014 Kosovo survey where when asked what is the best way to reveal the truth 
regarding the conflict, 30% (the highest category chosen) stated that trials/courts were the 
best option, whereas an international truth commission came in second with only 13%. 
(UNDP 2007, 21, UNDP 2014, 20) Similar levels of support for trials were also found in 
BiH. According to a 2010 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) poll, justice for 
the victims was the number one choice of mechanisms for inclusion in any transitional 
justice strategy according to Bosnian respondents. (2011, 21) Although it is clear that 
many in BiH and Kosovo support trials, it is not clear whether this is due to a deep desire 
for retribution, or many are not educated about alternative choices. For example, in the 
same Bosnian poll, 61% admitted they did not know what a truth commission was. (Ibid, 
25) 
In regards to support for the ICTY, this depends almost entirely upon ethnicity. 
Overall, general support for the international tribunal is high within Kosovo, typically the 
highest of any country in the region. In 2004, 66% of Kosovars supported the statement 
that the ICTY is the proper jurisdiction for war crimes cases; by 2006, 86% of Kosovars 
supported extraditions to the ICTY to further peace and by 2011 93% believed the same. 
(Ivkovich and Hagan 2009, 48 and Gallup Balkan Monitor) But, while there is support 
for the Tribunal in Kosovo, it is not uniform. When asked in 2012 if the ICTY meets 
international standards, only 1% of Kosovo Serbs agreed, which is a steep decline from 
the 30% of support Kosovo Serbs had given the court in 2007. (UNDP 2012, 15-17) 
Bosnian Serbs also do not believe in the impartiality of the ICTY. When asked if they 
had confidence in the tribunal, out of the 23% that did in BiH, only 7% were Bosnian 
Serbs. (UN Resident Coordinator’s Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013, 46)      
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Clearly, Serb support for the ICTY, whether in Serbia, BiH or Kosovo, is weak, 
particularly since it is viewed as a tool of victor’s justice by many Serb people. For 
instance, this belief is fueled by the facts that two-thirds of the ICTY-indictees are of 
Serb origin, and only two Kosovar Albanians were ever convicted by this ad-hoc 
tribunal.82 Yet, while there was initially strong Bosniak endorsement for the ICTY, this 
too is declining due to judicial decisions this community views as unfair. In 2000, 78% of 
the residents of Sarajevo agreed that the ICTY was the proper jurisdiction for war crimes, 
but only three years later, this level of support declined to 44%. (Ivkovich and Hagan, 48) 
During a series of interviews, representatives of Bosniak-based victims’ organizations 
acknowledged that the court was helpful, namely it prosecuted individuals that might not 
have otherwise stood trial, but recent court actions have eroded trust. One victim and now 
leader of an organization that represents victims from Srebrenica stated that the ICTY’s 
acquittal of Serbian leader Vojislav Seselj was “outrageous,” and she noted that the 
International Court of Justice’s failure to convict Serbia of genocide was even more 
upsetting.83  
In terms of support for others mechanisms of transitional justice, there are clearly 
strong desires within societies for their governments to do more. Eighty-eight percent of 
Bosnians believe their government should develop a strategy for confronting the past and 
providing the truth, and 81% note that the conflict’s victims have been abandoned or 
                                                          
82 Haradin Bala and Lahi Brahimaj are the two Kosovo Albanians convicted and sentenced to prison by the 
ICTY. Four other Kosovo Albanians stood trial at the ICTY but were acquitted.   
 
83 Many Bosniaks blame the ICTY for the ICJ’s verdict. The ICTY refused to share some FRY government 
documents with the ICJ due to this ad-hoc tribunal’s desire to protect the national security of Serbia. 
Munira Subasic, Head of the Movement of Mothers of Srbrenica and Zepa, interview, June 10, 2016, 
Sarajevo, BiH.  
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current attempts to remedy their situations have been insufficient. (UNDP 2011, 21, 29) 
In Kosovo, 95% support finding the truth, 81% believe all victims should receive 
material compensation and 73% endorse removing or barring from public office 
politicians involved in former abusive behaviors. (UNDP 2012, 22, 26 and 29)  
Considering these opinions, it is important to note that in transitional 
environments courts can only do so much. The ICTY indicted only 161 individuals, and 
Bosnian judicial proceedings, while laudable, led to the indictment of approximately 
1,500 people out of a country where close to 200,000 died, 170,000 were injured and 
millions were displaced. Due to its nature, trials in post-conflict states have difficulty 
reaching everyone. When asked whether they or their family had direct experience with 
the ICTY or local war crimes cases, 96% of Bosnians replied that they have had no 
involvement with these courts. (UN Resident Coordinator’s Office in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 29) Subsequently, while Bosnians and Kosovars support justice, they also 
want and need more. 
For Olsen, Payne and Reiter (2010) these desires for a justice balance are not 
surprising. Recall that in relation to democracy and human rights, the aforementioned 
scholars find that in order for transitional justice to have a positive effect on these two 
areas, there must be a justice balance. For instance, trials or a truth commission alone will 
not promote democracy or human rights; trials need to be accompanied by a restorative 
element, such as amnesties. (Ibid) The international models used in BiH and Kosovo did 
not couple trials with amnesties or a truth commission, and attempts at reparations were 
limited. While a justice balance for the rule of law was not part of the Olsen, et al.’s, 
study, it is logically consistent to expect the same for this other area as well.  
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Putting aside the absence of a justice balance for now, theoretically, the enhanced 
responsibilities for the design and execution of their respective transitional mechanisms 
should have helped transitional justice play a more meaningful role in both BiH and 
Kosovo. Bosnia has had more control over its transitional policies since 2005, and after 
independence in 2008, the international community has slowly given Kosovars more 
responsibilities. Based on a statistical comparison of means, these assumptions appear 
valid. Unfortunately, the permeation of a radicalized ethnic ideology, coupled with an 
over-reliance on trials, continue to impede potentially positive effects of transitional 
justice, whether under an international or mixed model.   
Transitional Justice & Its Effects  
 Before launching an assessment of the effects of transitional justice in BiH and 
Kosovo against Klienfeld’s five end goals of rule of law reform, it is important to first 
establish a baseline of the rule of law before the start of transitional justice. Since the 
WGI does not provide a measurement for either of these two countries before transitional 
mechanisms began, data on the state of the rule of law is taken from OHR and UN 
reports. Overall, during each country’s respective conflicts, the rule of law was generally 
absent. Approximately 200,000 people were killed, at least another 200,000 injured, 
millions were displaced and the destruction of personal and religious property was 
commonplace. Moreover, in BiH genocide occurred. In addition to the violence, 
institutions that protect the rule of law crumpled. In its first report on Kosovo, the 
UNSYG noted that there were no local police, the judiciary was not functioning and in 
some areas there was “lawlessness.” (July 12, 1999, 2, 4) Although the institutional void 
was not as deep in BiH, this country’s first post-conflict year included both entities 
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refusing to release their prisoners of war, arbitrary arrests based on ethnicity were being 
made, property rights were ignored and there were regular police beatings and torture of 
prisoners. (OHR, July 10, 1996, October 1, 1996 and December 10, 1996)  
While it is difficult to assign a numerical score for each country’s rule of law 
during and immediately following their conflicts, it is helpful to recall that three years 
after the cessation of violence in Kosovo, the WGI assessed the rule of law to be 
extremely poor (-1.06); Bosnia’s first representative score, a -0.64 in 1998 also signifies a 
country struggling to establish a nation governed by the law. Subsequently, against this 
backdrop, transitional justice was introduced.  
Government Subordinate to the Law & Equality of All Before the Law 
 Theoretically, these two end goals of rule of law reform should have improved 
dramatically in the trial-rich transitional environments of BiH and Kosovo. Many of the 
architects of the war crimes, including presidents, prime ministers and generals, were sent 
to the ICTY, and those that carried-out the orders have also been prosecuted in hundreds 
of local war crimes trials throughout BiH and Kosovo. Therefore, what much of the 
transitional justice literature expects from trials, primarily that they will reinforce the 
equality of all before the law, should be found in these two Balkan states. (Olsen, Payne 
and Reiter 2010, 133) Unfortunately, contrary to expectations, the widespread use of 
trials did little to promote these two end goals. The focus on ethnicity and ethnic politics 
diluted the effects of the trials, at least for now.  
 The data, both quantitative and qualitative, is in overwhelming agreement 
regarding the absence of governments subordinate to the law and that promote the 
equality of all before it. According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), both 
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BiH and Kosovo struggle to prosecute abuse of public office. Bosnia’s initial score in this 
area in 2006 was a six, which is where it remains today, and Kosovo has stayed at a five 
(out of 10).84 The second BTI indicator helpful in evaluating these end goals is the 
independence of the judiciary.85 In BiH, the independence of its judiciary is deteriorating 
after more than two decades of transitional trials and international oversight. In 2006, its 
judiciary was relatively independent, receiving a seven out of 10, but from 2008-2012 it 
dropped to a six and from 2014-2016 it declined even further to a five, i.e., a judiciary 
that is heavily impaired by political authority and corruption. Likewise, Kosovo is also 
weak in this domain, having received a five since 2010.  
 These results are troubling considering the enormous investment the international 
community and some local officials have spent on trials over the last two decades. 
Furthermore, the EU, UN, OSCE, ICTY and other international organizations have spent 
millions of dollars and countless hours on judicial reform in both states. While there are 
several factors that contributed to the failure of transitional justice to help improve these 
areas, the most significant is the prioritization of ethnicity over dealing with the crimes of 
the past.86 In both of these countries, impunity is tolerated as long as the accused or 
convicted is part of one’s ethnic community. For instance, when asked who was 
responsible for the Bosnian war, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats identify Serbia (62% and 
                                                          
84 According to the BTI, a seven is equated to a country where these abuses are generally prosecuted and a 
four signifies there is not adequate prosecution; hence, both countries fall somewhere in-between. 
 
85 Within the last chapter, this indicator was used to evaluate whether a predictable and efficient judicial 
system emerged. But, because it is unlikely there will be a government subordinate to the law without an 
independent judiciary, this indicator can also be used to measure this end goal as well. 
 
86 Here, one could also add the failure of international missions to consistently model accountability. But 
since this analysis focuses on transitional justice, this issue is not discussed.  
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61% respectively), while Bosnian Serbs blame the international community (62%). (UN 
Resident Coordinator’s Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21) In Kosovo, an 
overwhelming majority of Kosovo Albanians also believe their ethnic community was 
not responsible for war crimes (70%), whereas 49% of Kosovo’s Serbian community also 
claim innocence. (UNDP 2014, 21)   
The war-time narratives that dominate in these countries either portray one ethnic 
group as entirely the victims or liberators, or claim trials are simply victor’s justice. 
Consequently, in countries where hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed, raped, 
injured or displaced, there remains vehement disagreements over who is responsible for 
these crimes. From an outsider’s perspective, enough evidence has already been 
presented in the ICTY, ICJ and other legal forums that demonstrate crimes were 
committed by all sides, yet the politicization of ethnicity has prevented many from 
accepting fact. Subsequently, unlike Colombia where there is a relative degree of 
consensus that all sides share in the blame, in these two Balkan states agreement on a 
common narrative is not found, and therefore, the investigations and verdicts rendered in 
war crimes cases are seen by many through an ethnic-colored lens. Evidence of this 
commitment to ethnicity over justice is found in the lack of cooperation with the ICTY, 
reactions to local war crimes cases, the failure of society to purge itself and its political 
leadership of an extreme ethnic ideology and limited regional cooperation on dealing 
with the past. 
 In relation to the lack of ICTY compliance and local reactions to war crimes 
cases, from 1995-96 OHR noted that neither entity was abiding by the Rules of the Road, 
which meant that both sides were still making arbitrary arrests of war criminals based on 
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ethnicity. (October 1, 1996) The bias that had seeped into the local judiciary furthermore 
forced OHR to begin recruiting international judges and prosecutors. (October 13, 2003) 
In regards to its international obligations to cooperate with the ICTY, seven years after 
the termination of hostilities, RS officials had still failed to arrest or even facilitate the 
arrest of one ICTY-indictee. (May 14, 2002) Furthermore, although the tribunal issued 
indictments against the two most senior Bosnian Serb leaders in 1995, Ratko Mladic and 
Radovan Karadzic, the latter would not be apprehended until 2008 and the former not 
until 2011.87   
 Yet, even after these apprehensions, RS behavior has clearly sought to undermine 
any foreign trials against Bosnian Serbs. For instance, following Karadzic’s 
apprehension, the RS pledged to support him and his family; by 2016, officials in this 
entity committed to using public funds to pay the personal expenses of Karadzic, Mladic 
and two other Bosnian Serbs in The Hague. This pledge consists of a combined monthly 
stipend of more than 20,000 euros for things such as clothes, telephone bills and food. 
(Obradovic 2016) Official support has not stopped at monetary contributions. In 2010, 
the RS Serbian Democratic Party awarded Karadzic its highest honor, and three years 
later, RS President Dodik testified as a defense witness for Karadzic, stating during his 
testimony that the defendant, “…never insisted on the commission of any crimes…”88 
(OHR November 8, 2010 and May 8, 2013)  
                                                          
87 Bosniak and Bosnian Croat cooperation with the tribunal was better. (OHR April 9, 1998 and May 14, 
2002)  
 
88 Radovan Karadzic was found guilty and sentenced by the ICTY to 40 years’ imprisonment on March 24, 
2016. He was found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war. His 
verdict is currently under appeal.  
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Helping to explain this behavior, Subotic argues that war crime trials in BiH are 
not about delivering justice; rather, accountability proceedings have been “hijacked” by 
local elites for political purposes. In the RS, its limited “cooperation” is attributed to 
pressure from OHR and the EU, as well as its desire to gain legitimacy within the 
international community. Bosniaks on the other hand have been more supportive because 
they view it as an opportunity to weaken the RS, and thereby promote greater state unity. 
(2009, 151-52, 159-63) While some may argue that motivations for compliance are not as 
important as convicting the wrongdoers, in this case the elites’ behavior, i.e., minimal 
outward cooperation with the courts while taking action to undermine their results, does 
not support development of the rule of law. Moreover, recent denials by RS officials that 
genocide even occurred in Srebrenica despite this having been legally established in the 
International Court of Justice and ICTY decisions, further erodes confidence that justice 
is being served, as well as negates any potentially restorative effects from the report 
issued by the Srebrenica Commission more than a decade ago.89 (OHR November 8, 
2010) Unfortunately, this same type of behavior is also found in Kosovo.   
 Here, compliance by the majority Kosovo Albanian community has on the surface 
been better. Following the first ICTY indictments against the KLA in 2003, UNMIK 
reported that the arrests went without incident, although there were approximately two-
dozen non-violent demonstrations. (UNSYG April 14, 2003, 4) Two years later when the 
second round of ICTY indictments against the KLA were issued, which involved then 
Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, he immediately resigned, went to The Hague and 
                                                          
89 See ICTY March 24, 2016 verdict against Randovan Karadizic and ICJ decision of February 26, 2007. 
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called upon his fellow Kosovars to respect the rule of law. (UNSYG May 23, 2005, 9) 
While laudable, the Kosovars’ compliance with the ICTY was likely motivated by 
political interests, namely achieving independence. For instance, in the same report where 
it discusses the Prime Minister’s indictment, the UN requests approval from the Security 
Council for a comprehensive standards review that summer, which when subsequently 
completed led to the initiation of status talks.90 (Ibid, 6) If the Kosovo government would 
have ignored the ICTY’s indictments, or if the Prime Minister had fled Kosovo, a 
positive assessment on standards would likely not have been given and a decision on 
status delayed.  
 Support for this argument is found in the Kosovo Albanian leadership’s behavior 
behind the scenes. For instance, although Prime Minister Haradinaj went immediately to 
The Hague, this court’s Office of the Prosecutor complained of the difficulty in trying 
this case because of witness intimidation. (ICTY 2007, 20) Moreover, following the 
UNMIK arrest of several former KLA members for war crimes in 2002, Kosovo’s 
provisional government issued a resolution condemning the arrest of KLA “political 
prisoners.” (UNSYG October 9, 2002, 5) Furthermore, the UN believes that a March 
2004 protest against the arrest of four former KLA was part of the spark that ignited 
several days of ethnic riots later that same month. These riots, which were led by Kosovo 
Albanians and largely targeted minority communities, resulted in 19 deaths, 954 injuries 
and the damage or destruction of 730 homes and 36 Serbian Orthodox sites. (UNSYG 
April 30, 2004, 1-2) While several Kosovo officials initially blamed the riots on Serbia 
                                                          
90 During its mandate, UNMIK outlined a handful of Standards for Kosovo, which included good 
governance, the rule of law and protection of ethnic rights as benchmarks that would be periodically 
measured to assess Kosovo’s readiness for a status outcome.  
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and UNMIK’s presence in the province, the true tell of the tolerance for impunity is the 
lack of prosecutions that followed. Four years after these deadly events, the OSCE 
assessed the judicial response to these ethnically-based crimes as poor. Overall, witnesses 
did not come forward, sentences were too lenient, ethnicity was not considered a 
motivating factor in the trials and many local police who were summoned as witnesses 
refused to testify. (OSCE 2008, 3, 21) Moreover, of the more than 50,000 people 
estimated to have participated in the riots and from the 1,400 criminal complaints filed, 
only 301 people were convicted of riot-related crimes. (Ibid, 3)  
 Although the aforementioned incidents are from more than a decade ago, many 
Kosovo Albanians remain unwilling to acknowledge atrocities its forces committed 
during the war. During one war crimes trial in 2010, then Prime Minister Hashim Thaci 
referred to one defendant, who was also a member of his government, as a freedom 
fighter and innocent of the accused crimes. (EULEX 2010, 31) In April 2011, a mayor 
was sentenced to 30 days in jail for refusing to testify in a war crimes case. (UNSYG 
May 3, 2011, 7) Most recently, the continuation of impunity precipitated the international 
community to establish the Specialist Chambers outside of Kosovo. Describing why this 
court was needed in The Hague, Kosovo Prime Minister Mustafa told his parliament, 
“Unfortunately, the failure of the rule of law, in many cases, has influenced the 
international community’s loss of trust that we can develop this process in our country.” 
(Collak 2015)  
 In addition to the overt and more subtle obfuscation of ICTY and local war crime 
proceedings, there has been a general lack of political lustration and societal rejection of 
the war-time parties and the goals they espouse. Under UNMIK, EULEX and OHR, 
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vetting of judges and prosecutors was done. But, in general, there has not been any 
comprehensive lustration of the parties and officials responsible for waging these wars. 
Subsequently, many of those involved in the war remain politically active, and as one 
Bosnian official observed, while the physical violence stopped, the war has never 
ended.91   
For example, in Kosovo, three of its post-war prime ministers were senior KLA 
commanders, one of which was tried in the ICTY for war crimes.92 Additionally, two of 
the three largest political parties in Kosovo, the Democratic Party of Kosovo and Alliance 
for the Future of Kosovo, formed as a result of the demobilization of the KLA, and still 
embody many of this entity’s aspirations. Kosovo has also elected an indicted war 
criminal to its Assembly (Fatmir Limaj). In BiH, current members of the government 
were also in positions of authority before the war, such as RS President Dodik. Equally 
troubling and possibly more corrosive to the rule of law has been the persistence of war 
criminals within the ranks of the RS police. In 1997, OHR warned of the existence of war 
crime indictees in the local police, and ten years later the High Representative still had to 
take executive action, seizing the passports and suspending 35 police officers in the RS 
because they were under investigations for war crimes. (OHR July 11, 1997 and 
November 15, 2007) According to Subotic, an estimated 1,000 alleged perpetrators of 
crimes in Srebrenica were still in the RS police force. (2009, 157)  
 Certainly, it is reasonable that war-time leaders will seek to retain positions of 
power once the conflict ends, and it is acceptable that those war-time leaders or soldiers 
                                                          
91 Interview, supra n 78.  
 
92 These are Ramush Haradinaj, Agim Ceku and Hashim Thaci.  
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not responsible for war crimes be able to serve their country once they have laid-down 
their arms. As was illustrated in Chapter Three, several former guerillas in Colombia 
have made the successful transition to politics, and have become respected members of 
the government after completing officially-sanctioned amnesty processes. What differs in 
BiH and Kosovo, where there has been no amnesty and accountability has been 
prioritized, is that when there is a public policy of accountability yet individuals with 
criminal and questionable pasts are allowed to remain in positions of power, a double-
standard emerges and impunity is allowed to fester. Additionally, allowing these 
politicians and police to remain in office also makes it easier for them to manipulate the 
justice system. 
 One common theme that emerged in the one-on-one interviews, and which is 
borne-out by the BTI, is that the courts in both BiH and Kosovo are heavily influenced by 
political forces. One international official in Sarajevo noted that judicial decisions are 
often based on politics and not the law.93 And since politics are driven by ethnicity in 
these two countries, ethnicity can dictate court decisions. The OSCE noted in a recent 
report that at the state level in BiH, the WCC and State Prosecutor’s Office are constantly 
being attacked politically in order to influence war crimes cases; consequently, the 
barrage of attacks is eroding public trust in these trials. (2011, 85-86) This same level of 
political interference has also been noted by the UN in Kosovo. In his July 2010 report, 
the UN SYG warned of political interference in the judiciary at all levels, and three years 
later, the UN noted that during the war crimes trial of a Kosovo Assembly member, 
                                                          
93 International official, interview, June 7, 2016, Sarajevo, BiH.  
138 
 
Kosovo Albanian officials attempted to intervene in the proceedings. (UNSYG February 
4, 2013, 15) Judicial interference has risen to such a level in Kosovo that the OSCE 
warns that this behavior is negatively impacting the rule of law. (2012, 4) 
While it is clear that lustration did not go far enough, one must accept that many 
of these government officials have been democratically elected, often in elections 
monitored by the international community. President Dodik, Ramush Haradinaj and 
others were all chosen by their people. Moreover, while the international missions in both 
states had the authority to sanction and remove politicians, it was not easy to do. Both 
OHR and UNMIK were sent to establish and strengthen indigenous institutions of local 
government. Those locals capable of governing and capable of soliciting enough public 
and political support to win elections were also likely involved in war-time politics. In 
order to effect change, the international community was sometimes required to work with 
officials it probably preferred not to engage. Yet, while some responsibility falls at the 
feet of the international missions for not encouraging a wider lustration policy, in the end, 
the people of BiH and Kosovo are ultimately responsible for who they elect.   
One well-known scholar of Southeastern European politics contends that one of 
the missing pillars in transitional justice is the failure of society to come to terms with its 
responsibilities for the atrocities that were committed. The emphasis that trials place on 
individual accountability allows societies to ignore their direct or indirect complicity in 
the crimes that occurred. (Subotic 2011, 158-59) Describing society’s role, she reminds 
readers, “They [the war-time governments] built their policies on a societal receptivity to 
violent claims that were broadly accepted, normalized, and routinized in society and gave 
criminal policies a patina of legitimacy.” (Ibid, 160) Therefore, what should accompany 
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trials are things that require larger societal participation, such as apologies, reparations, 
public commemorations and truth commissions. (Ibid, 159-61) Unfortunately, there has 
not been a balanced approach to transitional justice in either Balkan state, and the various 
ethnic communities continue to resist accepting culpability for the crimes that transpired.  
This obstinacy to deal truthfully with the past is also clearly found in the lack of 
regional cooperation in prosecuting war crimes, working together to identify the missing, 
establishing a record of truth or providing reparations. While the Kosovo and Bosnian 
governments clearly have responsibilities to lead their transitional processes, the conflicts 
in both BiH and Kosovo involved other countries as well, particularly Serbia. The ethnic 
tensions that persist between these states continues to feed ethnic extremists while 
inhibiting the development of comprehensive transitional justice strategies. For instance, 
while Kosovo’s Albanian-led government has certain responsibilities for executing 
transitional justice, any program will be incomplete without Serbia’s involvement and 
resources. Serbia was the other actor in this bloody history, yet because Serbia has not 
had to govern Kosovo since 1999, it does not have any internal pressure or desire to make 
amends.   
When asked about the state of regional cooperation, an ICTY official replied that 
it is still insufficient, and that the realities of dual-citizenship and unwillingness of these 
countries to extradite war criminals provides sanctuary for many perpetrators. Absent an 
agreement on extradition, most of the countries in the region now rely upon agreements 
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that require convicted war criminals to serve their time in the country where they reside. 
But, even here, the ICTY acknowledged that these requests are sometimes ignored.94  
Outside of trials, cooperation on other mechanisms is equally poor and driven by 
ethnic animosities. Reference has already been made to the unwillingness of any country 
to participate in a regional truth commission over fears of equating levels of victimization 
and lack of trust. In Kosovo, one civil society activist lamented the failure of Kosovars to 
file reparation claims in Serbian courts before independence, and she believes at the very 
least, Serbia should offer an apology for the crimes its forces committed in Kosovo.95 The 
head of Kosovo’s Commission on Missing Persons agreed that at a minimum an apology 
should be offered, but he explained that Serbia also needs to be more forthcoming in 
providing information on the whereabouts of the remaining 1,665 missing from Kosovo. 
Mr. Gjetaj noted that Serbia’s actions in Kosovo during the war were coordinated, and 
when they withdrew, he believes these forces took the dead bodies with them and 
reburied or incinerated many of them in Serbia. Without resolution of the missing, 
reconciliation will be harder and accountability incomplete.96  
The lack of regional cooperation, the failure of these societies to truly purge 
themselves of a toxic ethnic ideology and those politicians that support it, as well as 
efforts to undermine war crimes trials all point to how ethnicity is being prioritized over 
justice. This ethnic inhibiter has prevented the multiple levels of trials from developing 
                                                          
94 ICTY official, interview, June 3, 2016, Sarajevo, BiH.  
 
95 Nora Ahmetaj, Consultant on Transitional Justice, Centre for Research, Documentation and Publication, 
interview, June 13, 2016, Pristina, Kosovo.  
 
96 Prenk Gjetaj, Government of Kosovo Commission on Missing Persons, interview, June 17, 2016, 
Pristina, Kosovo.  
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within these countries the accountability of all before the law. However, the hope is that 
over time, the reification of ethnicity will be weakened as these countries move closer to 
the EU, and with a new vision for the future, these trials will be viewed more positively.    
Law & Order 
 Another aim of transitional justice, particularly trials, is to deter future bad 
behavior. (Sikkink 2011, 169-71) Subsequently, much like the last two end goals, the 
extensive use of trials should have led to a significant reduction in the number of serious 
crimes, especially those targeting ethnic communities. While there has fortunately been a 
reduction in the numbers of murders and assaults in both countries since the termination 
of their conflicts, the reductions were not immediate, and it is not clear that trials were the 
cause. In addition to examining rates of serious crimes, adherence to law and order 
should also be manifested in the protection of property rights. Both countries emphasized 
policies to restore property to the displaced, but like much of what has already been 
discussed, the promotion of property rights has also been inhibited by ethnic tensions as 
well as a lack of resources.  
 In their immediate post-conflict environments, ethnic attacks continued in both 
BiH and Kosovo despite the ongoing operations of the ICTY. In both states, violent 
retributive actions against other ethnicities were commonplace; for three years (1996-98), 
OHR reported regular police beatings and torture of prisoners in both entities, along with 
an increase in attacks against religious heritage and the vacant properties of the displaced. 
(October 1, 1996, October 16, 1997, and July 14, 1998) In Kosovo, the situation was 
equally appalling. The UN reports from 1999-2001 highlight regular episodes of 
lawlessness, retribution and the absence of law and order. The killings of Kosovo Serbs, 
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looting their homes and setting ablaze Serbian patrimony was all too common in 1999. 
(UNSYG July 12, 1999, 2) Fortunately, with the deployment of international and local 
police, by 2002 serious crimes against minorities had decreased from “systematic to 
random,” but in March 2004, ethnic animosities boiled-over once again. (UNSYG 
January 15, 2002, 6)  
Although there has not been a major outbreak of ethnic violence in either Kosovo 
or Bosnia since 2004, ethnic relations are contentious. For instance, in its 2011 and 2012 
reports, the UN noted that ethnic crimes had increased in Kosovo 24% during the 
summer-fall period of 2011 when compared to the same time in 2010. (UNSYG October 
31, 2011, 5) Moreover, in 2012, ethnic crimes continued to rise. (April 27, 2012, 5) In 
BiH, many are still concerned that there will be another Mladic, and RS threats to hold a 
referendum next year on independence only exacerbates existing ethnic tensions. (OHR 
October 21, 2016)    
 The persistence of ethnic animosities also appears to be reflected in crime 
statistics for both countries.97 For instance, the number of assaults recorded by the police 
in BiH was more than 1,300 in 2005; this figure rose to close to 1,600 in 2007, but by 
2010 it had fallen to 505. In Kosovo, more than 3,300 assaults were committed in 2008, 
and the number did not drop below 3,000 per-year until 2013 when there were only 653. 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) Figures on the number of murders per 
100,000 people also reflects a stubbornly slow decline in serious crimes. For example, 
                                                          
97 Local crime statistics for both BiH and Kosovo are difficult to find. Neither UNMIK nor OHR provide 
regular crime statistics, and the national statistical agency for BiH did not begin producing public reports 
until 2011. Kosovo’s statistics agency did not publish its reports until 2005, and its section on crime only 
counts the number of cases before local courts. Moreover, UNODC’s statistics on murders and assaults 
only begins in 2005. 
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according to UNODC, there were approximately 1,900 murders throughout Kosovo in 
2008; by 2011 the number had declined to only slightly more than 1,000. Table 4.1 
provides statistics on the murder rates in both countries.  
Table 4.1: Murder Rates in BiH and Kosovo (per 100,000 people)  
Year BiH Kosovo 
2009 71 73 
2010 56 106 
2011 51 62 
2012 63 90 
2013 46 41 
2014 50 41 
 *Data is from UNODC.  
Since the available data does not provide a breakdown of victims by ethnicity, and 
because there are no reliable statistics on the numbers of assaults and murders in the 
immediate post-conflict years, reaching any definitive conclusions regarding the impact 
of transitional justice on improving law and order viz-a-viz reductions in serious crimes 
is difficult to achieve. It is possible that it took many years for the deterrent effect to be 
realized, or it could be that there have been fewer murders and assaults in BiH due to the 
federated structure, i.e., the ethnic divide is more tangible and therefore there is less 
interaction between the ethnic communities. What can be ascertained, however, is that 
the cessation of the wars and the deployment of international peacekeepers and police 
stopped any further episodes of genocide and widespread ethnic cleansing.  
After the Dayton Accords, NATO deployed 60,000 troops to BiH under the 
Implementation Force (IFOR), followed by a smaller (32,000) Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) from 1997 through 2004. From 2005 to today, the EU has military forces there 
under Operation Althea, which initially numbered 7,000 troops. For Kosovo, the 
international community provided a NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) of close to 50,000 
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troops in 1999; KFOR remains on the ground, today numbering around 4,500 
international military personnel. (NATO) In addition to these forces, the UN deployed a 
4,500 civilian-member police mission to help UNMIK restore law and order, which was 
followed by approximately 1,000 European and U.S. police under EULEX command in 
2008. (UNSYG December 15, 2000, 5, UNSYG March 17, 2009, 4) Subsequently, some 
of the stability and reduction in violence can be attributed to these robust international 
security deployments. In addition to the international community providing security, 
these countries’ international governing missions also played a role in promoting 
property rights, albeit with mixed results.  
Similar to events in Colombia, during the conflicts in BiH and Kosovo, property 
rights were not respected. Bosnia’s Commission on Real Property Claims for Displaced 
Persons and Refugees (CRPC) received at least 148,167 claims; in Kosovo, its Housing 
and Property Directorate (HPD) was required to resolve 42,701 residential property 
disputes. (OHR February 12, 1999, UNSYG August 1, 2014, 13) How these 
internationally-led agencies, along with their local implementing partners handled this 
aspect of restorative justice is a useful yardstick in measuring the state of a country’s law 
and order. Unfortunately, these transitional mechanisms were only effective in 
adjudicating claims; the lack of political will to enforce these decisions has hindered 
these processes successful completion.  
According to the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedoms, which forms 
part of the WGI’s rule of law score, property rights in BiH are abysmal. On a scale from 
0 (minimum protection) to 100 (optimal property rights), BiH languished at a 10 from 
1998-2009; from 2010-2015, these rights improved slightly to 20. Data for Kosovo is 
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only available for 2012, which despite 12 years of HPD-led work, only produced a 30 out 
of 100. Although both the CRPC and HPD completed the resolution of claims in 2006 
and 2015 respectively, implementation of their decisions has been slow. From the more 
than 19,000 claims adjudicated by HPD as of November 2004, only 46% of these 
decisions had been implemented. (UNSYG November 17, 2004, 17) In BiH, six years 
into its work, only 29% and 13% of the CRPC’s decisions were implemented in the 
Federation and RS respectively. (OHR March 12, 2001) Assessing why there has been 
poor rates of compliance, both OHR and UNMIK cite a lack of political will, particularly 
at the local/municipal level. Processing thousands of property claims is not easy, 
particularly in countries where property records might be non-existent or reside in other 
countries (Serbia). Yet, in these situations, the sheer logistical difficulty was compounded 
by local resistance or ambivalence to the importance of these rights. In these two 
countries where hundreds of thousands were displaced, enforcing property rights is not 
simply about following a judicial decision; ensuring property rights is central to other 
issues, such as the return of the displaced.  
Despite the work that has been done, largely by the international community, 
Kosovo Albanians continue to loot and vandalize Kosovo Serb homes and cultural 
patrimony, and the European Commission notes that although the CRPC was terminated 
in 2009, there remains a lack of political will and resources to finish the remaining 
cases/appeals, develop a database for unresolved property claims and provide reliable 
registries. (UNSYG October 31, 2011, 5, EC 2010, 19) Unfortunately, within this rule of 
law end goal, the impact of transitional justice is minimal. The cessation of the conflicts 
and deployments of international peacekeepers and police appear to have played greater 
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roles in restoring law and order than any potential deterrent effect. Moreover, despite the 
adjudication of thousands of property claims, which helped slightly improve property 
rights, the implementation of these decisions was delayed or ignored due to a lack of 
political will based on lingering ethnic divisions.   
Predictable & Efficient Justice 
 Unlike the inefficiency that plagues Colombia’s Justice and Peace process, 
transitional trials in both BiH and Kosovo are now operating more regularly and 
efficiently following their own slow starts. Unfortunately, this improved performance in 
domestic and hybrid war crimes trials has not been transferred into the overall judicial 
systems. In light of the fact that the international community controlled the initial wave 
of trials, primarily through the ICTY, as well as OHR’s, UNMIK’s and EULEX’s 
executive management of the justice systems, the responsibility for the failure to 
inculcate these qualities more widely rests as much with the international community as 
with Bosnian and Kosovar authorities. While missteps by the international community 
are part of the explanation for the lack of diffusion from transitional trials, other post-
conflict inhibiters are also preventing these systems of justice from fully maturing. In 
order to assess the predictability and efficiency of the rule of law, the manner in which 
the ICTY, hybrid and domestic war crimes trials operated, as well as the overall 
efficiency of the justice system, is examined.  
 In terms of the ICTY’s ability to operate efficiently, the court’s record is 
disappointing. Since its mandate began in 1993, the ICTY has only sentenced 52% of the 
161 individuals it indicted. Twenty indictments were withdrawn, 17 indictees died before 
a final verdict, 19 were acquitted, 13 cases were sent to local courts and two are currently 
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being retried. (ICTY website) While the number of convictions is not a court’s full 
measure of success, the rate at which the Tribunal processed these cases does reflect a 
court that was not too concerned with efficiency. For instance, the average proceedings 
ranged anywhere from three to eight years, and in some cases, i.e., Slobodan Milosevic, 
trials ended without a verdict due to the death of the defendant. Moreover, it took the 
court 12 years to issue all of its indictments, and although not entirely its fault, the 
tribunal is still adjudicating cases almost 25 years after its establishment. While the ICTY 
cited the lack of funding and intermittent international attention as reasons for the slow 
pace of its work, the tribunal enjoyed an annual budget of $200-$300 million for many 
years, and at its zenith it had more than 1,000 staff, investigators, prosecutors and judges. 
(ICTY 2005 and 2007, 10, 23) Why the ICTY was not able to indict and sentence more 
than 161 individuals over two decades is beyond the scope of this analysis, but this output 
does raise questions about the efficiency of this court.  
 Locally, the hybrid and domestic courts in BiH and Kosovo were also initially 
inefficient, but in recent years, the rate and quality of the verdicts have improved, 
especially in BiH with increased donor aid and growing local capacity. For example, 
from 2005 through 2012, Bosnia’s WCC closed on average 12 cases/year; from 2013-
2015, this rate jumped to 23 cases/year. This increased efficiency is also found in the 
entities; in the Federation for instance, it closed five more cases a year over the 2013-
2015 period compared to 2004-2012. (OSCE 2015, 1) Overall, Bosnia’s courts have 
completed 361 war crime cases between 2004-2015, including 537 defendants, and an 
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additional 260 cases were pending or already in the trial phase.98 (Ibid) In terms of the 
length of time it takes to finish a case, the less complex cases are usually done in less 
than a year and the more complex in 1 ½ to 2 years. (OSCE 2011, 56)  
In Kosovo, UNMIK failed to prioritize war crimes cases during its executive 
mandate, and by 2009 only 37 war crimes cases had been tried. (OSCE 2010, 8) When it 
transferred responsibility for war crimes to EULEX, UNMIK gave the EU 1,187 war 
crimes reports and 50 cases for trial. (UNSYG March 17, 2009, 13) Of the approximately 
1,200 cases, EULEX dismissed 500 for lack of evidence, and by June of 2013, EULEX 
and local judges had issued a verdict or were in the process of hearing 20 cases. (EULEX 
2013) Despite this modest improvement in Kosovo, the average length of a war crimes 
case is still painfully slow, ranging from five to eleven years. (OSCE 2010, 20) How 
many cases remain in both BiH and Kosovo is unclear, particularly since both EULEX 
and Bosnian prosecutors continue to issue new indictments. What is clear, however, is 
that BiH missed its initial goal of completing all of the most complex war crimes cases by 
2015, and the international bodies following these trials are doubtful that even with more 
efficient procedures these countries can complete all of the remaining cases before 
interest and resources are depleted. (Ibid, 21, EC 2016, 27)  
Putting aside the rate of processing war crimes cases, transitional justice also 
posits that capacity-building will take place locally when international and hybrid courts 
work closely alongside their domestic counterparts. It is theorized that as international 
judges develop case law or work alongside local judges and prosecutors, local capacity 
                                                          
98 The WCC processed 142 of these cases, the Federation 120, the RS 86 and Brcko 13.  
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will grow. (Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks 2006, Chapter 7) Yet, according to 
Stromseth, there can also be a “spaceship effect” if international judicial personnel 
simply deliver justice but do not leave a lasting imprint. (Stromseth 2011, 172-73) 
Unfortunately, in Kosovo, the spaceship effect is apparent, although the ICTY and OHR 
did a better job of building local capacity in BiH.  
For instance, in BiH, the ICTY has an established track-record of active 
engagement. The ICTY helped establish the WCC, it monitored local courts through the 
Rules of the Road, it transferred 10 cases to the WCC and through Bosnia’s law on the 
transfer of cases it shares evidence and testimony with local courts. Moreover, from 
1999-2006, the ICTY’s office of Outreach Activities, which coordinated things like 
regional training, provided 107 events for BiH but only 19 for Kosovo. (ICTY Outreach 
Activities Archives) Consequently, in 2016, the ICTY assessed local prosecutors’ 
capacity in war crimes to be generally good and even throughout BiH, which includes a 
cadre of 36 state war crimes prosecutors.99 Although there were fewer war crimes in 
Kosovo, the fact that EULEX still leads most investigations and tries most cases, and that 
there was only one Kosovo war crimes prosecutor as of June 2016, it is fair to conclude 
that the ICTY, UNMIK and EULEX have generally failed to build the same level of 
capacity in Kosovo than the ICTY and OHR did in BiH. In fact, representatives of both 
the Kosovo Judicial Institute and Kosovo’s State Prosecutor’s Office acknowledged their 
country still lacks training in international humanitarian law, and they both welcomed 
more capacity-building efforts by the international community.100 
                                                          
99 Interview, supra n 94.  
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Although BiH is showing progress in local war crimes capacity, the overall state 
of both countries’ judiciaries viz-a-viz efficiency and predictability is anemic. In both the 
civil and criminal courts, hundreds of thousands of cases are languishing, and the backlog 
is growing. In 2007, the European Commission found two million unresolved cases in 
BiH, and by 2016, there were a little more than two million.101 (EC 2007, 13 and EC 
2016, 14) In Kosovo, there were 280,638 un-adjudicated cases in 2008, which by 2016 
had grown to approximately 400,000.102 (EULEX 2009, 99) Because of these delays, the 
Kosovo Ombudsperson warned in his 11th report that the biggest complaints his office 
received regarding the judiciary were the delays in cases and non-enforcement of 
decisions, which is leading to growing public distrust in the courts. (UNSYG November 
8, 2012, 9) In light of these and other problems, which are beyond the scope of this 
analysis, Bosnia’s judiciary was recently assessed to have “some level of preparation” for 
EU membership, whereas in 2012, the EU graded Kosovo’s judiciary as a B, which 
signified “slow progress/need more impetus.” (EC 2015, 12, EULEX 2012, 8)  
 While these international reports provide one perspective, the inefficiencies of the 
judicial systems are often a frequent complaint of the people they are created to serve. 
According to polling data, 48% of respondents in Kosovo in 2008 stated they had 
confidence in the judiciary, yet, by 2012 this level dropped to 35%. (Gallup Balkan 
Monitor) When asked in 2010 if they were satisfied with their courts and prosecutors, the 
                                                          
100 Valon Jupa, Head of Continuous Training Programs, Kosovo Judicial Institute, interview, June 14, 2016, 
Pristina Kosovo.  
Kujtim Munishi, Kosovo State Prosecutor’s Office, interview, June 20, 2016, Pristina, Kosovo.  
 
101 Out of these two million cases, approximately 1.2 to 1.7 million are unpaid utility bills.  
 
102 Interview, supra n 100 (Kosovo State Prosecutor’s Office).  
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response was even worse. Only 19% of Kosovars were satisfied with their courts and 
only 15% with their prosecutors. By 2015, these totals dropped to 14% and 13% 
respectively. (UNDP Public Pulse Report 1, UNDP Public Pulse Report 12) In BiH, the 
majority of respondents also lack confidence in their judiciary (59%) whereas only 34% 
did. (Gallup Balkan Monitor) While these polls reflect public attitudes and not actual 
performance, it is reasonable that public attitudes are shaped in part by the courts’ 
performances. If these judiciaries were operating efficiently, it is likely that these ratings 
would be higher. Explanations for why international efforts and recent local ownership 
have failed to improve the judiciary are captured by three post-conflict realities.  
 First, it should be acknowledged that the state of the judiciaries in both countries 
following their conflicts was poor or non-existent. Conflict destroyed the physical 
infrastructure, and many judges and prosecutors were killed or fled as a result of the 
violence. OHR’s reports noted that this international mission was focused on institution-
building within the judiciary from 1996-2005; in early 2006, OHR finally reported that 
BiH now had the laws and institutions to “…inculcate and maintain the rule of law.” 
(January 31, 2006) Kosovo’s judiciary, which relied upon an emergency, ad-hoc judicial 
system for much of its first year, is still growing, although by 2003 it was handling 90% 
of the criminal and civil cases, and in 2005 ministries of interior and justice were 
established. (UNSYG January 29, 2003, 8) The fact that both the international 
community and local officials had to reassemble or assemble a judicial system needs to 
be taken into account when evaluating the progress in building predictable and efficient 
institutions.  
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 Yet, even with significant international oversight and assistance, the lack of 
physical and financial resources has stymied efforts to build a more complete judiciary. 
In 2008, the European Commission noted that the material conditions of Bosnia’s 
judiciary were sub-par, and in 2014, 13% of judgeships in this country still remained 
vacant due to a lack of funding. (EC 2008, 13, EC 2014, 12) Subsequently, the EU 
recently provided 15 million euros to help fund the salaries of local prosecutors and 
judges.103 Kosovo too suffers from a lack of personnel caused by a dearth of resources. 
For instance, EULEX reported in 2009 that the number of judges and prosecutors in this 
Balkan state were well below regional averages; in 2009, there were only 14 Kosovo 
judges per 100,000 inhabitants. In BiH, it had 22 judges per 100,000 residents in 2009. 
As for prosecutors, Kosovo’s four per 100,000 was well below the 13 in Montenegro and 
seven in BiH. (88) Little had improved by 2011 when 127 judgeships remained vacant, 
and in 2016, representatives in the Kosovo Prosecutor’s Office and other judicial bodies 
highlighted a lack of personnel due to a shortage of government funding.104 (EULEX 
2011, 36) 
 Although a lack of infrastructure and resources can be expected in post-conflict 
states, the international community has also made some mistakes that have exasperated 
inefficiencies. In BiH’s complicated federated structure there are 15 different police 
forces, 14 different ministries of justice, 14 different judicial budgets and four different 
criminal codes. When it comes to transitional justice, particularly trials at the entity level, 
                                                          
103 Niko Grubešić, Assistant Minister and Head of the Sector for Strategic Planning, Aid Coordination and 
European Integrations in the BiH Ministry of Justice, interview, June 6, 2016, Sarajevo, BiH.  
 
104 Interviews, supra n 100.  
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the disparity in funding has led to differing levels in the quality of justice. (EC 2005, 17) 
Moreover, for many years, the WCC used the 2003 state criminal codes retroactively, 
whereas the entities applied the criminal codes from the SFRY. Subsequently, individuals 
convicted of the same crimes could have received different sentences. For instance, the 
SFRY codes did not permit prison terms beyond 20 years, whereas under Bosnia’s 2003 
criminal codes, an individual could be sentenced to 45 years in prison. (OSCE 2011, 48, 
70-71) In light of these challenges, the OSCE contends that the biggest obstacle to 
addressing war crimes in BiH is the harmonization of judicial efforts. (Ibid, 94) While it 
is hard to second guess decisions made in the context of the Dayton Accords, the system 
that is in place is not conducive to establishing a solidified judicial structure. The fact that 
the entities could apply different criminal codes and that there is no state court of last 
instance allows justice throughout BiH to be uneven.105 Unfortunately, until the ethnic 
tensions preventing a more unified state are resolved, there does not appear to be an easy 
or quick fix to these problems.  
 While Kosovo was spared the bifurcated federated structure found in BiH, the 
unsettled state of Kosovo’s judiciary has impeded judicial consolidation. Since 1999, 
Kosovo’s courts and laws have been subject to a never-ending cycle of change. From 
1999-2004, FRY and Serbian laws, along with UNMIK regulations, served as the 
foundation of the criminal justice system. In April of 2004, new criminal codes and 
procedures, which were more consistent with an adversarial system, were implemented; 
six years later, this time under EULEX, new criminal codes and procedures were 
                                                          
105 A representative at the BiH Ministry of Justice informed me that efforts are being made to consolidate 
the four different criminal codes.  
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developed, which came into effect in 2013. Assessing this flux, the OSCE notes that it 
has been hard for the rule of law to take hold since Kosovo’s judiciary has been in a state 
of transition for more than a decade. (2012, 6) To compound these problems, war crimes 
cases have sometimes been forced to start over after new judges or prosecutors rotate into 
Kosovo. The terms of these international judges and prosecutors are not fixed, and with 
cases taking anywhere from five to eleven years, a judge that began hearing a case is 
likely not the same judge to render a verdict. (OSCE 2010, 15-20) In light of these 
factors, along with an inconsistent capacity-building program, war crime trials have had a 
hard time helping build institutions that are predictable and efficient. And, as will be 
discussed in the fifth and final end goal, transitional trials have also been limited in 
developing human rights, especially in light of lingering ethnic animosities.  
Upholding Human Rights 
 In order to assess whether transitional justice improved human rights, it is useful 
to evaluate whether trials helped deter political violence and protect civil liberties. 
According to the Political Terror Scale (PTS), after receiving the worst score (5) during 
its four years of conflict, politically-orchestrated violence in BiH fell to a three from 
1996-2000, a two from 2001-14, and most recently a one.106 Since the PTS did not begin 
to measure political violence in Kosovo until 2008, trends in this country are hard to 
discern, although this scale has assigned either a one or two to this Balkan nation since its 
first measurement. (Gibney et al. 2016) Another WGI-related metric, Freedom House’s 
annual scores of civil liberties, which are found in Table 4.2, mirrors the PTS. During the 
                                                          
106 According to the PTS, a five represents a country where political terror is prevalent throughout the entire 
population; four notes that political violence is common; three signifies that violence may be common; two, 
violence is exceptional and one violence is rare.  
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first several post-conflict years, the protection of civil liberties in BiH and Kosovo was 
poor; following these early years, civil liberties have consistently improved, although 
they are still not optimal.  
Table 4.2: Protection of Civil Liberties in BiH and Kosovo (1996-2015)  
Year BiH Kosovo 
1996 5 7 
1998 5 6 
2002 4 5 
2005 3 5 
2008 3 5 
2010 3 4 
2015 3 4 
*Data is from Freedom House. Its scale ranges from 1 (optimal protection of civil liberties) to a 7 (poor 
protection of civil liberties).  
 
 While transitional trials may have helped reduce political violence and promote 
civil liberties through a deterrent and/or demonstration effect, there were other, 
potentially more powerful factors, that likely contributed to these changes. For instance, 
international governing missions with executive authorities, including thousands of 
international police in Kosovo, have helped to temper the political environment, and 
when necessary, use their executive authorities to pass laws that protect human rights and 
civil liberties. Furthermore, there have also been strong political forces at work 
encouraging civility and human rights. In Kosovo, the international community would 
have been hard pressed to issue a positive assessment on standards or recognize a 
declaration of independence if there were widespread violations of human rights. 
Moreover, While Bosnia did not have to adjust its behavior for independence, OHR’s 
executive authorities and Bosnia’s pursuit of EU membership established human rights as 
a governing priority.   
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  Other examples that show that transitional justice did not usher-in meaningful 
human rights reforms are manifested in the previously cited local reactions to war crimes 
cases, along with the failure to take care of the victims. As was already outlined, while 
BiH and Kosovo officials improved cooperation with the ICTY, at least on the surface, 
their efforts to undercut war crimes cases and their verdicts indicates that ethnicity 
trumps prosecuting those who violated human rights. For instance, the RS pledging its 
financial support to indicted and convicted Bosnian Serbs responsible for genocide while 
failing to provide their victims monetary compensation sends a clear signal that human 
rights are not being prioritized. Furthermore, RS officials’ denials that genocide even 
occurred in Srebrenica, including statements by RS President Dodik, clearly indicate a 
true embrace of human rights has not yet occurred. (OHR November 8, 2012) 
Furthermore, Kosovo officials proclaiming that indicted war criminals are heroes and 
innocent before verdicts are even rendered also undercuts the potentially powerful 
message of human rights trials.  
In addition to this destructive behavior, the failure of BiH and Kosovo to develop 
and execute comprehensive transitional justice strategies leaves many victims still 
struggling to recover from wars that occurred more than two decades ago. While 
resources are limited, public officials and members of civil society noted that the lack of 
political will, not insufficient funding, was the primary reason transitional strategies are 
still not in place.107 Although victims welcomed trials, they and their representatives 
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Interview, supra n. 95. 
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clearly want state recognition of their suffering through things such as psychosocial 
assistance and reparations for homes they are unable to return to due to ethnic tensions.108   
Conclusion 
 The cases of BiH and Kosovo should be theory affirming viz-a-viz the 
relationship between transitional justice, particularly trials, and improving the rule of law. 
Both countries utilized a wide variety of transitional trials, yet as was shown, these trials 
had minimal, positive effects in most of the five end goals of rule of law reform. In fact, 
in areas where the effects of trials should be most apparent, i.e., establishing the equality 
of all before the law and helping create efficient judicial institutions, BiH is declining and 
Kosovo remains relatively weak. Overall, in both countries, impunity for war crimes is 
tolerated and even sometimes celebrated as long as the perpetrators are part of one’s 
ethnic community.  
 According to the literature, part of the explanation for this regression and 
stagnation should be attributed to the international models that were imposed upon both 
countries. Citizens in both Balkan states did not participate in the development and 
execution of their respective international models, and therefore, transitional justice 
should not play a major role in the development of the rule of law. While the 
improvements in the mean rule of law scores coincide with these countries changes to 
mixed models, the evidence clearly shows that problems such as impunity and inefficient 
judicial systems have existed under both forms of transitional justice. Moreover, under a 
mixed model, the independence of Bosnia’s courts is deteriorating, and since 2014, this 
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country’s mean rule of law has been declining. Furthermore, the minor improvements in 
property rights were not as a result of the shift in models; the international community 
imposed this form of reparations, and it generally managed these processes. When it 
came time to implement these decisions, local opposition hindered its successful 
completion.  
 Furthermore, there is currently not enough data to argue that hybrid and domestic 
trials served as a deterrent effect, leading to the improvements in law and order and less 
political violence. These changes could be the result of the deployment of international 
security forces, the development of more professional police, the solidification of ethnic 
divisions or the political pressure surrounding these countries’ desires for independence 
and EU membership. The fact that the political leadership and many others continue to 
promote a dangerous ethnic ideology illustrates that a true change has yet to occur. 
Consequently, in these two countries, the effects of transitional justice on the 
development of the rule of law have been minimal at best. This, however, does not mean 
that in the future the array of trials and convictions will not help future generations deal 
with this ugly period, but at the present, the prioritization of ethnicity over dealing with 
the past inhibits transitional justice from playing a more meaningful role.  
 In addition to ethnicity, two other inhibiters prevented more meaningful change. 
In line with Olsen, et al.’s justice balance for human rights and democracy, it appears 
trials also need to be accompanied by restorative mechanisms to help promote the rule of 
law. As was illustrated in a Bosnian poll, only 4% of respondents had any interaction 
with the ICTY or local war crimes trials. (UN Resident Coordinator’s Office in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 29) Although property was returned to some, many victims are still not 
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able to go home due to lingering ethnic animosities, and the state, including Serbia, has 
never apologized or attempted to financially restore the victims to their pre-war state.    
Moreover, like Colombia, both of these Balkan states suffer from endemic 
political corruption. According to the WGI measurement on the control of corruption, 
unlike the more positive trends in their rule of law scores, corruption is growing or 
remaining problematic. For example, in BiH, its score in 2005 was -0.20 but in 2015 it 
was -0.37. In Kosovo’s first assessment in 2003, corruption was -0.81, yet in 12 years, it 
only improved to a -0.52.109 Certainly, the lack of judicial independence previously 
identified contributes to this pandemic, but there is also a lack of political will to tackle 
this problem. The European Commission noted in its 2012 and 2016 reports on BiH that 
corruption is fueled by the failure to enforce anti-corruption laws, weak criminal 
sanctions for those found guilty and a lack of prosecutorial capacity. (15, 16)  
In the UN’s quarterly reports, its discussion of those arrested or on trial for 
corruption reads like a laundry list of Kosovo’s political leadership. Former Assembly 
Speaker Nexhat Daci was convicted of corruption in 2010, former Minister of 
Communities and Returns Slavisa Petkovic was on trial in 2012 for the misappropriation 
of funds and ironically, the Kosovo prosecutor in charge of the anti-corruption task force 
was arrested for corruption in 2012 as well. (UNSYG October 31, 2011, 16, UNSYG 
April 27, 2012, 15) Clearly, with the political landscape permeated with such a high level 
of political corruption, the rule of law cannot become a consolidated feature in either 
country, yet for corruption to be addressed, the rule of law, particularly its institutions, 
                                                          
109 Like the rule of law, control of corruption is measured each year from -2.5 (poor governance) to 2.5 
(optimal governance of corruption).   
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must become stronger and more independent. While a more meaningful discussion of the 
rule of law, corruption and transitional justice is beyond the scope of this analysis, this 
issue is identified to highlight the fact that even with its best efforts, transitional justice 
implemented in a corrupt environment can only do so much. In light of the disappointing 
results in BiH and Kosovo, it is useful to compare the four cases of this analysis against 
one another. Did these countries experience the same inhibiters, or can we identify 
common rule of law end goals where transitional justice positively impacted all four? To 
answer these and other questions, BiH, Kosovo, Colombia and Peru are presented 
together in Chapter Five.  
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Chapter 5 
Peru & Final Thoughts 
Introduction 
 Unlike the previous two chapters, Chapter Five is formatted differently, mixing a 
brief country case study (Peru) with the overall concluding analysis.110 Although the 
findings reached for Peru are tentative, this country is an important case since, as will be 
discussed below, it should be theory-affirming for those championing a domestic 
approach to transitional justice. Moreover, as outlined in Chapter Two, Peru is the one 
country in this study that supports the path dependency thesis as it relates to the rule of 
law in post-conflict states. Therefore, although in-country fieldwork was not done in this 
Andean country, it is important to address why a country that relied upon domestic 
design and implementation for its transitional mechanisms, as well as used a justice 
balance, has struggled to improve its rule of law. Much like the other countries discussed 
in Chapters Three and Four, transitional justice in Peru was not able to produce change in 
Kleinfeld’s five rule of law reform end goals due to some of the same reasons and 
inhibiters Colombia, BiH and Kosovo also experienced.  
Upon outlining the design, mechanisms and implementation of transitional justice 
in Peru, this chapter turns its attention to the wider implications the findings from these 
four countries provide for understanding the relationship between transitional justice and 
the rule of law. More specifically, the parameters of a theory of change, i.e., where and 
how does transitional justice improve the rule of law is sketched, and this chapter revisits 
                                                          
110 Due to financial and timing constraints, fieldwork was not conducted in Peru as part of this analysis. The 
brief discussion of Peru is based upon the quantitative findings in Chapter Two and insights from the 
existing literature.  
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the importance, or lack thereof, of model design (international, mixed or domestic). 
Finally, the chapter and analysis conclude with some recommendations on how to adjust 
the implementation of transitional justice in order to avoid common post-conflict 
inhibiters while also identifying avenues for further research.     
Peru  
The trajectory of Peru’s rule of law differs from the other three cases covered in 
this study. Unlike Colombia, BiH and Kosovo, the rule of law in this Andean state 
regressed during the implementation of transitional justice, and it has only slowly 
rebounded to a level similar to where it began in 1996. For instance, in 1996, Peru’s rule 
of law was a -0.65, but by 2007 it had fallen to -0.78. Since 2008, this metric has slowly 
risen, reaching -0.53 in 2015. In comparison, Peru’s neighbor Colombia, began its 
journey at -0.89, yet it has now surpassed Peru with a -0.31. (WGI; see Chapter Two, 
p.31 for scores for all years) Moreover, unlike Colombia whose mean rule of law score 
improved following the implementation of transitional justice, Peru’s is relatively the 
same, i.e., a -0.67 (1996-2000) before and a -0.63 after the introduction of transitional 
justice (2001-15).  
 The stagnation of Peru’s rule of law is theoretically perplexing. Peru designed and 
executed a full range of transitional mechanisms, including coupling retributive with 
restorative elements. Local trials were held, a truth commission was convened, amnesties 
and pardons were given and reparations provided. According to the literature that has 
been discussed throughout, Peru meets the domestic criteria for having sufficient local 
ownership over these processes, and the combination of mechanisms meets the needs of a 
justice balance. (Turner 2008, 138; Lambourne 2009, 31; Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010) 
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While any conclusions offered here are limited, Peru does fit the path dependency thesis 
outlined by Haggard and Tiede (2014), and its relatively weak rule of law is consistent 
with the general struggles of post-conflict states. It should also be remembered that 
although there have been modest improvements in Colombia, BiH and Kosovo, the 
ability of transitional justice to effect change within the rule of law is small, and not 
unlike these other countries, Peru also wrestles with a culture of impunity and 
corruption.111  
 Peru’s internal conflict during the 1980s and early 1990s, much like Colombia’s, 
involved the state, leftist guerillas and government-aligned paramilitaries all engaged in 
hostilities related to control of the Andean highlands. According to Peru’s truth 
commission, an estimated 61,000 to 77,000 individuals were killed during this struggle, 
and culpability for these crimes fell at the feet of both the guerillas and state security 
forces.112 (Root 2012, 88-89) In addition to the violence, the government was also highly 
corrupt and centralized under the leadership of President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). 
Consequently, although hostilities had largely abated by 1992 with the capture of the 
head of the Shining Path, Fujimori resisted attempts to initiate transitional justice, and it 
would not be until after Fujimori resigned that transitional proceedings would begin. 
 At the heart of Peru’s transitional justice was the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (CVR by its Spanish acronym), which was established in 2001 with the 
mandate to assemble a record of events from 1980 through 2000, as well as refer cases 
                                                          
111 According to the WGI, corruption is growing in Peru. In 2000, the ability of the government to control 
corruption was low (-0.49), but by 2015 it had worsened to (-0.60).   
 
112 The guerillas of the Shining Path committed 215 massacres while the state was responsible for 122. 
(Root 2012, 89) 
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for prosecution and develop recommendations for government reform. At the time of its 
creation, the CVR enjoyed 83% of the public’s support. (Ibid, 56) This truth commission 
released its findings two years after its creation, and following this report, Peru turned its 
attention to criminal proceedings. These trials consisted of 47 cases referred to the courts 
by the CVR, the re-trial of 1,400 terrorism-related cases adjudicated under the Fujimori 
era, and most visibly, the 2007-09 trial of former President Fujimori. According to 
Iglesias, the re-trials were generally successful and fair, but of the 47 cases referred by 
the CVR, only a “handful” have moved forward due to the unwillingness of the security 
forces to cooperate. (2012, 232) As for Fujimori, his 2009 conviction and 25-year prison 
sentence for abuse of authority, corruption and human rights violations is generally 
heralded as a positive development in Peruvian attempts to combat impunity. 
 In addition to trials and truth-telling, an amnesty law was passed under Fujimori 
for the military and police, which although it was later overturned, some pardons were 
issued for once-convicted terrorists after 2003. Peru’s reparations, which have included 
both individual and collective, have been slow in reaching the approximately 285,000 
registered victims. (Root 2012, 134) Although not without flaws, this transitional 
framework meets the theoretical criteria for success. Yet, as is demonstrated by the 
stagnation in its mean rule of law score, transitional justice had little to no effect in Peru.                      
 For example, within the rule of law reform goals of establishing a government 
subordinate to the law and ensuring the equality of all before it, the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI) reports no changes in Peru despite the truth being told about 
government involvement in conflict crimes and Fujimori’s conviction. According to the 
BTI, from 2006 to 2016, the independence of Peru’s judiciary and ability to prosecute 
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abuse of government office has remained at a six, which is in-between having a score 
representing serious deficiencies (a four) and being generally on the right track (a seven). 
Why this indicator is “stuck” despite a high-profile trial and a balanced account of events 
is difficult to explain, although one possible reason could be that the failure to hold many 
in the security forces accountable for their crimes has contributed to a sense of general 
impunity. As Root (2012, 94) notes, transitional justice in Peru did little to change 
existing structures of power; those in command during the war remained in positions of 
authority even after Fujimori resigned.   
 In terms of law and order, the defeat of the Shining Path, and the subsequent 
tempering of military operations helped to dramatically reduce civilian casualties. Yet, as 
the crime statistics illustrate, transitional justice did not deter non-conflict related violent 
crime. In fact, even with transitional justice, crime in Peru has skyrocketed, which helps 
explain why the level of the rule of law declined from 2005-2007. For instance, in 2000, 
there were approximately five homicides per 100,000 people in Peru; by 2005 there were 
11 and in 2008 there were 12. As for assaults, in the early years of transitional justice 
there were 55 per 100,000 (2004), yet by 2007 this number had increased to 192. 
(UNODC) Table 5.1 illustrates Peru’s rise in crime. 
Table 5.1: Crime Rates in Peru Since 2000 
Year Homicides (per 100,000) Assaults (per 100,000) 
2000 5 N/A 
2004 6 55 
2005 11 53 
2007 10 192 
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2009 10 191 
2011 10 194 
2014 7 211 
*Data is from UNODC.     
While explaining the dramatic rise in violent crime in Peru is beyond the scope of this 
analysis, what can be observed is that transitional justice, particularly trials, did little to 
deter individuals from killing and assaulting others. The demonstration effect from events 
such as the Fujimori trial does not appear to translate into deterring non-conflict crimes, 
which was also the case in Colombia. While there are likely strong economic and societal 
factors underlying this rise in crime, the fact that these trials were not predictable nor 
efficient, i.e., only a handful of security forces stood trial, may have contributed to a 
weakening of the deterrence effect.  
 As for transitional justice’s influence in promoting a government respectful of 
human rights, it does not appear that the range of mechanisms used were immediately 
successful. According to the Political Terror Scale (PTS), political violence, i.e., violence 
carried out by the state, has persisted despite efforts to bring to light prior crimes. For 
instance, in 1996, the PTS assessed political violence as widespread (a four); from 1997-
2004, the level of these types of crimes dropped to a three, which represents extensive 
political imprisonment and the likelihood of state violence. From 2005-09 this improved 
to a two, but from 2010-14, it regressed again to a three. Only in 2015 did political 
violence return to being rare or exceptional (a two). (Gibney et al. 2016) 
 Although this discussion of transitional justice in Peru is brief, it does shed light 
on some of the factors that have contributed to a relatively fixed level of the rule of law. 
167 
 
Surprisingly, a CVR that found culpability for human rights crimes amongst both the 
state and guerillas, along with a trial of a former president, failed to improve measures of 
governmental accountability. Although not regressing, Peru’s score of a six over a ten-
year span on both judicial independence and the ability to prosecute abuses of 
government office indicates that impunity remains problematic. Moreover, transitional 
justice did not serve as a deterrent, at least not when it comes to non-conflict related 
violent crimes, and a government committed to human rights is only slowly emerging. In 
light of these persistent challenges, why did a justice balance approach to transitional 
justice fail to promote the rule of law? 
 Although Peru’s CVR initially enjoyed widespread public support, backing for 
this truth commission waned over time. In 2003, the year it issued its report, public 
interest in the truth commission’s findings and recommendations had subsided as the 
situation stabilized, politics returned to normal and the military recovered its privileged 
position within society and the government. (Root, 162) Moreover, while many Peruvians 
wanted to see former President Fujimori account for his crime of corruption, there is still 
a strong base of support for the former president because he defeated the guerillas. 
Assessing the public’s attitude toward Fujimori and the conflict in general, Root opines 
that many Peruvians are willing to tolerate human rights violations as long as they served 
a greater purpose, i.e., ridding society of the Shining Path. (2012, 125, 162) This finding 
is supported by the public’s reaction to Peru’s Constitutional Court decision of 2003 that 
called for the re-trial of convicted terrorists under the Fujimori regime. According to one 
opinion poll, 77% of Peruvian respondents disagreed with this decision because they 
feared it would allow terrorists/guerillas to go free. (Ibid, 102-03)  
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Overall, transitional justice, at least those parts that seek to hold the state 
accountable, are still generally viewed as anti-government, pro-rebels. (Iglesias 2012, 
237-39) Consequently, although Peruvians may have initially supported the truth, it is not 
clear which version of the truth they were prepared to accept. Moreover, while Fujimori 
and some of his lieutenants were held accountable, there was never a purge of those in 
the military or society that carried-out or condoned state crimes. Subsequently, 
transitional justice appears to have had little to no effect on the rule of law, and other 
factors, which are beyond the scope of this analysis, continue to exert a strong negative 
influence.  
Final Thoughts 
 It is important to recall that within the literature, scholars and practitioners are 
only beginning to understand the state-level effects of things such as trials and truth 
commissions in post-conflict environments. The proceeding four chapters, as well as this 
chapter’s brief discussion on Peru, address one small piece of this larger puzzle, namely 
to identify the relationship between transitional justice and the rule of law. In keeping 
with this fundamental question, this analysis tested the hypothesis that domestically-
generated and implemented mechanisms are better suited in delivering positive change 
than those processes fully imposed and executed by the international community.  
While seeking answers to these important questions, this analysis first found that 
despite previous assertions (Haggard and Tiede 2014), the rule of law is not always path 
dependent in post-conflict states. In Colombia, BiH and Kosovo, the rule of law 
improved appreciably both during a conflict (Colombia) and after one (BiH and Kosovo). 
Although Haggard and Tiede’s path dependency thesis was not entirely discounted, 
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namely Peru exhibited this tendency, the rule of law can improve slowly over time. Yet, 
while improvements were recorded in three of this study’s four cases, all four nations still 
have comparatively low levels of the rule of law, and this element of society is not yet a 
consolidated feature. For instance, despite consistent improvements from 2005-13, the 
rule of law is now declining in BiH, moving from a -0.15 in 2013 to a -0.29 in 2015.  
 Moreover, although Sikkink (2011) and Weiffen (2012) identify a positive 
relationship between transitional justice and the rule of law, evidence from this analysis 
indicates that these findings are overstated, and improvements were found in only a few 
of Kleinfeld’s five rule of law reform end goals.113 In Colombia, BiH and Kosovo, 
transitional justice did help develop the rule of law, but the impact was minimal. Overall, 
transitional justice was found to produce change in three areas. First, transitional 
mechanisms, namely the restoration of property, improved the protection of property 
rights. In Colombia, after Law 1448 (2011) was passed, the WGI’s metric for property 
rights went from a 30 to a 50 out of 100. Although more modest, improvements in 
Bosnia’s property rights, which can be linked to transitional policies, also contributed to 
higher rule of law scores in this Balkan state.  
 Additionally, transitional mechanisms, principally amnesties coupled with 
demobilization, were also factors in improving law and order and human rights in 
Colombia. The amnesties provided to illegal combatants in accordance to the terms of the 
Justice and Peace Law removed from the general conflict approximately 50,000 guerillas 
and paramilitaries. Their absence from the battlefield coincided with reductions in 
                                                          
113 The five end goals are a government subordinate to the law, the equality of all before the law, the 
existence of law and order, predictable and efficient justice and upholding human rights. These five 
indicators are useful because they cover both the procedural and substantive domains of the rule of law. 
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conflict-related crimes and human rights violations. The cessation of hostilities also 
contributed to improvements in these two domains within BiH and Kosovo, although 
changes were much slower. Finally, the ICTY’s capacity building efforts, along with the 
use of a hybrid tribunal in Bosnia, aided in this state’s ability to adjudicate war crimes 
cases more predictably and efficiently. In fact, out of the three countries that had 
improvements to their rule of law scores, Bosnia’s war crimes courts have been the most 
productive, completing over 361 cases, covering more than 530 defendants since 2004. 
Colombia has only processed 47 cases since 2005, and although figures are only available 
through 2013, Kosovo has finished 63 cases. 
 Obviously, these were not the only changes to the rule of law, but they were the 
only ones able to be tied to transitional justice. For example, the WGI found that political 
violence had declined and civil liberties had improved in both BiH and Kosovo. Yet, 
following careful investigation, it is apparent that these improvements were due to other 
factors, such as international oversight missions with executive authorities, robust 
international military and police deployments and behavioral incentives tied to 
independence and EU membership. Moreover, in Colombia, its level of state-instigated 
political violence has also subsided, moving from a five to a three in the Political Terror 
Scale, but attributing this directly to transitional justice, particularly when agents of the 
state were not subjected to the Justice and Peace process, is a stretch. Like BiH and 
Kosovo, the reduction in the general conflict over time, and international pressure, such 
as the U.S. linking some of its assistance to better performance on human rights, were 
likely more important factors in producing this decline.  
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 In addition to identifying the nature of the relationship between transitional justice 
and the rule of law, this analysis also sought to uncover which model of transitional 
justice (international, mixed or domestic) was better suited to facilitate these changes. 
Recall that according to the descriptive statistics presented in Chapter Two, as well as the 
histogram presented below in Figure 5.1, the domestic and mixed models appear better 
suited to facilitate improvements in the rule of law when compared to international 
processes. For example, in Colombia, its mean rule of law score increased noticeably 
after the introduction of transitional justice, and the differences in means between 
Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s international and mixed eras are statistically significant.  
Figure 5.1: Models of Transitional Justice and Rule of Law Scores 
 
*Data is from the WGI, and the histogram represents all four countries in this study. 
  
Yet, while it appears that processes with at least some domestic design and 
execution will help lead to improvements in the rule of law, the evidence is inconclusive.  
For instance, Peru’s rule of law actually regressed during its purely domestic processes, 
and problems identified under Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s international models persist under 
the mixed. In fact, in BiH, its judiciary has become more corrupt and politically 
susceptible after local institutions assumed more responsibilities for transitional justice, 
and its overall level of the rule of law is declining under a mixed model. In addition to 
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these findings, the results from the regression analysis demonstrate that none of the 
models of transitional justice were statistically significant, although it is acknowledged 
that the model would benefit with more cases and observations. Furthermore, although 
the rule of law in BiH and Kosovo showed little improvement while ICTY trials 
dominated the transitional justice landscape, this does not support the conclusion that all 
international models are ineffective viz-a-viz the rule of law.  
It could be that only those international models employed by BiH and Kosovo did 
not work because of their own structural flaws. According to Garbett, there are two ways 
local support can emerge from an internationally-led judicial process. First, local legal 
traditions and culture should be incorporated into the proceedings, and secondly, 
individuals from the region need to be engaged in all the aspects of the court, beginning 
with its creation and all the way through to the final verdicts. (2012, 70) Unfortunately, 
the ICTY has been both geographically and culturally distant, and legal personnel from 
the countries where the defendants originated have not been properly involved. 
The international ad-hoc tribunal established for the former Yugoslavia sits in The 
Hague, Netherlands, and it did not conduct trials in any of the countries where the crimes 
occurred, although its statute did allow it. Moreover, the lawyers and judges were 
seconded from UN member states outside of the Balkans, and according to its statute, 
international law superseded any local law or tradition. Subsequently, it is clear from the 
start that the ICTY was operating from a disadvantage in terms of developing local 
partnerships and support.   
Furthermore, this court’s failure to develop at its inception a comprehensive 
outreach campaign left the proceedings open to local interpretations, which were plagued 
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by ethnic bias. Orentlicher notes that an outreach campaign was not established until six 
years after the ICTY’s creation, which by then individuals had already co-opted the 
narrative of the Tribunal for their own political purposes. (2010, 14, 20) This delay, along 
with the lack of inclusion of local traditions, left many in the region confused with the 
ICTY’s proceedings. According to Subotic, one of the reasons the ICTY was a “great 
disappointment” in BiH was due to its inability to explain its cases to those it was created 
to serve. (2009, 132-34) For example, Bosnians were generally not familiar nor 
comfortable with legal tools like plea bargains, reduced sentences for cooperation or 
early release since these were not part of their pre-war legal culture. (Ibid, 51-52)  
Following my interviews in BiH and Kosovo, the general consensus among 
international and local officials, as well as civil society, is that the greatest contributions 
of the ICTY are the establishment of an impartial record of events and the prosecution of 
individuals that might otherwise have escaped justice.114 While these are certainly no 
small feats, this type of international justice did not allow the people in the Balkans to 
experience the law. One of the reasons Sikkink argues that human rights trials were 
effective in promoting the rule of law in Latin America was because these proceedings 
were embedded in local courts; citizens participated in the design and adjudication of the 
trials, i.e., the people discovered the law together. (2011, 83)  
Although the majority of Bosnians and Kosovars support justice, the trials were 
clouded by physical and cultural distance, and many ethnic communities became 
disillusioned with the court’s work because of perceived biases. To be fair, a court of this 
                                                          
114 Interview supra n 69.  
Interview supra n 94. 
Interview supra n 78 (Humanitarian Law Center). 
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nature will never please everyone; the fact that it tried individuals from all major ethnic 
communities reflects its efforts to remain impartial in the disputes that plagued and 
continue to fester in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, it is also reasonable to conclude that the 
nature of this justice, i.e., distant and culturally different, contributed to its inability to 
elicit widespread local support and thereby promote major rule of law changes. 
Furthermore, both of these international models were too reliant upon accountability 
proceedings, and they did not couple these retributive elements with restorative policies.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, the initial responsibility for the failure to employ a 
justice balance does rest solely at the feet of local government officials or civil society in 
BiH and Kosovo. The ICTY was hesitant to support a truth commission in BiH over fears 
of resource and witness competition, and the UN mission in Kosovo also failed to use its 
authority to establish any mechanisms for truth-telling or meaningful victim reparations 
for reasons that are not clear. Presently, both the ICTY and UN have significantly less 
influence in these Balkan states, and current international efforts and pressure for these 
countries to do more on transitional justice is now channeled through the European 
Union.  
As each of these countries take steps towards EU membership, bureaucrats in 
Brussels are using the accession process to encourage passage of comprehensive 
transitional justice strategies. Moreover, the EU is also providing tangible financial 
assistance to Bosnian courts and prosecutors, and in Kosovo, EULEX is acting in a more 
direct fashion by continuing to adjudicate with Kosovar judges and prosecutors local war 
crimes cases. Although the international community remains active in each Balkan state, 
the EU’s approach is different from that of its predecessors. Following the immediate 
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cessation of hostilities, the international authorities in BiH and Kosovo each possessed 
executive mandates they were not afraid to use. Currently, most of these authorities have 
now been transferred to local institutions, and according to both international and local 
officials, the EU is hesitant to take a heavy-handed approach in forcing the passage of 
theses respective transitional justice strategies. Instead, the EU is attempting to foster 
local initiative and ownership over these processes.115  
While more local responsibility for transitional justice is sorely needed in BiH and 
Kosovo, it is fair to question whether this will be enough in light of the persistence of 
ethnic politics. But, the hope is that with the carrot of EU membership, ethnicity as the 
driving force in politics will fade over time. If a more European future is embraced 
instead of the current ethnic vitriol, there is the possibility that new mechanisms of 
transitional justice could be successful, but Subotic’s findings that local elites throughout 
the Balkans used the ICTY for their own political purposes should not be forgotten. 
(2009)  
Officials in both BiH and Kosovo could continue offering just enough 
cooperation to satisfy Brussels’ demands while ignoring meaningful reform. Ultimately, 
the responsibility for the passage of comprehensive transitional justice strategies lies at 
the feet of the citizens of both states. Leaders must be elected that are willing to shun the 
ethnic-centered politics that has dominated the post-war period, and then society must 
demand that more be done. Unfortunately, whether there is enough momentum and 
                                                          
115 Interview supra n 78.  
Interview supra n 93. 
Interview supra n 79 (GoK consultant on transitional justice). 
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support within these societies to actively lobby for things such as reparations and truth 
approximately two decades after these conflicts is unclear.        
Returning to the larger transitional justice context, while this analysis did not seek 
to address issues of mechanism sequencing or timing, it is important to briefly assess 
whether the sequencing and timing of mechanisms played a role in the development of 
the rule of law in these four states. Unfortunately, due to the failure of two (BiH and 
Kosovo) of this study’s four cases to utilize multiple mechanisms, it is difficult to draw 
any conclusions from this data about the sequencing of mechanisms. For example, 
Colombia launched its transitional justice mechanisms together, convening trials while 
also pursuing the truth and distributing reparations. Based upon the statistical and 
qualitative findings this simultaneous pursuit of truth, justice and reparations appears to 
have paid-off, at least compared to its Andean neighbor.  
In Peru, it initially emphasized truth over accountability. Whether this delay in 
trials helps explain some of Peru’s rule of law problems is not clear due to the limited 
assessment of this case. What is logical to assume, however, is that some elements of 
Peruvian society may have felt disillusioned with transitional justice since many of those 
responsible for human rights violations failed to stand trial for their crimes a decade or 
more after they were committed. This delay in justice may be responsible for the failure 
to improve some elements of the rule of law, particularly those that focus on the equality 
of all before the law. Yet, due to the limitations of this study’s cases and available data, 
any conclusions stemming from the Colombia/Peru comparison regarding sequencing are 
inconclusive and tentative at best.  
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 On the surface, these findings may seem disappointing for practitioners and 
scholars who expect a more robust, positive effect from transitional justice. While 
admittedly far from optimal, transitional justice can play a greater role in developing the 
rule of law if implementers are aware and address powerful inhibiters that block more 
meaningful change. In all of the cases in this study, the lack of institutional capacity and 
financial resources stymied the implementation of transitional justice. For example, part 
of the reason Colombia has been unable to sentence more than 47 demobilized criminals, 
as well as distribute judicial reparations, is due in part to insufficient numbers of 
investigators, prosecutors and judges. In BiH and Kosovo, the latter still only had one 
prosecutor for war crimes in 2016, and while not the primary reason, the lack of funding 
has hindered the implementation of comprehensive transitional justice strategies in both 
of these Balkan states.  
 Along with a lack of institutional capacity and resources, all four countries also 
share in the persistence of political corruption. Colombia’s corruption has reached a level 
where approximately 10% of its 2017 national budget is being siphoned-off for illicit 
purposes. (Alsema 2016) While the connection between political corruption and 
transitional justice may not be obvious at first, the fact that billions of dollars are being 
diverted for illegal enrichment while victims continue to suffer, illustrates the negative 
impact corruption can have on transitional programs.  
 While both of the aforementioned inhibiters are strong, Colombia also wrestles 
with two specific ones. The continuation of its conflict and inability of the state to govern 
former conflict regions has allowed revictimization to occur, discourages victim 
participation in things like truth-telling and slows down the return of property. For 
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example, in 2015 the government’s Victims’ Unit recorded more than 170,000 people 
effected by the conflict that year, and despite an agreement with the FARC in 2016, there 
were more than 69,000 victims last year. (Victims’ Unit) Moreover, the failure of the 
government to control all of its territory allows drug trafficking to grow, which serves as 
a powerful incentive for illegal combatants not to demobilize. In BiH and Kosovo, 
transitional justice is being diluted by a prioritization of ethnicity over dealing with the 
past. Chapter Four highlighted the fact that in both Balkan nations, impunity is tolerated, 
and sometimes celebrated, and ethnic attacks are ignored as long as these behaviors are 
targeted against other ethnic communities. 
 Clearly, some of these inhibiters are to be expected in post-conflict environments, 
especially the lack of resources. Unfortunately, not much can be done to alleviate this 
problem unless donors are willing to increase their assistance. Yet, for some of the others, 
there are solutions. Primarily, post-conflict states should employ a justice balance. 
Colombia’s institutional deficiencies in the judiciary were compounded by this country’s 
reliance upon the courts to deliver truth, justice and reparations. Now, after more than a 
decade of experience, Colombia has implemented a more efficient and less costly 
administrative reparations program, modified its prosecutorial strategy and has 
committed to establishing a truth commission. In BiH and Kosovo, proponents of 
transitional justice are continuing to advocate the adoption of comprehensive transitional 
justice strategies that will restore the victims through monetary reparations, establish the 
truth and reform corrupt institutions. While the need remains, the implementation of these 
strategies is more difficult now as international attention and assistance wanes, but the 
fact remains that many victims still want more than simply trials.  
179 
 
 In addition to identifying the need to balance trials with reparation programs that 
do more than return property, there is also a critical need for more comprehensive 
lustration. The vetting of judges and prosecutors is important, but in all cases, politicians 
and members of the security forces involved in state crimes remain in positions of 
authority. Trials of human rights violators were stymied in Peru because of the lack of the 
military’s cooperation, and in Bosnia and Kosovo, former political and military leaders 
with at best questionable pasts are being elected for some of the highest offices. While it 
is recognized that removing and/or precluding popular individuals from political office is 
sensitive and difficult to do, the permeation of a dangerous ethnic ideology in BiH and 
Kosovo are examples of the results of not doing so. In both states, politicians still 
capitalize on an ethnic narrative to maintain their power while allowing ethnic 
animosities to fester. Whether the pull of EU membership can dilute this vitriol is 
unclear.     
Yet, with a justice balance, there is a caveat. While countries should strive to mix 
retributive with restorative elements, governments should not promise to do more than 
what they can deliver. Colombia’s pledge to prosecute more than 5,000 individuals and 
provide judicial reparations have largely gone unfulfilled, thereby exasperating societal 
tensions. Promising more than a government can deliver also erodes trust in institutions, 
an ingredient central to the rule of law, and one that needs to be cultivated in post-conflict 
societies.  
Way Ahead 
 Conflict and post-conflict environments are by nature unstable. Consolidating the 
transition from war to peace entails many challenges, one of which is building the rule of 
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law. As Haggard’s and Tiede’s findings illustrate, establishing predictable and efficient 
institutions, ensuring the equality of all before the law and instilling a new ethos 
regarding the treatment of others is not easy nor does it naturally follow the termination 
of a conflict. Yet, the results of this analysis are somewhat more optimistic, and while 
modest, transitional justice can help. While this study aids in the understanding between 
transitional mechanisms and the rule of law, it does have its limitations. For instance, the 
regression analysis includes only four cases, and in each, there are observations missing. 
Therefore, a more robust statistical analysis of these variables that encompasses more 
cases and observations could help establish whether one model is more effective.  
 In addition to expanding this analysis, there are two other important, unanswered 
questions that emerged during this investigation. Clearly, Colombia’s ability to 
implement transitional justice was and is hindered by the inability of the state to expand 
its authority to previous conflict zones. Because of this, revictimization continues and 
criminality thrives. Consequently, scholars and practitioners should be concerned with 
addressing the sequencing between state-building and transitional justice, along with 
whether things such as trials, reparations and government reforms can be used to aid in 
the development of the state.  
Since the foundational work done by Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003-2004), little 
has been done to empirically test these authors’ claim that transitional justice done in the 
absence of state/institutional capacity could be harmful. While many appreciate the need 
for institutions to carry-out transitional justice, in many post-conflict states these 
institutions struggle to meet even the most basic governing demands. This therefore, 
raises several important questions, such as can transitional justice be a tool for building 
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state capacity or should transitional justice wait until there is sufficient institutional 
support?   
Moreover, in each of the four cases, corruption served as a serious inhibiter to 
transitional justice and the rule of law. Resources that are needed to restore the victims 
and fund costly expenditures such as trials are being wasted. The idea that the scope of 
transitional justice should expand to include political corruption is being debated. For 
instance, Andrieu argues that since grievances towards corruption can lead to political 
transitions, i.e., the Arab Spring, these crimes should be dealt with within the space 
created by transitions. While logical, Andrieu also cautions that adding new 
responsibilities to already overloaded courts and truth commissions may redirect the 
focus away from serious human rights violations. (2012)  
Based upon the findings in this analysis, concerns centering around weak 
institutions have merit. Yet, the political space created by a transition, particularly when 
there is a change in government, is an attractive opportunity to deal comprehensively 
with crimes of the previous regime. What is needed now is work that investigates the 
sequencing and institutional needs to do both. In light of these gaps, along with the 
remaining work to be done on transitional justice and the rule of law, transitional scholars 
will remain busy. Yet, the recent empirical work has greatly advanced our understanding 
of transitional justice, which by the unfortunate events that continue to transpire in places 
like Syria, will remain an important tool for consolidating peace and addressing the needs 
of conflict victims.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
WGI Rule of Law Sources & Their Indicators 
 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BiH, Kosovo, Colombia and Peru) 
Separation of Powers 
Independent Judiciary  
Civil Rights 
 
Business Enterprise Environment Survey (BiH and Kosovo) 
How often is the following characteristic associated with the court system: fair and 
honest? 
How often is the following characteristic associated with the court system: enforceable? 
How often is the following characteristic associated with the court system: quick?  
How problematic is crime for the growth of your business? 
How problematic is the judiciary for the growth of your business?  
 
Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale (BiH, Kosovo, 
Colombia and Peru) 
Political Terror Scale (state-led political violence) 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit Riskwire and Democracy Index (BiH, Kosovo, Colombia 
and Peru) 
Violent Crime 
Organized Crime 
Fairness of judicial process 
Enforceability of contracts 
Speediness of judicial process 
Confiscation/expropriation 
Intellectual property rights protection 
Private property protection 
 
Freedom House (BiH and Kosovo) 
Judicial framework and independence 
 
Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads (Colombia and Peru) 
Rule of law 
 
Gallup World Poll (BiH, Kosovo, Colombia and Peru) 
Confidence in the police force 
Confidence in the judicial system 
Have you had money/property stolen from you or another household member? 
Have you been assaulted or mugged?  
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Global Integrity Index (BiH, Kosovo, Colombia and Peru) 
Public management 
Rights 
Gender 
 
Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators (BiH, Colombia and Peru) 
Expropriation of private businesses 
State contract alteration 
Contract enforcement 
 
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (BiH, Kosovo, Colombia and Peru) 
Property Rights 
 
IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments (BiH, Colombia and Peru) 
Access to land 
Access to water for agriculture 
 
Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook (Colombia 
and Peru) 
Tax evasion is a common practice in your country 
Justice is not fairly administered in society 
Personal security and private property are not adequately protected 
Parallel economy impairs economic development in your country 
Patent and copyright protection are not adequately enforced in your country 
 
Institutional Profiles Database (BiH, Colombia and Peru) 
Degree of security of goods and persons by criminal organizations 
Degree of judicial independence vis-à-vis the State 
Degree of enforcement of court orders 
Timeliness of judicial decisions 
Equal treatment of foreigners before the law (compared to nationals) 
Practical ability of the administration to limit tax evasion 
Efficiency of the legal means to protect property rights in the event of conflict between private 
stakeholders? 
Generally speaking, does the State exercise arbitrary pressure on private property (e.g. red 
tape...)? 
Does the State pay compensation equal to the loss in cases of expropriation (by law or fact) 
when the expropriation concerns land ownership? 
Does the State pay compensation equal to the loss in cases of expropriation (by law or fact) 
when the expropriation concerns production means? 
Degree of observance of contractual terms between national private stakeholders 
Degree of observance of contractual terms between national and foreign private stakeholders 
In the past 3 years, has the State withdrawn from contracts without paying the corresponding 
compensation... vis-à-vis national stakeholders? 
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In the past 3 years, has the State withdrawn from contracts without paying the corresponding 
compensation... vis-à-vis foreign stakeholders? 
Respect for intellectual property rights relating to… trade secrets and industrial patents 
Respect for intellectual property rights 
 
Latinobarometro (Colombia and Peru) 
Trust in judiciary 
Trust in police 
Have you been a victim of crime?  
 
Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (Colombia and Peru) 
Law and order 
 
United States Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report (BiH, Kosovo, 
Colombia and Peru) 
Trafficking in persons 
 
Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer (Colombia and Peru) 
Trust in supreme court 
Trust in justice system 
Trust in police 
Have you been a victim of crime?  
 
World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (BiH, Kosovo, Colombia and 
Peru) 
Property rights and rule-based governance 
 
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (BiH, Colombia and Peru) 
Business cost of crime and violence 
Cost of organized crime 
Reliability of police services 
Judicial independence 
Efficiency of legal framework for challenging regulations 
Individual property rights protection 
Informal sector 
 
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (BiH, Colombia and Peru) 
Order and security 
Criminal justice 
Civil justice 
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Appendix B 
Yearly Categorization of Transitional Justice 
 
Year BiH Colombia Kosovo Peru 
1996 I - - - 
1997 I - - - 
1998 I - - - 
1999 I - M - 
2000 I - I - 
2001 I - I D 
2002 I - I D 
2003 I - I D 
2004 I - I D 
2005 M D I D 
2006 M D I D 
2007 M D I D 
2008 M D I D 
2009 M D M D 
2010 M D M D 
2011 M D M D 
2012 M D M D 
2013 M D M D 
2014 M D M D 
2015 M D M D 
I = International; M = Mixed; D = Domestic 
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Appendix C 
Independent Sample T Tests 
Bosnia 
Group Statistics 
 
International/Mixed/Domestic 
Type of Transitional Justice N Mean Std. Deviation 
Yearly Rule of Law Level International 6 -.5650 .16526 
Mixed 11 -.3545 .13269 
Group Statistics 
 
International/Mixed/Domestic Type of 
Transitional Justice 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Yearly Rule of Law Level International .06747 
Mixed .04001 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for 
Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t 
Yearly Rule of Law Level Equal variances assumed .324 .577 -2.872 
Equal variances not assumed   -2.683 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean 
Difference 
Yearly Rule of Law Level Equal variances assumed 15 .012 -.21045 
Equal variances not assumed 8.603 .026 -.21045 
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Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Std. Error 
Difference 
90% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Yearly Rule of Law Level Equal variances assumed .07327 -.33890 -.08201 
Equal variances not assumed .07844 -.35500 -.06591 
Kosovo 
Group Statistics 
 
International/Mixed/Domestic 
Type of Transitional Justice N Mean Std. Deviation 
Yearly Rule of Law Level International 5 -.9420 .10085 
Mixed 8 -.5625 .06251 
Group Statistics 
 
International/Mixed/Domestic Type of 
Transitional Justice 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Yearly Rule of Law Level International .04510 
Mixed .02210 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for 
Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t 
Yearly Rule of Law Level Equal variances assumed 1.090 .319 -8.465 
Equal variances not assumed   -7.556 
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Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean 
Difference 
Yearly Rule of Law Level Equal variances assumed 11 .000 -.37950 
Equal variances not assumed 5.955 .000 -.37950 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Std. Error 
Difference 
90% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Yearly Rule of Law Level Equal variances assumed .04483 -.46001 -.29899 
Equal variances not assumed .05022 -.47722 -.28178 
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Appendix D 
List of Variables & Their Sources 
 
Independent Variable: Mechanisms/Models of Transitional Justice  
Sources: Transitional Justice Database Project: http://www.tjdbproject.com/ & my own 
fieldwork and coding.  
 
Dependent Variable: Rule of Law 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
 
Control Variables 
GDP Per Capita (Yearly) 
Source: World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
 
Total Natural Resources Rents as a Percentage of GDP (Yearly) 
Source: World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS?locations=BA 
 
(Country) Yearly Percentage of Protestants 
Source: United States Department of State: www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/ 
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Appendix E  
Colombia Interview Questions 
Q. What was the process during the drafting and ratification of the Justice and Peace 
Law? Were there any Congressional hearings?  
Q. Does the Fiscalia’s Special Directorate on Transitional Justice have enough personnel 
and resources to finish the process under Law 975 as well as investigate and prosecute 
new cases emerging from the FARC and possibly the ELN peace processes?   
Q. How many of the 35 individuals sentenced have finished the appeals process?  
Q. How many cases are still underway or are awaiting trial?  
Q. Is prosecution solely based on the perpetrators confessions/desire to be part of this 
process?   
Q. After a demobilized serves his sentence and probation period is his conviction 
expunged?  
Q. If someone is convicted now under 975, will he go to jail?   
Q. According to Article 44.3 of Law 975, the perpetrators are to make a public statement 
of repentance and ask for forgiveness. When and how does this take place? 
Q. Why have there been only 526 cases of requests for forgiveness or public 
acknowledgement/repentance?  
Q. How does Law 1424 of 2010 relate/change Law 975?  
Q. How many witnesses, victims and their leaders have been killed since 2005?  
Q. Of those 30 or more senior paramilitary leaders extradited to the United States since 
2006, how many are still cooperating in the Justice and Peace process?  
Q. How many individuals received de-facto amnesties under the Justice and Peace Law?  
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Q. How does the Fiscalia share with the victims or publicly announce verdicts reached 
after a trial?  
Q. How much of the reparations fund came from the demobilized and how much from the 
Government of Colombia? 
Q. Some international reports indicate that the GoC will not have enough money to fully 
implement Law 1448. Has the GoC allocated more than the initial $29 billion for this 
law?  
 Q. Aside from judicial expediency, why did the GoC shift transitional justice strategies, 
i.e., from the justice and peace process to the new Legal Framework for Peace? 
Q. Can you please describe the elements of the Legal Framework for Peace?   
Q. Do you have any polling data on Colombian attitudes toward transitional justice?   
Q. How has civil society provided input into the agreement on victims? 
Q. How does the government intend to enhance the presence and strength of the state in 
conflict-affected regions?  
Q. How would you rate the rule of law in Colombia; poor, good or above the regional 
average?  
Q. What is the biggest impediment to improving the rule of law in Colombia?  
Q. What was the effect of the change in criminal code in 2005 on the development of the 
rule of law?  
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Appendix F  
BiH & Kosovo Interview Questions 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Q. How would you rate the performance of the ICTY in prosecuting individuals 
responsible for  
war crimes during the 1992-1995 conflict? (poor-average-good) 
Q. How did the arrests/convictions of Karadzic and Mladic influence Bosnian views of 
the ICTY?  
Q. As the ICTY completes its mandate, what is its greatest legacy in BiH? 
Q. Besides helping create the War Crimes Chamber (WCC), what other type of 
assistance, direct  
or indirect, did the ICTY provide judicial institutions in BiH?   
Q. Are there any international judges or prosecutors still working in the WCC or Special 
Department for War Crimes? How would you assess their contributions in assisting local 
institutions?  
Q. How many cases has the WCC completed? How many cases remain?  
Q. Assess the impact of the 2003 change in criminal code and criminal procedure code.  
Q. How does the governing structure of BiH help or hurt in the prosecution of war crimes 
and the development of a shared understanding of the rule of law? Has the application of 
criminal codes been harmonized between the state and entities?  
Q. Do you/your ministry/agency view transitional justice in BiH as internationally 
imposed or domestically developed and implemented?    
Q. Where is BiH today in meeting the prosecutorial goals of its National Strategy?  
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Q. Is the government of BiH or either of the two entities considering other mechanisms of 
transitional justice, such as a truth commission, reparations or amnesties?  
Q. How many individuals remain missing in BiH?  
Q. How would you rate the rule of law in BiH today? (poor-average-good) 
Q. What is the biggest obstacle to improving the rule of law?   
Q. What changes are being implemented or envisioned in the judicial branch/police force 
for eventual European Union membership? Has potential EU membership improved the 
rule of law?  
Q. How do you view the ethnic future of the state of BiH? Can Bosniaks, Serbs and 
Croats live together in a unified state?  
Q. How would you assess regional cooperation on war crimes and rule of law issues, 
such as corruption?  
Kosovo 
Q. How would you rate the performance of the ICTY in prosecuting individuals 
responsible for war crimes from the 1998-1999 conflict? (poor-average-good) 
Q. As the ICTY completes its mandate, what is its greatest legacy in Kosovo? 
Q. What type of assistance, direct or indirect, did the ICTY provide judicial institutions in 
Kosovo?   
Q. Are there any international judges or prosecutors still working on war crimes? How 
would you assess their contributions in assisting local institutions?  
Q. How many war crimes cases have been completed in Kosovo?   
Q. Why after the ICTY and prosecutions in Kosovo does Kosovo need a new war crimes 
court in The Hague? How will it be different?  
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Q. Is there any role for the Kosovars in operating this court?   
Q. Do you/your ministry/agency view transitional justice in Kosovo as internationally 
imposed or has there been sufficient domestic consultation?  
Q. Is the government of Kosovo considering other mechanisms of transitional justice, 
such as a truth commission (RECOM), reparations or amnesties?  
Q. How many individuals remain missing in Kosovo?  
Q. How would you rate the rule of law in Kosovo today? (poor-average-good) 
Q. What is the biggest obstacle to improving the rule of law?   
Q. What changes are being implemented or envisioned in the judicial branch/police force 
for eventual European Union membership? Has potential EU membership improved the 
rule of law?  
Q. How would you assess regional cooperation on war crimes and rule of law issues, 
such as corruption?  
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